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Abstract 
Expressions of prejudice against black people and, more specifically, against black 
immigrants are still prevalent in Portugal and in other western countries (Dickter & 
Newton, 2013; Santos, Oliveira, Rosário, Kumar & Brigadeiro, 2005). When people 
witness expressions of prejudice against others, they can decide to confront those 
expressions, that is, to express dissatisfaction with the prejudiced behavior to the person 
responsible for that behavior (Kaiser & Miller, 2004). Confronting prejudice has 
important positive consequences, decreasing future expressions of prejudice from the 
confronted person (Czopp, Monteith & Mark, 2006) and observers’ agreement with the 
biased expressions (Rasinsky & Czopp, 2010). The positive consequences of 
confrontation occur especially when the confronter is not the target of the prejudiced 
behavior (Gulker, Mark & Monteith, 2013).  
In the current thesis, we present a research project investigating social and 
individual factors influencing witnesses’ confrontations of bias. In seven studies, we 
approached the topic from three main perspectives: (a) the social norms regarding 
witnesses’ responses to bias; (b) observers’ attitudes regarding witnesses’ responses to 
bias; and (c) witnesses’ actual confrontational behavior. We showed that social factors 
emerging from the relationship between the person expressing bias and the witness of the 
biased remark influence norms and attitudes toward confrontational behaviors and 
witnesses’ actual responses to bias. More specifically, the results of the first empirical 
chapter suggest that when the person expressing bias has high power over the potential 
confronter, observers’ attitudes toward confrontational behaviors are less favorable; in 
the second empirical chapter, results suggest that witnesses tend to confront an ingroup 
member who expresses bias less strongly than an outgroup member who expresses bias; 
and in the final empirical chapter, we showed that it is more normative to confront a close 
person than a stranger. However, individual differences in egalitarian values and 
standards moderated the effects of these social factors in attitudes toward confrontations 
of bias and confrontational behaviors. People who have strong egalitarian values and 
standards have positive attitudes toward confrontation and confront expressions of bias 
even in unfavorable social conditions. With the present thesis, we contributed to the 
current knowledge about witnesses’ confrontations of bias, an interpersonal process that 
may fundamentally help reducing of public expressions of prejudice. 
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Resumo 
Expressões de preconceito contra pessoas negras e, mais especificamente, contra 
imigrantes negros ainda são prevalente em Portugal e noutros países ocidentais (Dickter 
& Newton, 2013; Santos, Oliveira, Rosário, Kumar & Brigadeiro, 2005). Quando uma 
pessoa testemunha expressões de preconceito contra outros grupos, esta pode decidir 
confrontar essas expressões, ou seja, exprimir desagrado com o comportamento 
preconceituoso diretamente à pessoa responsável pelo comportamento (Kaiser & Miller, 
2004). A confrontação de expressões de preconceito tem consequências positivas 
importantes, diminuindo expressões preconceituosas futuras por parte de quem é 
confrontado (Czopp, Monteith & Mark, 2006). Além disso, observar outros a confrontar 
expressões preconceituosas diminui o grau em que outras pessoas apoiam essas 
expressões (Rasinsky & Czopp, 2010). As consequências positivas da confrontação 
ocorrem especialmente quando o confrontador não é o alvo do comportamento 
preconceituoso (Gulker, Mark & Monteith, 2013).  
Na presente tese, apresentamos um projeto de investigação que teve como objetivo 
testar fatores sociais e pessoais que influenciam a confrontação de preconceito por parte 
das testemunhas. Em sete estudos, abordámos o tópico de três perspetivas distintas: (a) as 
normas sociais que governam as respostas das testemunhas a expressões de preconceito; 
(b) as atitudes de observadores face às respostas das testemunhas a expressões de 
preconceito; e (c) o próprio comportamento das testemunhas de preconceito. 
Demonstrámos que fatores sociais com origem na relação entre a pessoa que exprime 
preconceito e a testemunha influenciam as normas e atitudes face à confrontação e a 
própria resposta da testemunha face à expressão de preconceito. Mais especificamente, 
no primeiro capítulo empírico demonstrámos que quando a pessoa que exprime 
preconceito tem poder sobre o potencial confrontador, as atitudes dos observadores face 
à confrontação são menos favoráveis. No segundo capítulo empírico, os resultados 
mostraram que as testemunhas estão menos dispostas a confrontar um membro do 
endogrupo que exprime preconceito do que um membro do exogrupo que exprime 
preconceito. No último capítulo empírico, os resultados sugerem que é mais normativo 
confrontar uma pessoa próxima do que um desconhecido. No entanto, diferenças 
individuais na adesão e internalização de valores igualitários moderam os efeitos destas 
variáveis sociais nas atitudes face à confrontação e no próprio comportamento de 
confrontação. As pessoas que têm valores e padrões igualitários altos têm atitudes 
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positivas face à confrontação e confrontam expressões de preconceito mesmo em 
condições sociais menos favoráveis. Com a presente tese, contribuímos para o 
conhecimento científico sobre a confrontação de preconceito por parte das testemunhas, 
um processo interpessoal fundamental na redução de expressões públicas de preconceito. 
 
Palavras-chave: preconceito racial, confrontação, testemunhas, valores igualitários 
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Resumo Alargado 
Atualmente, muitas sociedades têm normas que condenam a discriminação de 
imigrantes e de membros de grupos racializados. É o caso da sociedade Portuguesa e da 
sociedade Americana, onde a discriminação com base na origem nacional ou étnica é 
condenada, formal e informalmente (Crandall, Eshleman, & O'Brien, 2002; Dovidio & 
Gaertner, 2000; Katz & Hass, 1988; Vala, Lopes & Lima, 2008; Vala & Pereira, 2012). 
No entanto, expressões de preconceito contra estes grupos continuam a ser prevalentes 
no dia-a-dia, principalmente contra pessoas negras (que sejam imigrantes ou não), quer 
em Portugal quer nos Estados-Unidos (Dickter & Newton, 2013; Santos, Oliveira, 
Rosário, Kumar & Brigadeiro, 2005; Swim, Hyers, Cohen, Fitzgerald, & Bylsma, 2003), 
com consequências negativas sérias para o bem-estar das pessoas que são alvo dessas 
expressões (Paradies et al., 2015; Schmitt, Branscombe, Postmes & Garcia, 2014).  
Uma das formas de reduzir estas expressões negativas contra pessoas com 
diferentes origens nacionais e étnicas é confrontando o preconceito. A confrontação pode 
ser definida como a expressão de desagrado com o comportamento preconceituoso, feita 
diretamente à pessoa que expressa preconceito (Kaiser & Miller, 2004; Shelton, 
Richeson, Salvatore, & Hill, 2006). De fato, estudos anteriores têm demonstrado que a 
confrontação é eficaz a reduzir futuras expressões de preconceito, a motivar a pessoa que 
é confrontada a compensar o alvo do seu preconceito e a diminuir a concordância de 
observadores da confrontação com expressões preconceituosas (Czopp, Monteith & 
Mark, 2006; Mallet & Wagner, 2011; Rasinski & Czopp, 2010). No entanto, a 
confrontação pode ser especialmente eficaz quando é realizada por testemunhas, isto é, 
por pessoas que não são, direta ou indiretamente alvo do comportamento preconceituoso. 
A maior eficácia da confrontação de preconceito por testemunhas deve-se a dois fatores. 
Por um lado, a confrontação por parte de testemunhas é mais surpreendente, levando a 
um maior processamento da mensagem; por outro lado, gera menor reações negativas não 
só por parte da pessoa que é confrontada mas também por parte de pessoas que observam 
a confrontação de preconceito (Gulker, Mark & Monteith, 2013; Rasinski & Czopp, 
2010). Importa, por isso, compreender os fatores que podem motivar ou desencorajar a 
confrontação de preconceito por parte de testemunhas.  
Na presente tese, procurámos integrar fatores sociais (com origem na relação entre 
a pessoa que expressa preconceito e a testemunha) e fatores individuais (relacionados 
com a adesão a valores igualitários) para compreender a confrontação de preconceito 
 Witnesses’ confrontation of racial bias  
 
 
viii 
 
racial por parte de testemunhas sob três perspetivas diferentes: (a) as normas sociais 
prescritivas relativas à confrontação de preconceito; (b) as atitudes dos observadores face 
às respostas de confrontação ou não confrontação; e (c) o comportamento de confrontação 
de preconceito.  
Os resultados de sete estudos, organizados nos três capítulos empíricos que 
compõem esta tese, sugerem que características da relação entre a pessoa que expressa 
preconceito e a pessoa que testemunha essa expressão de preconceito influenciam o 
comportamento, as atitudes e as normas sociais relativas à confrontação de preconceito. 
No entanto, a influência destes fatores sociais nas atitudes dos observadores e nas 
respostas de confrontação ou não confrontação das testemunhas dependem da adesão a 
valores igualitários. Pessoas (não-alvo de preconceito) que têm fortes valores igualitários 
apoiam mais a confrontação de preconceito e estão mais dispostas a confrontar 
preconceito, mesmo em condições sociais menos favoráveis à confrontação.  
No primeiro capítulo empírico, avaliámos as atitudes de observadores do grupo 
maioritário face à reação de uma testemunha que, no decorrer de uma entrevista de 
trabalho, confronta ou não confronta um comportamento preconceituoso do seu 
entrevistador. Manipulámos também o grau de poder do entrevistador face à testemunha 
de preconceito e, consequentemente, os custos da confrontação: confrontar podia ter 
baixos custos (porque a entrevista era para um emprego pouco desejado pela testemunha) 
ou altos custos (porque a entrevista era para um emprego muito desejado pela 
testemunha). As atitudes dos observadores face à confrontação foram geralmente mais 
positivas do que as atitudes face à não confrontação, replicando resultados anteriores que 
sugerem que as testemunhas que confrontam são melhor avaliadas que as testemunhas 
que não confrontam (Dickter, Kittel, & Gyurovski, 2012). A avaliação da confrontação 
foi especialmente positiva quando a confrontação tinha custos baixos. Quando confrontar 
implicava custos altos, o comportamento de confrontação foi mais positivamente avaliado 
do que o comportamento de não confrontação apenas pelos observadores com forte 
adesão a valores igualitários. Assim, no primeiro capítulo empírico demonstramos que os 
observadores com maior adesão a fatores igualitários são menos influenciados por fatores 
sociais relacionados com os custos da confrontação. 
No segundo capítulo empírico investigámos a influência da partilha de uma 
pertença grupal com a pessoa que exprime preconceito no grau em que testemunhas 
confrontam esse mesmo preconceito. Uma vez que comportamentos negativos realizados 
 Witnesses’ confrontation of racial bias  
 
 
ix 
 
por membros de um exogrupo tendem a ser mais atribuídos a disposições internas do que 
comportamentos negativos realizados por membros de um endogrupo (Hewstone, 1990; 
Petigrew, 1979), colocámos a hipótese que as testemunhas de preconceito iriam atribuir 
mais características tipicamente associadas a pessoas racistas a um membro de um 
exogrupo que faz um comentário preconceituoso do que a um membro do endogrupo que 
faz o mesmo comentário. Por sua vez, quanto mais se atribuem características racistas à 
pessoa que faz um comentário preconceituoso, mais forte deverá ser a confrontação. Os 
resultados apoiaram as duas hipóteses. No entanto, o efeito da pertença grupal na 
atribuição de características associadas a pessoas racistas foi moderado pelo grau em que 
os participantes tinham internalizado padrões igualitários, ou seja, o grau em que os 
participantes estavam motivados para responder sem preconceito (Plant & Devine, 1998, 
2009). Apenas os participantes menos motivados para responder sem preconceito 
atribuíram menos características preconceituosas e consequentemente confrontaram 
menos um membro de um endogrupo do que um membro de um exogrupo. Uma vez que 
as pessoas mais motivadas para responder sem preconceito são altamente responsivas a 
expressões de preconceito contra outros grupos, estas confrontaram a pessoa que 
expressou preconceito independentemente da sua pertença grupal. 
Por fim, no último capítulo empírico, analisámos a influência da relação entre a 
pessoa que faz um comentário preconceituoso e a testemunha desse comentário nas 
normas prescritivas que regem as respostas a expressões de preconceito. Em linha com o 
demonstrado no primeiro capítulo empírico, os resultados deste último capítulo empírico 
mostraram que a confrontação de preconceito é um comportamento valorizado 
socialmente. No entanto, a confrontação de preconceito foi vista como mais normativa 
quando a pessoa que expressa preconceito é alguém próximo (isto é, um amigo ou um 
familiar), comparativamente com quando a pessoa que expressa preconceito é um 
desconhecido. Expressões de preconceito por parte de pessoas próximas constituem uma 
maior ameaça à imagem de grupos altamente valorizados (grupos de amigos e família) 
do que expressões de preconceito de desconhecidos. A ameaça à imagem de um grupo 
altamente valorizado, por sua vez, legitima comportamentos de confrontação por parte 
das testemunhas de preconceito, tornando mais normativo confrontar.  
Os resultados da presente tese contribuem de forma importante para a literatura 
sobre a confrontação de preconceito racial. A confrontação de preconceito por parte de 
testemunhas tem sido pouco estudada na literatura, uma vez que estudos anteriores têm-
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se focado principalmente nas respostas de alvos de preconceito. Além disso, investigámos 
fatores que não tinham sido ainda explorados nos estudos sobre confrontação, tais como 
a partilha de uma pertença grupal e a ameaça à imagem de um grupo altamente valorizado. 
Por fim, mostrámos que a influência de fatores sociais (com origem na relação entre a 
pessoa que expressa preconceito e a testemunha desse preconceito) nas atitudes e 
comportamentos de confrontação depende da adesão a valores igualitários por parte dos 
observadores e das testemunhas de preconceito. Desta forma, os nossos resultados 
contribuem diretamente para o conhecimento científico sobre as respostas de testemunhas 
de preconceito, comportamentos interpessoais que, como referido, são processos 
fundamentais na redução ou manutenção de expressões de preconceito racial. 
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Imagine that you hear someone who shares your nationality and/or ethnicity making 
a prejudiced comment against immigrants or people perceived to be from a different 
ethnicity. You are aware that social norms in the country condemn expressions of 
prejudice against those groups, and it is likely that you have also internalized those norms 
to some extent. Would you confront the person, expressing your disagreement to him or 
her? Or would you ignore the expression of prejudice? And what do you think other 
people in the same situation should do? Would you support another person’s decision to 
confront? Because the situation is described in a rather vague manner, your answer to the 
above questions probably is “it depends”. It may depend on who the person who made 
the comment is, that is, on social factors; but also on your own personal beliefs, that is, 
on individual differences in value-based motivations.  
In the present thesis, we investigated social and individual factors that may 
influence how witnesses’ respond to racial bias and how observers’ evaluate witnesses’ 
responses to prejudice. We focused on expressions of prejudice against Black people and, 
more specifically, against Black immigrants, because they are one of the groups that are 
more frequently targeted by everyday discrimination in Portugal and the US, the countries 
where this research was conducted (Dickter & Newton, 2013; Santos, Oliveira, Rosário, 
Kumar & Brigadeiro, 2005). However, even though our studies were focused on Black 
people and on Black immigrants, they contribute to the understanding of the 
psychological processes underlying high-status group members’ responses to prejudice 
targeting any low-status groups who are simultaneously protected by egalitarian norms 
and the targets of prejudice. 
We will next summarize research investigating the prevalence of expressions of 
bias against Black people in Portugal and in the US. We will then review past work 
regarding confrontations of bias and present the hypotheses of the current thesis, as well 
as its chapters’ outline.  
 
Expressions of prejudice in Portugal and in the US 
Both in Portugal and in the United States, egalitarian norms condemn expressions 
of prejudice toward Black people, such as immigrants or descendants of immigrants from 
African countries living in Portugal (e.g., Vala, Brito & Lopes, 1999/2015; Vala, Lopes 
& Lima, 2008; Vala & Pereira, 2012) or African-Americans in the United States (e.g., 
Crandall, Eshleman, & O'Brien, 2002; Dovidio & Gaertner, 2000; Katz & Hass, 1988; 
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Plant & Devine, 1998). In addition to being informally condemn, discrimination based on 
race, skin color, nationality or ethnic origin is formally punished by the Portuguese law 
since 19991 (complementing the 13th chapter of the Portuguese Constitution of 1974 also 
prohibiting any type of discrimination based on origin, sex, ‘race’, language religion, 
political or ideological beliefs, education, economic position, social class or sexual 
orientation), while several Federal Laws in the US also prohibit discrimination based on 
a person's national origin, race, color, religion, disability, sex, and familial status2. In an 
index evaluating countries’ policies to integrate migrants, including anti-discrimination 
policies, Portugal is described as having “favorable [anti-discrimination] laws, 
enforcement mechanisms and equality policies” but it is also suggested that Portugal’s 
“relatively recent laws and policies may be too poorly known or resourced to get potential 
victims to regularly report discrimination.” According to the same index, in the US 
“[people] enjoy the strongest laws to protect them against discrimination” (MIPEX - 
Huddleston, Bilgili, Joki, & Vankova, 2015).  
However, despite the laws, policies and norms condemning prejudiced behaviors, 
Black people in both countries still report – in surveys and interviews – facing everyday 
racism – that is, they still experience being the target of another person’s prejudice and 
discrimination in mundane social interactions (Essed, 1991). As much as 29% of a sample 
of people from sub-Saharan African countries living in Portugal3 reported being 
discriminated against due to their ethnicity or immigrant status at least once in the last 
year, in domains such as work, housing and public services (European Union Agency for 
Fundamental Rights, 2009). Similarly, in a survey about immigrants’ experiences in 
Portugal, immigrants from Cape Verde and Guinea-Bissau reported having been the 
target of harassment (e.g., being insulted or threatened) in the streets more often than 
immigrants from other national origins, such as Brazil and Ukraine. In fact, 38% of the 
respondents from both countries reported having been harassed on the street at least once 
in the last year. Of these, more than one quarter reported having been publicly harassed 
                                                          
1 Portugal/Law 134/99 (28.08.1999) 
2 The United States Department of Justice – http://www.justice.gov/crt/federal-protections-against-
national-origin-discrimination-1#ed 
3 Immigrants from African countries constitute about 25% of the total population of immigrants legally 
residing in the country. They are mainly from Portuguese-speaking countries such as Cape-Verde, Angola 
and Guinea-Bissau (SEF, 2014). 
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five or more times in the last year (Santos, et al., 2005).4 A more recent survey also found 
that discrimination often occurs in public places, such as public transports, stores or cafes 
and restaurants (Mendes & Candeias, 2013). Non-reporting the experiences of 
discrimination (at the place they occurred or to a competent authority) is still, by far, the 
most common behavior of immigrants and ethnic minorities in Portugal (European Union 
Agency for Fundamental Rights, 2009; Peixe et al., 2008). Even so, in 2014 the 
Portuguese Committee for equality and against racial discrimination [Comissão para a 
Igualdade e Contra a Discriminação Racial] registered 60 complains of racial 
discrimination, the majority of which were made by people who self-identified as Black 
(CICDR - ACIME/ACIDI/ACM, 2016). 
Similarly, studies conducted in the United States show that racially biased remarks 
tend to target Black people more often than other racial groups (Dickter & Newton, 2013) 
and that Black people report having to deal with other people’s prejudice frequently. For 
instance, in a sample of African-American undergraduate students, only 11% reported 
never having heard negative remarks about Black people on campus (D'Augelli, & 
Hershberger, 1993). In a recent poll, 45% of Black interviewees reported being the target 
of racial discrimination at least once a month (CNN/ORC, 2015). African-American 
undergraduate students reported on average 1.24 events (SD = 1.45) in the course of two 
weeks that they considered probably or definitely caused by prejudice. Of these, about 
one quarter were verbal expressions of prejudice, and about one third occurred in a public 
or institutional setting (Swim, Hyers, Cohen, Fitzgerald, & Bylsma, 2003). Likewise, 
interviews with Black middle-class people suggest that verbal expressions of prejudice 
constitute 25% of the reported discriminatory events occurring on the street, and 12% of 
the reported discriminatory events occurring on public places like shops or restaurants 
(Feagin, 1991; however, like in the above cited study of Swim et al., 2003, these 
                                                          
4 Brazilians and Ukrainians reported being more discriminated against in other areas, such as in access to 
credit and being promoted at work. It should be noted that Mendes and Candeias (2013) survey of the 
immigrant population residing in the Oeiras municipality found that Brazilians reported being the most 
discriminated against: 67% had experienced discrimination at least once since they arrived (compared 
with 56% of the Angolans, 36% of the Cape Verdeans and 46% of nationals from other Portuguese-
speaking African Countries). However, Mendes and Candeias (2013) did not access how frequently those 
experiences occurred. In addition, while Santos and colleagues (2005) asked participants about 
experiences with several behaviors that may be considered discrimination, Mendes and Candeias (2013) 
asked participants a single question about experiences with “discrimination,” even though what 
constitutes discrimination may vary considerably among respondents. Finally, it should be highlighted 
that a considerable amount of the Brazilian population in Portugal can be categorized as Black, that is, as 
having an African origin (European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights, 2009). 
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percentages are based on a rather small number of events). It should be noted that the 
prevalence of these comments is likely higher, because the cited studies did not include 
expressions of bias that occurred in absence of members of the target group. In a more 
recent study, a mixed sample of White and non-White students reported witnessing an 
average of almost nine comments a week targeting other ethnic groups (Dickter & 
Newton, 2013). 
Verbal expressions of prejudice are typically made by members of high-status 
groups about a member of low-status or traditionally disadvantaged group (Dickter, 2012; 
Dickter & Newton, 2013; Ayres, Friedman, & Leaper, 2009; Swim et al, 2003)5. Some 
groups tend to witness more prejudiced comments made by familiar people than 
prejudiced comments made by strangers. For instance, when women were asked to recall 
a time when they heard a sexist remark, about 20% of the described comments were made 
by strangers, while about 70% of the comments were made by a familiar person. Of this, 
about 60% were made by a person of the same status, such as a friend, a peer, or a co-
worker (Ayres, et al, 2009). Similarly, studies using recall and diary methodology showed 
that most racially biased comments witnessed by college students (who were not the 
targets of that racial prejudice) were made by friends or acquaintances (Dickter & 
Newton, 2013; it should be noted, however, that Black people report more frequently 
being the target of prejudiced behaviors from strangers than from friends or 
acquaintances; Swim et al., 2003). These studies emphasize the importance of studying 
people’s responses to biased comments made not only by strangers (as has been done 
more frequently in the past; e.g., Shelton & Stewart, 2004; Swim & Hyers, 1999; 
Woodzicka & LaFrance, 2001) but also by familiar people, as those episodes may be 
more frequent or salient. 
Verbal expressions of prejudice perpetuate negative feelings and beliefs against the 
targeted groups (Blanchard, Crandall, Brigham, & Vaughn, 1994; Blanchard, Lilly, & 
Vaughn, 1991). Importantly, being the target of discrimination has, serious negative 
consequences for members of the targeted groups, decreasing their physical and mental 
health and wellbeing (for recent meta-analysis, see Paradies et al., 2015; Pascoe & 
Richman, 2009; Schmitt, Branscombe, Postmes & Garcia, 2014; for a study specifically 
                                                          
5 Potentially biased action performed by a member of a dominant group may also be more likely to be 
detected and reported as prejudiced because members of dominant groups constitute the prototype of 
perpetrators of prejudice (Inman & Baron, 1996). 
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investigating the relation between experiences of discrimination and the well-being of 
immigrant adolescents residing in Portugal see Neto, 2001; 2006) Given these negative 
consequences, it is fundamental to investigate possible factors that facilitate or inhibit 
expressions of prejudice targeting racialized groups (that is, groups whose boundaries are 
defined by phenotypical characteristics commonly associated with “races;” Cabecinhas, 
2002). One of the strategies may be to directly confront people expressing prejudice. 
 
Confrontation: Addressing expressions of prejudice 
Since expressions of prejudice are still prevalent today, people may face the 
decision of how to respond to those expressions, both if they are its targets or witnesses. 
People must choose whether to show agreement, to ignore the expression of prejudice or 
to confront prejudice, that is to “verbally or nonverbally expressing one’s dissatisfaction 
with prejudicial and discriminatory treatment to the person who is responsible for the 
remark or behavior” (Shelton, Richeson, Salvatore, & Hill, 2006, p. 67; see Kaiser & 
Miller, 2004, for a similar definition)6. This definition allows multiple signals of 
disagreement to be considered confrontation of prejudice, as long as they are expressed 
directly to the person being biased. Thus, it highlights that confrontations can have 
different degrees of assertiveness, ranging from non-verbal expressions, such as facial 
expressions denoting disgust, to explicit, verbal disagreement with the comment (see, for 
example, Hyers, 2007; Shelton & Stewart, 2004; Swim & Hyers, 1999; Woodzicka & 
LaFrance, 2001).  
Confrontations of bias address a socially unfair treatment and can be motivated by 
individuals’ desire to promote egalitarian values. People who are confronted about their 
bias tend to refrain from expressing prejudice in the future (Czopp, Monteith & Mark, 
2006). In addition, after being confronted with an accusation of prejudice, people may 
engage in efforts to mend their own self-image as an unprejudiced person and to repair 
the relationship with the confronter (efforts that are effective in increasing mutual liking; 
                                                          
6 It is also pertinent to distinguish between confrontation of prejudice and attributions to discrimination. 
Even though they may sometimes overlap, attributions of discrimination do not always constitute 
confrontations of prejudice. Attributions to discrimination requires perceiving discrimination as the cause 
of an outcome and can be done publicly (to the person responsible for that outcome or to other people) or 
privately (see Kaiser & Miller, 2001; 2003; Garcia, Reser, Amo, Redersdorff & Branscombe, 2005). 
Confrontations of prejudice require perceiving a behavior, regardless of its outcomes, as motivated by 
prejudice, and that dissatisfaction with that prejudiced behavior is expressed directly to the person 
responsible for the behavior (see Kaiser, Hagiwara, Malahy, & Wilkins, 2009; Shelton et al., 2006). 
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Mallett & Wagner, 2011), especially if they are internally or externally motivated to 
respond without prejudice (Plant & Devine, 1998, 2009). Although some evidence 
suggests that both confronters who belong to the group target by the prejudiced behavior 
(henceforth called “targets”) and confronters who do not belong to that group (henceforth 
called “witnesses”) are effective in reducing bias (Czopp et al., 2006), other studies 
support the idea that witnesses’ confrontations may be more persuasive than target 
confrontations (Czopp & Monteith, 2003; Drury & Kaiser, 2014; Gulker, Mark & 
Monteith, 2013; Rasinski & Czopp, 2010). The higher effectiveness of witnesses’ 
confrontation (compared to targets’ confrontation) may be due to it being more surprising. 
People tend to process more a message that is inconsistent with the source’s self or group 
interest, which may increase the persuasiveness of that message (Petty, Fleming, Priester, 
& Feinstein, 2001). Accordingly, in Gulker et al. (2013) study, participants who were 
confronted about their own prejudice against Black people perceived the confrontation to 
be more unexpected when the confronter was White (vs. Black) and perceived the White 
confronter less as a complainer (also consistent with findings showing that targets who 
act against their self-interest tend to be evaluated more positively; Eagly, Wood, & 
Chaiken, 1978). The extent the confrontation was evaluated as surprising and evaluations 
of the confronter predicted, in turn, the extent people were willing to acknowledge their 
own prejudice (Gulker, et al., 2013). Non-target confrontations are also more effective in 
decreasing the agreement of people who watch witnesses confront (henceforth called 
observers) with a biased behavior and in increasing perceptions of the confronted person 
as prejudiced (Rasinski & Czopp, 2010).  
Despite the potential of confrontation to reduce expressions of prejudice (Czopp et 
al., 2006), only recently researchers have started to focus on the psychological 
mechanisms explaining targets and witnesses’ responses to bias (for a recent special issue 
on the topic, see Becker, Zawadzki, & Shields, 2014). Studies specifically focusing on 
factors predicting witnesses’ responses to expressions of prejudice are even sparser, 
despite the important practically and theoretically implications of the topic. Besides 
informing practices aiming to reduce prejudice, studying witnesses’ confrontations of 
bias is theoretically interesting, because the behavior lays in the intersection between 
interpersonal, intragroup and intergroup processes. Indeed, witnesses’ confrontations of 
prejudice are interpersonal interactions, often between high-status group members 
regarding low-status group members (Dickter, 2012; Dickter & Newton, 2013; Ayres, et 
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al., 2009; Swim et al, 2003). Thus, confronting prejudice not only requires managing 
interpersonal relations but also one’s position as a member of a dominant group who 
challenges fellow ingroup members on behalf of outgroup members.  
 
Investigating witnesses’ confrontations of bias 
It is possible to investigate witnesses’ confrontations of prejudice from three main 
perspectives. The first perspective considers how individuals’ evaluate witnesses’ 
responses to prejudice. It is generally represented by the following question: do 
observers’ who see a witness confront prejudice evaluate the behavior positively? The 
second perspective is focused on how society globally perceives responses to prejudice: 
is witnesses’ confrontation of bias a prescriptively normative behavior, that is, a behavior 
that is valued, approved and perceived as desirable by society (Cialdini, Reno & Kallgren, 
1990; Dubois, 2003)? Finally, the third perspective pertains how people react when they 
witness prejudice toward a low-status group – to what extend do they confront or, 
alternatively ignore those expressions? These perspectives should not be seen as opposed, 
but as complementary, because attitudes, social norms and behaviors likely have a 
reciprocal relation with one another (e.g., Ajzen, 1991; Bem, 1972; Cialdini, Kallgren & 
Reno, 1991; Fazio, 1990).  
In the present thesis, we aimed to contribute to the current understanding of 
witnesses’ responses to bias by integrating social factors (emerging from the interpersonal 
relationship between the person expressing prejudice and the witness of bias) and 
individual factors (related to individual differences in egalitarian values) in predicting not 
only individual attitudes regarding witnesses’ confrontation of bias, but also the extent 
witnesses’ are actually willing to confront prejudice. As Doise (1980; 1986) highlighted, 
any social complex behavior is likely the product of the influence of multiple factors, of 
the same and of different levels of analysis: individual factors, relationships at the 
interpersonal and intergroup levels, and societal norms, all potentially influence people’s 
attitudes and social behaviors. Witnesses’ confrontation of bias should be no exception. 
In order to fully understand why and when witnesses confront prejudice, and how 
confrontations of prejudice are evaluated, it is necessary to integrate factors at different, 
complementary levels of analysis.  
Thus, in the current dissertation, we relied on social and individual factors 
previously identified by research on confrontation of bias or, more broadly, in intergroup 
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research, and integrated them to predict attitudes and behavior regarding witnesses’ 
responses to expressions of prejudice. We also investigated the effect of social factors in 
predicting prescriptive norms regarding witnesses’ confrontation of bias. However, 
because prescriptive norms reflect beliefs shared by a social group, rather than beliefs of 
a given individual, about a behavior, we did not expect differences in value-based 
motivations to be important predictors of prescriptive norms. We will next briefly 
summarize research regarding each of the variables included in our studies, starting with 
the social factors and later presenting the individual factors. 
 
Social factors  
One of the most powerful predictors of targets’ and witnesses’ confrontations of 
bias is the relationship between the potential confronter and the person expressing bias. 
People usually report being more willing to confront a close person than a stranger (Ayres, 
et al., 2009; CNN/ORC, 2015). Different reasons can account for this difference. On one 
hand, people tend to feel more comfortable discussing emotionally charged topic with 
close people than with strangers (Clark & Taraban, 1991) and reactions from a close 
person who is confronted may be more predictable and less threatening, compared with 
the reactions of a stranger, making confrontation less costly (as suggested by Ayres, et 
al., 2009). On the other hand, it is expectable that witnesses believe it is more 
prescriptively normative to confront a close person than a stranger. Often, social norms 
suggest that “people should mind their own business” (e.g., Schwartz, 1973), and 
witnesses may refrain to confront because they feel they are not directly implicated in the 
prejudiced comment.  
However, behaviors that benefit an ingroup tend to be perceived as socially 
appropriate and justified (Pereira, Vala, & Leyens, 2009; Ramos, Pereira & Vala, 2016), 
especially when those actions benefits a group that is highly valued (Kaiser, et al, 2009). 
It is likely that people perceive they have more social legitimacy to act when they feel 
that the image of a highly-valued ingroup is threatened. Because expressions of prejudice 
tend to be perceived as an immoral behavior (Dickter, Kittel, & Gyurovski, 2012; Effron, 
Miller, & Monin, 2012; Rutland, Killen & Abrams, 2010), ingroup members who express 
prejudice should threaten the image of the ingroup (Brambilla, Sacchi, Pagliaro, & 
Ellemers, 2013). A friend who expresses bias should threaten the image of a highly-
valued group (i.e., the group of friends; Lickel, et al, 2000) more than a stranger who 
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expresses bias; and the more the image of a highly-valued ingroup is threatened the more 
people may perceive it is prescriptively normative to confront bias, to the extent that 
confronting would restore the ingroup image. 
The extent the person expressing prejudice has power (i.e., the ability of control 
resources or outcomes of another individual; Keltner, Gruenfeld, & Anderson, 2003) over 
the potential confronter seems to be an important predictor of both target and witnesses’ 
responses to prejudice. Women are less likely to confront sexism if the person expressing 
bias is someone who has power over them (e.g., if that person is a professor or a boss), 
compared with when the person has an equal status (e.g., is a friend or a co-worker; Ayres 
et al., 2009), presumably because confronting a person who has power over oneself 
implies potential higher costs. Similarly, women interviewing for a job were less likely 
to confront a sexist interviewer when confronting implied higher costs (i.e., they were 
being interviewed for a highly desirable job) than when confronting implied lower costs 
(i.e., the interview was for an undesirable job; Shelton & Stewart, 2004). Indeed, the 
perceived costs (vs. benefits) of confronting prejudice influence both targets’ and 
witnesses’ decision to confront (Ashburn-Nardo, Blanchar, Petersson, Morris, & 
Goodwin, 2014; Good, Moss-Racusin & Sanchez, 2012; Kaiser & Miller, 2004). Like 
targets, witnesses of prejudice are less willing to confront a boss than a co-worker, both 
because they feel less responsible to confront and because they anticipate more negative 
consequences of confronting someone who has power over them (Ashburn-Nardo, et al., 
2014).  
Besides influencing potential confronters’ responses to prejudice, the costs of 
confronting may also influence observers’ evaluations of those responses. Past research 
has shown that prosocial actions are evaluated less positively when those actions imply 
higher personal risks (Holahan, 1977; Piliavin, Dovidio, Gaertner, & Clark, 1981). 
Because witnesses’ confrontational behaviors can be conceptualized as prosocial 
behaviors (as they benefit a person other than the self; Penner, Dovidio, Piliavin, & 
Schroeder, 2005), the costs of confronting may reduce the perceived appropriateness of a 
confrontational behavior and increase the acceptability of a non-confrontational behavior.  
However, we were not aware of any research investigating whether this is the case.  
Decisions to confront or not confront may also be influenced by the extent people 
perceive the person expressing prejudice as an ingroup member or an outgroup member. 
People generally tend to perceive ingroup members as more moral, believing them to be 
 Witnesses’ confrontation of racial bias  
 
 
12 
 
more trustworthy and honest (Brewer, 1999; Hewstone, Rubin, & Willis, 2002; Mullen, 
Brown, & Smith, 1992). Moreover, negative behaviors tend to be attributed less to 
dispositions of a person when that person is an ingroup member, compared with when 
that person is an outgroup member (Hewstone, 1990; Pettigrew, 1979; Weber, 1994; see 
also research on the linguist intergroup bias, Maass, Salvi, Arcuri, & Semin, 1989). These 
findings suggest that the group membership of the person expressing prejudice (i.e., 
whether that person is an ingroup or an outgroup member) may alter the way he or she is 
perceived by witnesses: they may attribute characteristics associated with racism (see 
Sommers & Norton, 2006) more strongly to an outgroup member who expresses bias than 
an ingroup member who performs the same behavior.  
Because confrontations of prejudice are predicted by the extent a comment is 
perceived to reveal internal biases of the actor who makes the comment (Lee, Soto, Swim, 
& Bernstein, 2012), the attribution of characteristics associated with racism to a person 
expressing bias may, in turn, predict witnesses’ willingness to confront. While the group 
membership of the person expressing prejudice may have been a factor influencing 
witnesses’ reactions to expressions of prejudice in previous studies (e.g., in studies using 
a diary methodology where participants report hearing prejudiced comments from people 
from different groups; Dickter & Newton, 2013), so far no research has considered 
whether a shared group membership with the person expressing bias reduces the extent 
witnesses attribute prejudice-related characteristics to him or her and, consequently, the 
extent they are willing to confront.  
 
Individual factors  
At least in societies with anti-prejudice norms, confrontations of bias by witnesses 
tend to be perceived in a positive light (Dickter, et al, 2012), because they promote 
egalitarian values and address a behavior that is considered socially unjust. However, 
people differ in the extent they adhere to and have internalized egalitarian values (Plant 
& Devine, 1998, 2009; Schwartz, 1992; Schwartz et al., 2012). These individual 
differences likely predict observers’ evaluations of responses to prejudice and witnesses’ 
actual responses to prejudice.  
Values can be defined as beliefs that guide not only a person’s own actions but also 
the evaluation of other people’s behaviors across situations (Schwartz, 1992). According 
to the theory of basic human values (Schwartz, 1992; Schwartz, et al., 2012), it is possible 
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to identify a set of values that is shared across cultures; however, people vary on how 
much they prioritize each value in that set. The theory of basic human values has been 
tested by cross-cultural research in more than 80 countries from different continents, 
including Portugal and the US, with results asserting its comprehensiveness and 
applicability (Schwartz, 2012; Schwartz, et al., 2001).  
One of the proposed values of the theory of basic human values that is of special 
interest in the present thesis is the value of universalism (Schwartz, 1992; Schwartz et al., 
2012). Universalism is defined as a motivation to understand, appreciate, tolerate, and 
protect all people and nature. Universalism is closely and positively related to 
benevolence (together, they constitute the supra-ordinate value of self-transcendence). 
However, while benevolence is defined as a motivation to protect and enhance the welfare 
of close-people, universalism is defined as a concern about all people, regardless of their 
relationship with the self (Schwartz, 1992; 2012). Accordingly, although both 
universalism and benevolence predict prosocial behaviors (Caprara, Alessandri & 
Eisenberg, 2012; Caprara & Steca, 2007), universalism is, conceptually, a better predictor 
of behaviors that benefit groups of people or people more distant from the self (Schwartz, 
2010). Furthermore, universalism is usually more strongly (negatively) related to 
measures of prejudice and social dominance than benevolence (Cohrs, Moschner, Maes 
& Kielmann, 2005; Duriez & Van Hiel, 2002; Feather & McKee, 2008), and is an 
important predictor of attitudes toward immigrants and racialized groups (Peral & Ramos, 
2014; Ramos, 2011; Ramos, Pereira & Vala, 2016). 
Universalism can be further specified into three lower-order values motivations: 
universalism-nature, a motivation to preserve the natural environment; universalism-
tolerance, a motivation to accept and understand people who are different from oneself; 
and universalism-concern, that represents a commitment to fight for equality and social 
justice (Schwartz et al., 2012). Universalism-concern is the value that is more closely 
related to attitudes toward other groups that are in a disadvantaged position in society. 
For instance, universalism-concern predicts attitudes toward homosexuals better than 
universalism-nature, and attitudes toward economic inequality better than universalism-
tolerance (Schwartz et al., 2012). Universalism-concern is also more closely related to 
behaviors supporting a group fighting for equality than universalism-nature or 
universalism-tolerance (Schwartz & Butenko, 2014).  
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The degree to which observers endorse universalism-concern should determine 
their evaluations of witnesses’ responses to bias, because values influence not only 
individuals’ behaviors, but also their attitudes toward other people’s behaviors (Homer & 
Kahle, 1988; Schwartz, 1992). Individuals who prioritize universalism-concern relatively 
to other values may evaluate witnesses’ confrontations of prejudice more positively, as 
confrontations of prejudice directly affirm egalitarian values. However, no research had 
investigated this possibility. 
Because values express individuals’ goals and motivational concerns (Schwartz, 
1992), it is possible to assess the extent people have internalized egalitarian values 
through their internal motivation to act without prejudice towards other people (Plant & 
Devine, 1998, 2009). Plant and Devine (1998) distinguish between two sources of 
motivation to respond without prejudice: an internal motivation to respond without 
prejudice, reflecting the extent non-prejudiced beliefs are important personal standards of 
conduct; and an external motivation to respond without prejudice, which reflects 
individuals’ motivation to control their own prejudiced responses due to normative 
concerns and fear of social sanctions (Devine, Plant, Amodio, Harmon-Jones, & Vance, 
2002; Plant & Devine, 1998, 2009).  
Individuals who are internally motivated to respond without prejudice tend to act 
unbiasedly, expressing low levels of prejudice when answering to explicit measures of 
prejudice privately and publicly. A person who is externally, but not internally motivated 
to respond without prejudice, in contrast, tend to only act unbiased in the presence of 
others who may criticize their behavior (Plant & Devine, 1998; Plant, Devine & Brazy, 
2003). While external motivation to respond without prejudice does not influence 
responses in explicit measures of prejudice for people who are internally motivated to 
respond without prejudice (Plant et al., 2003), the same is not true for responses that are 
harder to control, such as responses in implicit measures of prejudice. In such measures, 
individuals high in internal and low in external motivation to respond without prejudice 
tend to show lower levels of prejudice than those who are high both in internal and in 
external motivation and those who are not internally motivated to respond without 
prejudice (Devine et al., 2002). 
Importantly, internal motivation to respond without prejudice has also been shown 
to predict people’s distress after witnessing another person expressing bias. Participants 
higher in internal motivation to respond without prejudice revealed more physiological 
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reactions linked with negative affect and reported more negative emotions when watching 
an ingroup member expressing biased attitudes, compared with participants lower in that 
motivation. External motivation to respond without prejudice, on the contrary, was 
unrelated to both measures of negative affect (Schmader, Croft, Scarnier, Lickel, & 
Mendes, 2012). These results are not surprising, as external motivation to respond without 
prejudice does not reflect the internalization of egalitarian values, which constitute 
standards against which the behavior of others can be evaluated. Instead, it captures 
people’s willingness to regulate their own bias according to an external norm or standard 
(Plant & Devine, 1998, 2009; Schmader, et al., 2012).  
Based on Schmader et al. (2012) results, we hypothesized that people who are more 
internally motivated to respond without prejudice would be more willing to confront a 
person expressing prejudice because the stronger negative feelings they experience after 
witnessing another person expressing bias would transcend group membership. Because 
they have internalized strong egalitarian standards, people higher in internal motivation 
to respond without prejudice are more motivated to control their own prejudice toward 
other groups (Monteith, 1993; Plant & Devine, 1998); similarly, they may also be more 
motivated to reduce other people’s prejudiced behavior. Past research on witnesses’ 
confrontation of bias has focused on differences in attitudes toward different groups who 
are the target of prejudice, either showing that participants who have more favorable 
attitudes toward those groups confront prejudice more or showing a null relationship 
between attitudes and confrontation of prejudice (Dickter, 2012; Dickter & Newton, 
2013). However, because internal motivation to respond without prejudice was shown to 
be both a predictor of explicit and implicit attitudes toward other groups (Devine et al., 
2002) and, especially important, a predictor of reactions to other people’s prejudice 
(Schmader et al., 2012), it may be a particularly relevant individual factor influencing 
witnesses’ direct responses to a person expressing prejudice.  
 
In summary, many factors (social, individual, and also societal) should influence 
people’s behaviors and attitudes in any given situation (Doise, 1980, 1986). While 
previous research has examined several factors influencing both observers’ attitudes 
toward confrontations of prejudice and targets’ and witnesses’ actual responses to 
prejudice, to our knowledge no studies have investigated the role of witnesses’ and 
observers’ endorsement and internalization of egalitarian values on those processes. 
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Furthermore, no studies have integrated social factors emerging from the relationship 
between the person expressing bias and the potential confronter with such value-based 
individual differences. Therefore, one of the contributions of the present thesis is the 
integration of factors from different levels of analysis to contribute to the understanding 
of witnesses’ responses to expressions of prejudice and of observers’ evaluations of those 
responses.   
 
Overview of the current thesis 
The current thesis investigated social and individual factors influencing witnesses’ 
confrontation of bias7 from three distinct perspectives: a) observers’ attitudes toward 
witnesses’ confrontation (and non-confrontation) of bias; b) witnesses’ actual 
confrontation of bias; and c) the extend confrontation is perceived to be prescriptively 
normative. More specifically, it was hypothesized that characteristics of the relationship 
between the potential confronter and the person expressing bias would predict each of the 
three outcomes (norms and attitudes regarding confrontation of bias, and behavioral 
responses to bias). We hypothesized that the influence of variables related with the 
relationship between the potential confronter and the person expressing bias on attitudes 
toward responses to bias and actual responses to bias would depend on witnesses’ and 
observers’ endorsement and internalization of egalitarian values, but we expected 
prescriptive norms to be relatively  unaffected by individual differences in value-based 
motivations, because prescriptive norms reflect rules and standards shared by members 
of social groups (Cialdini et al., 1991; Cialdini & Trost, 1998). 
The proposed relations between the social and individual variables investigated in 
this dissertation are represented in Figure 1. It should be noted that although it is likely 
that norms, attitudes and behavior influence one another, we did not test the actual 
relationship among these variables. For that reason, we represented the relation among 
                                                          
7 Even though in the current introduction we use both the terms “bias” and “prejudice”, in the empirical 
chapters of this thesis we opted to use the term “expression of bias” instead of “expression of prejudice” or 
“expression of stereotypes.” While prejudice can be defined as negative affect toward people due to their 
membership in that group (Brown & Lepore, 1996) and stereotypes can be defined as shared beliefs about 
the characteristics that are perceived to be true of members of particular social groups (Stangor, 1996), bias 
is a more encompassing term that may include both expressions of prejudice and of stereotypes (Dovidio 
& Gaertner, 2010). Indeed, expressions of bias against other groups often include a mix of expressions of 
negative affect and negative beliefs about the characteristics of those groups. 
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prescriptive normativity of confrontation, attitudes toward confrontation, and actual 
confrontation of prejudiced with two-way arrows and dashed lines.  
 
Figure 1. Proposed relations between social and individual factors and the normativity 
of witnesses’ confrontation of prejudice, attitudes toward witnesses’ confrontation of 
prejudice and actual confrontations of prejudice by witnesses. 
 
To test the hypothesized relations among these variables, seven studies were 
conducted. These studies are presented in three empirical chapters, written as individual 
papers. 
In Chapter II, we showed that witnesses’ confrontations of bias are generally more 
positively evaluated than non-confrontations of bias, in line in previous research (Dickter, 
et al., 2012). This was specially the case when the relation between the potential 
confronter and the person expressing bias implied that confronting would have low costs 
(i.e., the person expressing bias was an interviewer for a job the confronter does not need). 
However, we further contributed to the literature by showing that when confronting 
would entail high costs (i.e., the actor expressing bias was an interviewer for a job the 
confronter really needs), confronting was not evaluated as a more appropriate behavior 
than non-confronting (Study 1, Chapter II). We argue that when the actor expressing bias 
was an interviewer for a needed job, the personal costs of confronting (i.e., losing a much 
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needed job opportunity) and the social costs of not confronting (i.e., not addressing an 
unfair behavior) were in conflict, increasing the ambiguity of the appropriateness of 
different responses to bias. In more ambiguous situations, individual factors become 
important determinants of evaluations of others’ behaviors (Mischel, 1973; Snyder & 
Ickes, 1985). Therefore, in Study 2 of Chapter II, we focused on the high cost situation. 
Results showed that attitudes toward responses to bias depend on individuals’ 
endorsement of universalism-concern, that is, on the extent participants are committed to 
fight for equality and social justice (Schwartz et al., 2012). In the high cost situation, only 
participants who endorse universalism-concern more strongly evaluated confrontation of 
bias as more appropriate than non-confrontation. 
In Chapter III, we investigated the effect of a shared group membership with the 
person expressing bias in witnesses’ willingness to confront bias, a factor previously 
overlooked in the confrontation literature. Because people tend to make more 
dispositional attribution for negative behaviors when the actor is a member of an outgroup 
than when the actor is a member of an ingroup (Hewstone, 1990; Pettigrew, 1979; Weber, 
1994), we hypothesized (and found) that witnesses would be less willing to confront an 
ingroup than an outgroup member, and that these effect would be explained by witnesses 
attributing bias-related characteristics to the person expressing bias less strongly when 
that person was an ingroup (vs. an outgroup) member. However, this effect was 
moderated by the extent witnesses had internalized egalitarian values. Only participants 
lower in internal motivation to respond without prejudice (Plant & Devine, 1998) 
attributed bias-related characteristics less strongly to an ingroup member who expressed 
bias than to an outgroup member who expressed bias, and consequently, confronted the 
outgroup member more; we found no such difference for participants higher in internal 
motivation to respond without prejudice. 
In Chapter IV, we hypothesized that the prescriptive normativity of witnesses’ 
confrontations of bias would depend on who the person expressing bias is. More 
specifically, we predicted that it would be more normative to confront a close person (i.e., 
a friend or a relative) than a stranger. Confrontations of bias are sometimes perceived as 
impolite or out-of-place behaviors; however, one of the factors that may increase the 
normativity of confrontational behaviors is threat to the image of a highly-relevant 
ingroup, such as a group of friends. Confronting bias may restore the image of an ingroup, 
by reinforcing egalitarian norms, and behaviors that aim to protect an ingroup are 
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generally socially approved (Pereira et al, 2009; Ramos et al, 2016), especially when that 
group is highly-valued (Kaiser et al, 2009). Results supported the hypothesis. Confronting 
bias is generally prescriptively normative, but confronting a close person is more 
normative than confronting a stranger. Threat to the image of a highly-valued group 
mediated this effect. A close person who expresses bias threatened the image of a highly-
value group more; and the more the image of a highly-valued group was threatened, the 
more was socially valued and approved to confront. These results suggest that threat to 
the image of a highly-relevant group grants witnesses social legitimacy to challenge 
expressions of prejudice, making confrontations more normative. 
Finally, in Chapter V, the results of the empirical chapters are integrated, and the 
theoretically and practical contributions of the thesis are discussed. We also discuss the 
limitations of the present work and propose future direction for this line of research.  
In summary, we investigated the joint influence of social and individual factors 
underlying three different facets of confrontation of bias: witnesses’ actual responses to 
biased comments, observers’ attitudes toward confrontation and the prescriptive 
normativity of witnesses’ confrontations of bias. Our main contributions to the 
understanding of confrontations of bias resides in three features of the current thesis. First, 
we investigated witnesses’ confrontations of bias, a topic understudied in the literature. 
Second, we investigated the influence of key variables that had been overlooked in 
previous research in witnesses’ confrontation of bias, namely the group membership 
shared by the witness and the person expressing bias, and the threat to the image of a 
highly-valued ingroup. Third, we showed that the influence of social factors related to the 
relationship between the person expressing bias and the potential confronter on attitudes 
and behavioral responses to bias depends on observers’ and witnesses’ individual 
differences in egalitarian values. People who are strongly committed to equality and 
social justice confront and evaluate positively another person even in less favorable social 
conditions. Therefore, our findings directly contribute to the current understanding of 
witnesses’ responses to bias, interpersonal behaviors that may fundamentally allow or 
prevent public expressions of prejudice. 
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Chapter II 
 
Evaluations of Witnesses’ Responses to Bias: Universalism-Concern and the Costs 
of Confrontation 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This chapter is based on:  
Lavado, S., Pereira, C. R., Dovidio, J. F., & Vala, J. (2016). Evaluations of witnesses’ 
responses to bias : Universalism – Concern and the costs of confrontation. Personality 
and Individual Differences, 96, 172–180. doi:10.1016/j.paid.2016.03.0038 
 
  
                                                          
8 As the first author, I was the primary responsible for the design, implementation, data analysis and 
writing of the studies reported in this paper. My co-authors (my doctoral advisors) provided fundamental 
guidance and supervision throughout the entire process, ultimately leading to the publication of this 
manuscript. 
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Abstract 
The present research examined how situational and individual difference 
factors influence majority-group observers’ evaluations of witnesses’ 
responses to an incident of bias. In Study 1, participants learned of a situation 
in which a White person applying for a job he did or did not need (high vs. 
low cost of confrontation) heard his interviewer make a racist comment, 
which the White person did or did not confront. Non-confrontation was 
evaluated as less appropriate than confrontation when the costs of confronting 
were low, but not when costs were high, revealing that in a high cost situation 
the appropriate response to bias is more ambiguous. Study 2 focused on this 
high cost situation to show that evaluations of another person’s responses to 
bias depend on individual differences in the observer’s values. Observers who 
scored low on Universalism-Concern evaluated another person’s non-
confrontation as appropriate as confrontation, but participants who scored 
high on Universalism-Concern perceived non-confrontation as less 
appropriate. Considering how responses to bias are assessed helps illuminate 
normative processes that affect confrontations of bias against outgroups, 
contributing to the knowledge of the processes that may allow biases to 
persist. 
 
Key-words: bias, confrontation, costs, universalism-concern, witnesses 
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Introduction 
Recent research has aimed to understand when targets of bias confront unfair 
negative comments and actions directed toward them or their group (see, for example, 
Becker, Zawadzki, & Shields, 2014). That research also considers how individual 
differences, such as in beliefs about the malleability of prejudice (Rattan & Dweck, 2010) 
or optimism (Kaiser & Miller, 2004), among targets can increase or decrease their 
willingness to confront bias. However, confronting bias is not solely the responsibility of 
members of targeted, disadvantaged groups; how members of majority groups not only 
perceive injustice (Drury & Kaiser, 2014; Inman & Baron, 1996) but also evaluate the 
responses of others to injustice can affect the persistence and impact of social bias in 
society. In the present research, consisting of two studies, we investigated how majority-
group members evaluate other ingroup members who do or do not confront racial bias 
against another group. Specifically, we tested the potential moderating roles of (a) the 
social conditions under which the person decided whether to confront the bias (Study 1), 
and (b) individual differences in the values held by observers of the other person’s 
response to bias (Study 2).  
 
Background  
 Confrontations of bias address socially unfair treatment and preserve egalitarian 
norms and are therefore generally seen by observers as positive social behaviors (Dickter, 
Kittel, & Gyurovski, 2012). Non-confrontations of bias are typically perceived as less 
appropriate, because they allow a biased remark to remain unchallenged, and may even 
convey agreement with bias.  
Costs of Confrontation. Although confronting bias may generally be perceived as 
a socially responsible act, how people evaluate the appropriateness of confrontation and 
non-confrontation may be shaped by contextual influences. Previous research on 
prosocial behavior has highlighted that perceiving personal costs associated with 
performing the act affects the way people evaluate the appropriateness of both engaging 
in and refraining from enacting the prosocial behavior. For instance, when helping 
involves greater personal cost to the person who intervenes (e.g., greater personal risk), 
not intervening is perceived to be a more socially acceptable response (Holahan, 1977; 
Piliavin, Dovidio, Gaertner, & Clark, 1981).  Indeed, people often justify not intervening 
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to help another person on the basis of the potential costs incurred for helping (Penner, 
Dovidio, Piliavin, & Schroeder, 2005).  
Confrontation of bias by a witness may also be considered a form of prosocial 
behavior involving assessments of costs and benefits of various courses of action 
(Ashburn-Nardo, Blanchar, Petersson, Morris, & Goodwin, 2014; Penner et al., 2005). 
As such, when people recognize that the personal costs are high to a witness for 
confronting bias, they may perceive non-confrontation as excusable, and thus as relatively 
socially appropriate. We tested this general hypothesis in Study 1.  
Values and Appropriateness of Confrontation and Non-Confrontation. The 
degree to which people evaluate the appropriateness of confrontation or non-
confrontation by a witness may also be affected by relevant individual differences, 
particularly in situations in which the personal costs of confronting are at odds with the 
social costs of not confronting bias. In situations in which behavioral appropriateness is 
ambiguous or there are conflicting influences, individual differences among observers are 
particularly important guides of behavior (e.g., Eccleston & Major, 2006). As Mischel 
(1973) explained, “Individual differences can determine behavior most strongly when the 
situation is ambiguously structured … so that subjects are uncertain about how to 
categorize it” (p. 276; see also Snyder & Ickes, 1985). Previous research has revealed that 
confrontations by individual targets of bias are shaped by personal factors, such as 
commitment to fight bias or optimism (Kaiser & Miller, 2004; Shelton, Richeson, 
Salvatore, & Hill, 2006). However, we are not aware of research on individual differences 
in how people assess the appropriateness of others’ confrontation or non-confrontation of 
bias. 
Observers’ values likely influence their judgments of the appropriateness of another 
person’s action or inaction in the face of bias. Values are general beliefs that guide not 
only people’s selection of actions but also evaluations of their own and other people’s 
behaviors (Feather, 1995; Rokeach, 1973; Schwartz, 1992; 1994; Schwartz & Bilsky, 
1987), particularly members of their own group’s (Marques & Paez, 1994; Tyler & 
Blader, 2003). Values would likely be important predictors of the weight given to 
different costs and rewards in responses to bias, because values directly define the 
standards by which action (or inaction) is judged.  
Schwartz’s (1992) original theory of basic human values attempted to capture a 
comprehensive and cross-culturally valid set of values and to describe the relations among 
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those values.  Schwartz identified 10 basic human values (Self-Direction, Stimulation, 
Hedonism, Achievement, Power, Security, Conformity, Tradition, Benevolence and 
Universalism) that can be organized into a circular continuum, according to 
compatibilities and conflicts among them. Cross-cultural research in more than 80 
countries and with diverse samples supported the comprehensiveness of this set of values, 
their relationships, and their broad applicability (see Schwartz, 1992, 2012; Schwartz, 
Melech, Lehmann, Burgess, Harris, & Owens, 2001). The theory of basic human values 
has been used in research on diverse topics, such as political behavior (Schwartz, Caprara, 
& Vecchione, 2010), self-affirmation (Burson, Crocker & Mischkowski, 2012), and 
altruism (Lӧnnqvist, Leikas, Paunonen, Nissinen, & Verkasalo, 2006). 
Universalism, the value of primary interest in Study 2, represents a motivation to 
understand, appreciate, tolerate, and protect all people and nature. Universalism is closely 
(and positively) related to Benevolence. However, Benevolence is defined as a motivation 
to care for the welfare of people with whom one is close and therefore has a relatively 
narrow focus of application. By contrast, Universalism is related to concerns about the 
welfare of others more generally. Both Universalism and Benevolence are in conflict with 
Power (a motivation to attain social status and prestige, and control or dominance over 
people and resources) and Achievement (a motivation to be personally successful 
according to social standards) (Schwartz, 1992).  
While Universalism, Benevolence, Achievement, and Power are all related to 
traditional measures of social bias, Universalism is the value most strongly related to 
measures of prejudice and social dominance (Cohrs, Moschner, Maes, & Kielmann, 2005; 
Duriez & Van Hiel, 2002; Feather & McKee, 2008) – individuals who more strongly 
endorse the value of Universalism score lower on these measures. In addition, although 
Benevolence and Universalism (but not other values in the model) are important 
predictors of prosocial behaviors (Caprara, Alessandri, & Eisenberg, 2012; Caprara & 
Steca, 2007), Universalism is more closely related conceptually to prosocial actions 
toward other people in general, not just toward others with whom one is close (Schwartz, 
2010). Because values affect behavior mainly when they are activated by a specific 
situation (Verplanken & Holland, 2002) and the value of Universalism captures whether 
equality is held as a central standard of behavior, we hypothesized that Universalism 
would be the primary value in guiding evaluations of confrontations (and non-
confrontations) of bias. 
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In addition, Schwartz and colleagues (2012) recently refined the theory of basic 
human values and identified three subtypes of Universalism: Universalism-Nature, a 
motivation to preserve the natural environment; Universalism-Tolerance, a motivation to 
accept and understand people who are different from oneself; and Universalism-Concern 
a “commitment to equality, justice and protection for all people” (Schwartz et al., 2012, 
p. 669).  
To the extent that Universalism-Concern specifically reflects a motivation to strive 
for social justice and equality, even at personal expense, when appraising the 
appropriateness of different responses to bias, people relatively high on this value would 
likely give more weight to the social cost of not confronting, even when there are 
potentially mitigating personal costs associated with confronting. In Study 2, we apply 
the situation identified in Study 1, where the personal costs of confronting are at odds 
with the social costs of not confronting, to test the unique effects of Universalism-
Concern over and above other basic values in Schwartz et al.’s (2012) refined theory on 
observers’ assessments of the appropriateness of non-confrontation versus confrontation 
of bias.  
 
Purpose 
The purpose of the present research was to examine how situational factors (Study 
1) and individual differences in values (Study 2) influence majority-group observers’ 
evaluations of witnesses’ responses to an incident of bias. The aim of Study 1 was to 
understand how observers assess the appropriateness of not confronting (vs. confronting) 
as a function of situational factors affecting personal costs for intervention. The goal of 
Study 2 was to illuminate how individual differences in endorsement of a value related to 
the degree to which equality is held as a central standard of behavior (i.e., Universalism-
Concern) influence observers’ evaluations of different responses to bias in situations in 
which the cost to a witness for confronting bias is high.  
Theoretically, expanding the study of confrontation to how others evaluate those 
who do or do not confront bias can broaden the perspective on the general social forces 
that can either ameliorate or maintain social bias.  Practically, understanding the 
influences on non-targets who witness bias can have important social consequences, as 
non-targets who confront are taken more seriously and are seen as more persuasive than 
confronters who are the target of bias (Czopp & Monteith, 2003; Gulker, Mark, & 
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Monteith, 2013; Rasinski & Czopp, 2010). Investigating how observers evaluate 
witnesses’ decision to confront bias or not and the conditions that may shape that 
assessment can provide insight into the process that socially inhibit unfair bias (Blanz, 
Mummendey, & Otten, 1997).  
 
Study 1 
Overview 
In Study 1, participants (all from a majority group) learned of a situation in which 
a White applicant heard his interviewer make a biased comment about Black applicants 
and then did or did not confront the interviewer about that comment. We also varied the 
social circumstances of the applicant by indicating that he had a high versus low need for 
the position for which he was interviewing. The dependent measure was how appropriate 
participants perceived the behavior of the applicant.  
Because confronting bias tends to be seen as a prosocial behavior that preserves 
egalitarian norms, we expected that a White witness confronting an expression of bias 
against a Black person would generally be seen as more appropriate social behavior than 
would non-confrontation. However, we further hypothesized that this effect would be 
diminished when the personal costs to the witness for confronting bias were relatively 
high (i.e., the applicant had a high vs. low need for the job). The costs of confronting 
would make non-confrontation more excusable and, thus, more appropriate. 
Both studies in the present paper were conducted in the context of race relations in 
Portugal. Previous research has suggested that discrimination against Black immigrants 
in Portugal is generally condemned by social norms (Vala, Lopes, & Lima, 2008; Vala & 
Pereira, 2012). Concurrently, however, Black immigrants still report being the target of 
verbal harassment more often than other immigrant or ethnic groups (Santos, Oliveira, 
Kumar, Rosário, & Brigadeiro, 2009). Thus, we expected that participants would find the 
situation presented in these studies plausible and would consider the blatantly biased 
comment as unfair and inappropriate. 
 
Method 
Participants. With the permission of the university, during a week in mid-
November, 2013, a female experimenter approached students in classroom locations 
across the campus and asked them to take part voluntarily in a study about people’s 
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opinions about others’ behaviors. Approximately 91% of the students approached 
consented to participate. The surveys, which reflected the different experimental 
conditions, were arranged randomly, and the experimenter was unaware of the condition 
a participant received. Participants received no direct compensation for their participation 
in the study.   
Based on a priori power estimates for detecting an effect of moderate strength 
(G*Power; Faul, Erdfelder, Lang, & Buchner, 2007), to achieve power of .80 the targeted 
sample was 90 participants.  A total of 106 students agreed participate. Because the 
theoretical focus in the research was on responses of members of the majority racial group 
as a function of whether another member of their group confronted bias against a racial 
minority group, Portuguese undergraduate students (n = 87; 55 men, 31 women, 1 did not 
specify gender; mean age = 20.69 years, SD = 4.05; participants’ ages ranged from 18 to 
41 years) were included in the analyses. An additional 19 participants who completed the 
survey but indicated a different nationality were not included in the final analyses.  
The protocol for the research (for both Study 1 and Study 2) was approved by the 
Institutional Review Board (IRB) of the university where one of the authors is affiliated, 
and was consistent with the ethical standards and procedures of the university in Portugal. 
No information personally identifying participants was collected. Study materials and 
data (for both Study 1 and Study 2) are available upon request from the first author. 
Design and procedure. Study 1 employed a 2 (Need for the Job: High vs. Low) x 
2 (Behavior: Confrontation vs. Non-Confrontation) between-groups factorial design. 
Similar to the procedure of Shelton and Stewart (2004, Study 1), participants were 
presented with a scenario in which a candidate was being interviewed for a job. In this 
scenario, the interviewer indicated that he was favorably impressed by interviewee Paulo 
(a name selected because it is one of the most common names for White Portuguese men), 
but followed that with a racist comment about Black applicants for the same position.  
The potential cost to the interviewee for confronting biased remark was varied by 
information in the scenario suggesting that the interviewee had a high need for the job 
(high cost for confrontation) or a low need for the position (low cost of confrontation). 
Specifically, the participants read the following text (low need for the job condition in 
brackets):  
Paulo is in a room waiting to be called for a job interview. This interview is 
[not] very important to Paulo because this is his third job interview in months 
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and no one has offered him a job yet [he already received some interesting 
job offers]. Paulo [doesn’t want] wants to give his best shot at this interview 
because he [doesn’t] really needs the job. Plus, this position [does not seem] 
seems really interesting and he [doesn’t want the opportunity to work in the 
company that much] would love the opportunity to work in the company. 
Paulo is called in to the interview. He is greeted by the interviewer, a tall 
White man wearing a suit. They both sit down and he starts asking Paulo 
questions. Paulo has the impression that the interview is going well. In the 
end, the interviewer shakes his hand and says: I really liked you and I think 
you and the company would be a good fit. We had a lot of Black applicants, 
so it’s good to have someone White for a change. I’ll contact you when we 
have a decision. 
We then varied the description of the behavior after the interviewer’s racist 
comment. In the Confrontation condition, participants were told that the interviewee 
answered, “I don’t think skin color should have anything to do with this.” In the Non-
confrontation condition, participants were told that the interviewee stated simply, “I’ll be 
waiting for your call.”  
After participants read the scenario, they completed items measuring their 
perceptions of the appropriateness of the interviewee’s behavior during the interview. In 
particular, participants were asked to evaluate, from 1 = not at all to 7 = very much, the 
degree to which the interviewee’s behavior reflected four qualities: appropriate, wise, and 
(reverse-coded) irrational and unreasonable. The responses to the four items were 
averaged to form a behavioral appropriateness scale, α = .79. 
To evaluate the effectiveness of the manipulations, we also asked participants to 
rate, on separate 1 = not at all to 7 = very much scales, how important it was for him to 
get the job and the likelihood that he would be offered the position. Finally, we asked 
participants for their age, gender and nationality.  
 
Results 
We began by checking the normality of the distribution of the residuals on our main 
variable (behavioral appropriateness), which was verified, Shapiro-Wilk(87) = .981, p = 
.223, skewness of -.66 (SE = 0.26) and kurtosis of -.04 (SE = 0.51). Because our predictors 
were both categorical variables, we analyzed our data using a 2 (Need for the Job: High 
 Witnesses’ confrontation of racial bias  
 
 
32 
 
vs. Low) x 2 (Behavior: Confrontation vs. Non-Confrontation) analysis of variance 
(ANOVA). 
The manipulation produced the intended effects on the perceptions of participants. 
A 2 (Need for the Job: High vs. Low) x 2 (Behavior: Confrontation vs. Non-
Confrontation) ANOVA yielded a main effect of need for the job on the importance to 
the interviewee of getting the job, F(1,83) = 939.13, p < .001, η2p = .92. Participants in 
the high need for the job condition perceived that it was more important for the 
interviewee to get the job (M = 6.87, SD = .40) than participants in the low need for the 
job condition (M = 2.05, SD = .96). There was no effect for Behavior (F(1,83) = .02, p = 
.898, η2p < .01) and no interaction effect (F(1,83) = 1.17, p = .283, η2p = .01).  Also, as 
anticipated, participants perceived that the interviewee would incur personal costs for 
confronting the interviewer about the racist remark.  A 2 x 2 ANOVA on the likelihood 
the interviewee would receive the job offer revealed a main effect for Behavior, F(1,83) 
= 14.11, p < .001, η2p = .15.  Participants in the confrontation condition perceived that he 
would be less likely to receive the job offer (M = 4.80, SD = 1.38) than those in the non-
confrontation condition (M = 5.74, SD = 1.02).  There was also a marginally significant 
main effect of cost, F(1,83) = 3.56, p = .063, η2p = .04. Participants in the high need 
condition perceived it was less likely for the interviewee to get the job (M = 5.09, SD = 
1.40) than participants in the high cost condition (M = 5.52, SD = 1.13).  We found no 
interaction effect (F(1,83) = .107, p = .745, η2p < .01). 
Addressing our primary research question, we conducted a 2 x 2 ANOVA on 
behavioral appropriateness. There was, as expected, a main effect of confrontation, 
F(1,83) = 17.78, p < .001, η2p = .18. Participants in the confrontation condition judged 
the behavior as more appropriate (M = 5.83, SD = 1.14) than participants in the non-
confrontation condition (M = 4.73, SD = 1.38). Importantly, this effect was qualified by 
a significant interaction between Need and Behavior, F(1,83) = 9.32, p = .016, η2p = .07 
(see Figure 1).  
Planned comparisons revealed that when the costs were low, there was a significant 
difference between confronting and not confronting bias conditions, F(1,83) = 21.71, p < 
.001, η2p = .21. Confronting bias was evaluated as more appropriate (M = 6.10, SD = .78) 
than not confronting (M = 4.32, SD = 1.50). However, when the costs were high there 
was no difference between confronting bias (M = 5.54, SD = 1.38) and not confronting 
(M = 5.07, SD = 1.20), F(1,83) = 1.58, p = .212, η2p = .02. From an alternative perspective, 
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when the interviewee confronted the person interviewing him, his behavior was rated as 
equivalently socially appropriate whether his need for the job was high (and thus the costs 
for confrontation were high) or low (Ms = 5.54 vs. 6.10), F(1,83) = 2.13, p = .148, η2p = 
.03. However, not confronting the comment was viewed as more socially appropriate 
when the interviewee’s need for the job was high than when it was low (Ms = 5.07 vs. 
4.32), F(1,83) = 4.16, p = .044, η2p = .05. 
 
Figure 1. Evaluations of behavioral appropriateness for each experimental condition of 
Study 1. 
 
 
Discussion 
 The current study complements previous research, which shows that people are 
less likely to confront a biased remark when the costs of confronting are higher (Ashburn-
Nardo et al., 2014; Shelton & Stewart, 2004), by investigating how others perceive the 
behavior of individuals in such situations. Consistent with previous research (Dickter et 
al., 2012), the results of Study 1 demonstrated that when an individual blatantly exhibits 
bias, participants perceived confrontation as a more socially appropriate response than 
non-confrontation. Future research might further investigate the processes contributing to 
this evaluation.  For example, one reason why confrontation may be viewed so favorably 
is because such actions are positively distinctive: Majority-group members rarely respond 
to expressions of prejudice (Kawakami, Dunn, Karmali, & Dovidio, 2009). Another 
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reason why the type of confrontation represented in Study 1 may be viewed positively is 
because the bias was directed toward a group for which there are strong norms against 
biased treatment (Blacks), and the interviewee had no immediate self-interest in 
confronting the interviewer (Eagly, Wood, & Chaiken, 1978). It is possible that 
confronting a biased statement about another group would be perceived as less socially 
appropriate if the norms regarding prejudice against that group were less strong (e.g., 
overweight people) or possibly even support negative treatment (e.g., criminals) 
(Crandall, Eshleman, & O’Brien, 2002).   
 Study 1, however, further demonstrates that how people evaluate non-
confrontation of bias depends upon their understanding of the circumstances of the other 
person who does not intervene. Importantly, Study 1 offers direct evidence of the 
moderating role of perceived mitigating circumstances on how inappropriate non-
confrontation of even blatant bias is perceived.  Specifically, although confrontation of 
bias was generally seen as more socially appropriate than non-confrontation of bias, 
majority-group observers tended to excuse non-confrontation. They rated non-
confrontation as more socially appropriate (and as socially appropriate as confronting 
bias) when the costs to a witness of confronting bias are relatively high (i.e., not getting 
a job that was needed). Practically, the present results suggest that people who encounter 
an incident of bias may face different types of costs (or lack of rewards) for action or 
inaction, some emanating directly from the perpetrator (e.g., a boss) but others associated 
with the way observers evaluate their behavior. 
Study 1 suggests majority-group observers are responsive to at least two different 
types of social forces in judging the appropriateness of confronting or not confronting 
expressions of racial bias.  On the one hand, observers seem sensitive to prevailing 
egalitarian norms against racial bias and, as a consequence, evaluate a White person’s 
confrontation of racial bias by another White person as more socially appropriate than a 
non-confrontation of such behavior.  On the other hand, observers are responsive to the 
circumstances a witness of bias encounters in making a decision about whether to 
confront.  Specifically, observers appear more willing to excuse a witness for not 
confronting bias when such action involves greater personal cost. 
When these two factors – the cost to society for not intervening and the cost to an 
individual for confronting bias – are in conflict, the appropriate response to bias becomes 
more ambiguous. In this situation – our situation of interest in Study 2 – we hypothesized 
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the cost that would be more influential would relate systematically to individual 
differences between observers. We predicted that people who value social justice more 
would be more sensitive to the social costs of not confronting a behavior that violates 
egalitarian norms. We tested this hypothesis in Study 2. 
 
Study 2 
Overview 
Study 2 examined whether the endorsement of Universalism-Concern predicts how 
majority-group observers evaluate a confrontation of bias versus a non-confrontation in 
a situation where the appropriate response to bias is ambiguous (i.e., the high need/high 
cost situation, identified in Study 1). We tested the unique effects of Universalism-
Concern over and above the effects of other values, which complement or are in conflict 
with Universalism-Concern (Universalism-Tolerance, Universalism-Nature, 
Benevolence-Dependability, Benevolence-Caring, Achievement, Power-Dominance, and 
Power-Resources) in Schwartz et al.’s (2012) refined values theory. As noted earlier, the 
value of Universalism-Concern distinctively emphasizes the importance of equality in the 
treatment of all people, and this value is likely to be activated when people are exposed 
to an incident of injustice, such as bias (Verplanken & Holland, 2002). 
We hypothesized that when the personal interests of a person who witnesses bias 
are in conflict with the general social interest in limiting expressions of bias, individual 
differences in observers’ commitment to strive for equality would be important predictors 
of their evaluations of responses to bias. Specifically, we predicted that whereas 
participants lower in Universalism-Concern would perceive non-confrontation as 
appropriate as a confrontation, those higher in Universalism-Concern would perceive 
non-confrontation as less appropriate than confrontation, giving more weight to the social 
cost of not addressing an unfair treatment in their judgments.  
 
Method 
Participants. Based on the effect size and parameter estimates obtained in Study 
1, a priori power analysis identified a target sample size of 110 participants to achieve the 
desired power of .80 in Study 2 (Faul et al., 2007). One hundred and twenty undergraduate 
students completed the study (60 men, 60 women; mean age = 21.84 years, SD = 3.61; 
participants’ ages ranged from 18 to 33 years). A male and a female experimenter 
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recruited participants in a university library during two weeks in May/June 2014. All 
students present at the library at the recruitment time were individually approached and 
asked to complete the survey. Approximately 72% of the students who were asked agreed 
to participate. The study was introduced as an evaluation task, in which participants would 
be asked to give their opinion about another person’s behavior in a social situation. The 
experimenters were unaware of the condition represented in the survey they asked 
participants to complete.  
Design and Procedure. Participants were first asked to respond on a 6-point scale 
(1 = not like me at all, 2 = not like me, 3 = a little like me, 4 = somewhat like me, 5 = 
like me, 6 = very much like me) to the three Universalism-Concern items of the Schwartz 
et al. (2012) revised Portrait Values Questionnaire (PVQ-5X): “Here we briefly describe 
some people. Please read each description and think about how much each person is or is 
not like you:” “Protecting society’s weak and vulnerable members is important to 
him[her]”; “He [she] thinks it is important that every person in the world have equal 
opportunities in life”; “He [she] wants everyone to be treated justly, even people he/she 
doesn’t know.” The scale showed good reliability in the current sample (α = .72).   
The items were embedded among items from the PVQ-5X measuring other related 
values: Universalism-Tolerance (motivation for accepting and understanding people who 
are different from oneself), Universalism-Nature (motivation for preserving nature), 
Benevolence-Dependability (motivation for being a dependable ingroup member), 
Benevolence-Caring (motivation for caring for other ingroup members), Achievement 
(motivation to succeed according to social standards), Power-Dominance (motivation for 
having power through control of other people), and Power-Resources (motivation for 
having power through control of material and social resources) (Schwartz et al., 2012). 
Because we believed the scenario would be mainly related to concerns about social 
justice, we did not have specific predictions for individual differences in these additional 
values. However, we included this items in order to investigate the unique predictive 
ability of Universalism-Concern, not only relative to other Universalism values but also, 
more broadly, to other self-transcendence and self-enhancement values. 
Then, participants read in the survey the scenario representing the high cost context 
of Study 1. Participants were randomly assigned to one of two confrontation conditions 
varied in Study 1. In one condition the interviewee confronted the interviewer who made 
a racist comment; in the other condition the interviewee did not confront the interviewer. 
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After reading the scenario, participants answered the same Behavioral Appropriateness 
items (appropriate, wise, irrational and unreasonable) of Study 1 (α = .77). Then, 
participants were asked to indicate (from 1 = not at all to 7 = very much) their perceptions 
of the interviewer’s behavior as (a) prejudiced, (b) appropriate, and (c) fair. Responses 
(reverse-coded for fair and appropriate) were averaged to produce a measure of perceived 
bias (α = .82). At the end of the survey we asked participants to recall whether the 
interviewee’s had confronted or not confronted the prejudiced comment (as an attention 
check) and to provide information about their age, gender, and nationality9. All 
participants indicated they were Portuguese. We excluded from the final sample 11 
participants who failed to correctly answer the attention check10. Thus, the final sample 
was composed by 109 participants. 
 
Results 
Because we had a categorical (Behavior: confront or not confront) and a continuous 
(Universalism-Concern) predictor, and a continuous dependent variable, we used linear 
regression analysis to test our hypothesis, which allowed us to test for the main effects 
and interaction of our variables of interest (Aiken & West, 1991), as well as to control for 
the effects of other variables. In order to do so, we began by checking the normality of 
the distribution of the residuals on our main variable dependent (behavioral 
appropriateness), which was verified, Shapiro-Wilk(109) = .986, p = .314, skewness of -
.10 (SE = 0.23) and kurtosis of -.43 (SE = 0.50).    
To test how participants perceived the interviewer’s behavior, we regressed 
perceptions of bias on Behavior (confrontation vs. non-confrontation, dummy-coded), 
Universalism-Concern (centered) and the Behavior x Universalism-Concern interaction 
term. As expected, the way participants rated the interviewer’s behavior was not predicted 
by their endorsement of Universalism-Concern or by the behavior of the interviewee.  The 
overall model was not significant (p = .161), and there were no main or interaction effects 
(p’s > .130).   Participants generally viewed the interviewer’s behavior as biased (M = 
6.33, SD = .97, on a 1-7 scale). 
                                                          
9 We conducted regression analyses using gender and age as control variables. We found no significant 
effects of either age or gender, and including these variables as controls did not change the pattern of results.  
10 Participants who failed to correctly answer the attention check were evenly distributed across conditions, 
Χ2(1, N = 120) = .10, p = .752. 
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 In order to test our main hypotheses, we regressed behavioral appropriateness on 
Behavior (confrontation vs. non-confrontation, dummy-coded), Universalism-Concern 
(centered; M = 4.52, SD = .89) and the Behavior x Universalism-Concern interaction 
term. The model explained a significant amount of variance, adjusted R2 = .07, F(3, 105) 
= 3.67, p = .015. There was a significant effect of Behavior on behavioral appropriateness, 
B = .53, SE = .27, p = .050, η2p = .03. The interviewee’s behavior was perceived as more 
appropriate when he confronted (M = 5.02, SD = 1.22) than when he did not confront the 
interviewer’s bias (M = 4.49, SD = 1.57). Importantly, this effect was qualified by the 
Behavior x Universalism-Concern interaction, B = .81, SE = .31, p = .010, η2p = .06 (see 
Figure 2).  
 
Figure 2. Predicted behavioral appropriateness scores as a function of experimental 
condition and participants’ endorsement of the Universalism-Concern value. 
 
 
Simple slopes analysis (Aiken & West, 1991) revealed, as predicted, that among 
participants who scored higher in Universalism-Concern (i.e., one standard deviation 
above the mean), there was a significant effect of Behavior, B = 1.25, SE = .38, p = .002, 
η2p = .09: participants who scored higher in Universalism-Concern perceived confronting 
bias as more appropriate (estimated mean = 5.45) than not confronting bias (estimated 
mean = 4.21). Among participants who scored lower in Universalism-Concern (i.e., one 
standard deviation below the mean), however, we found no significant effect of Behavior, 
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B = -.18, SE = .38, p = .637, η2p < .01. As expected, participants lower in Universalism-
Concern evaluated non- confrontation (estimated mean = 4.90) as appropriate as 
confrontation (estimated mean = 4.73) in these circumstances.11 
Supplementary analyses revealed that the Behavior x Universalism-Concern 
interaction remained significant after controlling for the seven other values in the 
Schwartz scale, B = .81, SE = .32, p = .013, η2p = .06. No other scale showed an interaction 
with Behavior in comparable analyses. 
 
Discussion 
Study 2 results supported our hypothesis that individual differences in 
Universalism-Concern moderate how majority-group observers evaluate responses to 
bias when the appropriate response is ambiguous. Under circumstances in which the 
personal costs to a witness for confronting bias are high – in this case, jeopardizing being 
hired for a job that is needed – participants lower in Universalism-Concern judged non-
confrontation as equivalently appropriate as confrontation. By contrast, participants 
higher in Universalism-Concern, who are highly committed to the value of equality, 
perceived non-confrontation as less appropriate than confrontation.  This effect occurred 
because participants higher in Universalism-Concern tended to view both confrontation 
as more appropriate and non-confrontation as less appropriate.   
Previous work has demonstrated that greater endorsement of the higher-order value 
of Universalism predicts a range of behaviors reflecting concern for the welfare of others 
(Feather & Mckee, 2012; Kuntz, Davidov, Schwartz, & Schmidt, 2015; see also 
Schwartz, 2010). Although less research has tested the more differentiated values of the 
Schwartz and colleagues’ (2012) revised theory, the evidence that does exist indicates 
that greater endorsement of Universalism-Concern specifically predicts responses 
supporting social justice better than other forms of Universalism.  In particular, 
Universalism-Concern is a better predictor of attitudes favoring equal rights for 
immigrants and homosexuals than Universalism-Nature (which reflects a concern for 
preserving the natural environment), as well as a better predictor of opposition to 
                                                          
11 From an alternative perspective, simple slopes analyses demonstrate that participants higher in 
Universalism-Concern tended to perceive the behavior of the interviewee as more appropriate when he 
confronted bias, B = .42, SE = .23, p = .068, η2p = .03, and as less appropriate when the interviewee did not 
confront bias, B = -.40, SE = .21, p = .063, η2p = .03. 
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economic inequality than Universalism-Tolerance (which measures a motivation for 
accepting and understanding people different from the self) (Schwartz et al., 2012; see 
also Schwartz & Butenko, 2014).  
The results of Study 2 offer additional evidence of the distinctive effects of 
Universalism-Concern for affirming general principles of social justice. Perceptions of 
how biased the interviewer was did not vary as a function of the participant’s endorsement 
of Universalism-Concern, but differences in this value did affect the way the behavior of 
the person who witnessed bias was evaluated. Participants who scored low in 
Universalism-Concern apparently viewed high personal cost for intervention as a 
mitigating factor for not confronting; they judged non-confrontation to be as socially 
appropriate as confrontation under these circumstances. The effect remained even when 
controlling for their endorsement of other values (including Universalism-Nature and 
Universalism-Tolerance). Thus, in addition to extending work on confrontation of bias 
by identifying a particularly relevant individual difference variable that moderates 
evaluations of a decision to confront bias, our findings offer further evidence of the 
discriminant validity of Universalism-Concern, as distinguished from other forms of 
Universalism (Nature and Tolerance) and other types of individual values.  
Both Benevolence-Caring and Benevolence-Dependability are positively related to 
Universalism values. However, Benevolence-Caring and Benevolence-Dependability 
scales were designed by Schwartz et al. (2012) to reflect motivations to care about the 
welfare of ingroup members and to be a dependable member of the ingroup, respectively. 
Perhaps because the scenario made social justice concerns more salient than concerns 
about other ingroup members, we did not find a relation between either of the 
Benevolence values and the extent a confrontation was perceived to be appropriate.  
 
General discussion 
The present studies revealed that the perceived appropriateness of a witness’s 
response to bias depends both on situational and personal factors. In Study 1, majority-
group observers evaluated non-confrontation of bias as less appropriate than 
confrontation when the personal costs of confronting were low but not when the personal 
costs of confronting were high. These results suggest that when the personal costs of 
confronting bias are at odds with the social costs of not confronting it, the appropriate 
response to bias is ambiguous.  
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Building on the results of Study 1, Study 2 investigated how individual differences 
predict evaluations of responses to bias. In Study 2, observers’ personal values associated 
with equality and social justice predicted their evaluations of confrontations when the 
appropriate response to bias was ambiguous. In this situation, participants who scored 
lower on Universalism-Concern evaluate non-confrontation as appropriate as 
confrontation of bias, while participants who scored higher on Universalism-Concern 
perceived non-confrontation to be less appropriate.  
Taken together, these two studies suggest majority-group observers attend to two 
different types of costs, and potentially benefits, associated with witnesses’ responses to 
racially biased comments. On the one hand, confronting the biased remark appears to 
represent a socially valued behavior, particularly by majority-group observers who 
endorse Universalism-Concern more strongly. Allowing bias to remain unchallenged 
would permit the violation of basic social principles of fairness and justice, fundamental 
pillars of society (Oishi, Kesebir, & Diener, 2011; Tyler & Blader, 2003), which would 
be especially aversive for people highly committed to equality. On the other hand, 
majority-group observers also appear to attend to the costs a witness of bias could incur 
for confronting it.  Participants, especially those lower in Universalism-Concern, judged 
non-confrontation to be as socially appropriate as confrontation when the costs for this 
action were high. For majority-group members less committed to equality and social 
justice, the costs of confronting bias seem to constitute valid excuses for not confronting 
it.  
To our knowledge, the present research is the first to explore how individual 
differences shape majority-group observers’ perceptions of the appropriateness of 
different responses to bias, highlighting the important role of endorsing Universalism-
Concern. In addition, the current results contribute to the validation of the Schwartz’s 
refined theory of human values by showing that Universalism-Concern, but not other 
Universalism values, predicts evaluations of behaviors related to social justice. Thus, our 
studies also underscore the distinctiveness of each of the three factors (Universalism-
Concern, Universalism-Tolerance, and Universalism-Nature), which are usually 
collapsed into a single higher-order value.  
We note a seemingly inconsistent finding between Study 1 and Study 2. Across the 
situations involving potentially high personal costs for confronting bias, we found that 
participants low in Universalism-Concern in Study 2 viewed non-confrontation slightly 
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but not significantly more appropriate than confrontation, participants in Study 1 (in 
which Universalism was not assessed) on average perceived non-confrontation as 
somewhat less appropriate than confrontation, and participants high in Universalism-
Concern in Study 2 evaluated non-confrontation as significantly less appropriate than 
confrontation.  However, this apparent inconsistency may be accounted for by statistical 
considerations.  In particular, while the size of the effect of Behavior (confrontation vs. 
non-confrontation) on judgments of appropriateness was comparable in Study 2 (η2p = 
.03) and in Study 1 (η2p = .02), there were over twice as many participants in Study 2 (n 
= 109) than in the high cost condition of Study 1 (n = 45). Statistical power is a function 
of sample size. Indeed, post hoc estimates of statistical power using G*Power (Faul, et 
al., 2007) revealed that the power to detect a small-sized effect was .52 in Study 2, but 
only .25 in Study 1.  Thus the non-significant effect for Behavior in in the high-cost 
condition of Study 1 but significant effect in Study 2 is likely a function primarily of the 
statistical sensitivity of the test not a difference in the size of the effect. 
Taken together, the findings of Study 1 and Study 2 highlight the role of perceived 
costs and benefits associated with observers’ perceptions of majority-group member’s 
decisions about how to respond to bias.  Consistent with our hypothesis that individual 
differences systematically shape how people weigh the costs of confrontation and non-
confrontation of bias, Study 2 highlights how endorsement of the value of Universalism-
Concern uniquely predicts how people appraise action or inaction by another person who 
witnesses bias. 
 
Limitations and future research 
Methodologically, one limitation of the present research was that although we 
manipulated the perceived cost to witnesses for confronting bias in Study 1, we did not 
directly assess participants’ perceptions of the costs or benefit to the witness or to society 
for the alternative behaviors.  We did not include such measures before asking how 
socially appropriate participants perceived the witness behavior because we did not want 
to sensitize participants to the specific predictions of the work.  Measuring perceived costs 
and benefits after assessing perceptions of social appropriateness may reflect post hoc 
justifications for ratings of social appropriateness rather than true mediating mechanisms. 
Moreover, conceptually, observers may not be consciously aware of their processes of 
weighing different costs and benefits in shaping their assessments (Piliavin et al., 1981; 
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Nisbett & Wilson, 1977).  Nevertheless, future research might consider indirect measures 
of the attention people devote to either the personal or social costs in their consideration 
of the situation, for example by measuring the relative cognitive accessibility in a lexical 
decision task (Kay & Jost, 2003) of words associated with social justice (e.g., equality) 
and words associated with the consequences for the witness (e.g., employment). These 
indirect measures would be expected to mediate how people judge the social 
appropriateness of confronting or not confronting bias.  
We also note that we assessed Universalism-Concern, along with other scales in 
Schwartz and colleagues’ (2012) value inventory at the beginning of Study 2, before the 
manipulation and the assessment of the dependent variables, because it was hypothesized 
to represent a moderator of the effect of the manipulation of confrontation versus non-
confrontation.  It is possible that including the value items first in the procedure might 
operate as a kind of prosocial prime.  However, inconsistent with a general prosocial 
prime interpretation of our findings, Universalism-Concern systematically moderated 
responses to the manipulation even when controlling for the other values in Schwartz et 
al.’s instrument.  Nevertheless, methodologically, future work might present the value 
scales at the very beginning and very end of the study (counterbalanced) to assess any 
order, and potential priming, effects. 
Another limitation of the present research is that we relied on a scenario 
methodology to assess participants’ evaluations of a witness’ behavior. Indeed, a number 
of studies of responses to an incident of bias have used scenarios (Ashburn-Nardo et al., 
2014; Shelton & Stewart, 2004; Swim & Hyers, 1999; Woodzicka & LaFrance, 2001) or 
retrospective reports of responses (Good, Moss-Racusin, & Sanchez, 2012; Kaiser & 
Miller, 2004), in addition to immediate and spontaneous reactions to an incident. We used 
the scenario methodology for the experimental control it provides for manipulating 
specific elements of the situation and our interest in a particular outcome – judgments of 
social appropriateness. Perceptions of what behaviors are socially appropriate or 
inappropriate are particularly important, because perceptions of normative 
appropriateness can guide behavior, including intergroup behavior, in ways independent 
of personal attitudes (e.g., Paluck, 2009).  
Nevertheless, because people’s descriptions of what they would do in situations 
portrayed in scenarios do not always match their behavior when presented with the actual 
incident, particularly in the context of confrontations of bias (Kawakami et al., 2009; 
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Woodzicka & LaFrance, 2001), future research might productively investigate how 
people respond to others who do or do not confront bias in more immediately unfolding 
and compelling situations. In an actual situation directly involving them, observers may 
spontaneously weigh the social costs of not confronting and the personal costs of 
confronting differently, in line with the finding that targets of prejudice imagine they 
would be less influenced by the confrontation costs than they actual are (Shelton & 
Stewart, 2004).  This kind of finding suggests that future work on how observers evaluate 
whether someone confronts bias should compare the responses of observers detached 
from the situation, as in the present research, to those more immediate involved in the 
situation that unfolds.   
We acknowledge that the present research focused on responses in a particular 
social context in which the observer, the person who witnessed bias, and the person who 
expressed bias were all members of the same group – the majority racial group in the 
society. Future research might consider how group membership affects observers’ 
evaluations of responses to bias. Both the status of the group and the group membership 
of the parties may be influential.  With respect to group status, majority-group members 
tend to be less sensitive to prejudice than are minority-group members (Blodorn, O'Brien, 
& Kordys, 2011; Inman & Baron, 1996) and, as a consequence they may be more likely 
to view non-confrontation of bias as more socially appropriate.   
In addition, whether an observer shares group membership with the target of bias 
or with the person expressing bias may critically affect the way they evaluate relevant 
behaviors. Observers who are not members of the group targeted by bias tend to be less 
supportive of a confrontation than are observers who belong to the target group (Becker 
& Barreto, 2014; Dodd, Giuliano, Boutell, & Moran, 2001). Also, because people tend to 
be more lenient with negative behaviors of ingroup members than of outgroup members 
(Hewstone, 1990), they may be more likely to discount the offensiveness of a statement 
of an ingroup than an outgroup member, particularly when the comment is directed at a 
member of a different group (Drury & Kaiser, 2014). To evaluate the potential effects of 
group membership in this context, future research could parametrically vary whether an 
observer is a member of the same or a different group as (a) the target of bias, (b) the 
person who expresses bias, and (c) the witness who does or does not confront bias.    
One additional noteworthy finding in the present research, which merits further 
research, is that across our two studies the ratings of the appropriateness of both 
 Witnesses’ confrontation of racial bias  
 
 
45 
 
confrontation and non-confrontation were at or above the midpoint of the scale for all 
conditions. Although confrontation was generally more positively evaluated than non-
confrontation on average, participants found any reactions to racism preponderantly 
appropriate, even if they were high on Universalism-Concern. This result suggests that 
even those highly motivated by principles of social justice and equality may excuse and 
see as appropriate other people’s inaction (see also Kawakami et al., 2009). Thus, while 
the finding that confronting bias is perceived as more socially appropriate relative to not 
confronting bias, the fact that participants assessed non-confrontation as socially 
appropriate in absolute terms may help account for why even highly principled people 
often tolerate bias in others (Dickter & Newton, 2013). Whereas past research on this 
topic has focused primarily on the confrontation of bias, future research might 
productively consider factors that contribute to perceptions of non-confrontation of bias 
as socially appropriate.  For example, people may generally recognize that confronting 
bias is personally costly (e.g., Czopp et al., 2006), and this perception of the potential 
costs incurred may lead them to excuse non-intervention and accept it as socially 
appropriate.  
 
Conclusion 
Our work focused on factors that influence how majority-group observers perceive 
the social appropriateness of another majority-group member’s confrontation and non-
confrontation of bias targeting a racial outgroup member. Both situational factors (costs 
to the witness for confronting bias) and individual differences (in the degree to which 
observers endorse Universalism-Concern) systematically shape these perceptions. 
Because people are highly attentive to what is socially appropriate conduct in intergroup 
behaviors (Blanz, et al., 1997; Gaertner & Insko, 2001; Paluck, 2009; Pereira, Vala, & 
Leyens, 2009), the way observers’ evaluate responses to bias constitutes an important 
influence that may help or hinder witnesses’ confrontation of bias. Considering how 
observers assess the appropriateness of alternative behaviors helps painting a more 
complete and complex picture of the processes that may allow traditional biases to persist 
socially or to combat it through social and interpersonal interventions. 
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Chapter III 
 
Ingroup favoritism and witnesses’ confrontation of racial bias 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This chapter is based on:  
Lavado, S., Dovidio, J. F., & Pereira, C. R. Ingroup favoritism and witnesses’ 
confrontation of bias. (Submitted).12 
 
 
                                                          
12 As the first author, I was the primary responsible for the design, implementation, data analysis and 
writing of the studies reported in this paper. My co-authors (my doctoral advisors) provided fundamental 
guidance and supervision throughout the entire process, ultimately leading to the submission of this 
manuscript. 
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Abstract 
The present research, consisting of two experiments, in which group 
membership was based on assignment to minimal groups, investigated 
whether the group membership of the person expressing bias against another 
group (a racial/ethnic group) influences witnesses’ confrontation of bias. We 
predicted that because negative actions tend to be attributed more to internal 
dispositions of an outgroup than an ingroup member, participants would 
attribute bias-related characteristics more strongly to an outgroup than an 
ingroup member who makes a racially biased remark and, consequently, 
confront him or her more. Moreover, we hypothesized that these effects 
would occur primarily among participants low in internal motivation to 
respond without prejudice, and not for those high on this dimension, whose 
internalized standards transcend group membership. Results converged to 
support these hypotheses.  Practical implications related to the frequency with 
which people witness bias expressed by an ingroup member, and future 
directions are considered.  
 
Key-words: confrontation, ingroup favoritism, minimal groups, prejudice, 
witnesses 
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Introduction 
Much of the literature on confronting expressions of bias has focused on how direct 
targets (Mallett & Melchiori, 2014; Shelton & Stewart, 2004; Woodzicka & LaFrance, 
2001) or members of the group against which bias is expressed (Lee, Soto, Swim, & 
Bernstein, 2012; Swim & Hyers, 1999; Rattan & Dweck, 2010) respond to a biased 
statement or action.  When these individuals do confront bias, they often elicit negative 
reactions (Dodd, Giuliano, Boutell & Moran, 2001; Rasinski & Czopp, 2010; Shelton & 
Stewart, 2004).  By contrast, when people who are not associated with the group that is 
the target of bias confront prejudice, they are less likely to experience backlash and are 
more likely to be successful at preventing future acts of bias (Drury & Kaiser, 2014; 
Gulker, Mark & Monteith, 2013; Rasinski & Czopp, 2010). Understanding the factors 
that may moderate people’s willingness to confront bias against a member of another 
group is thus important, practically as well as theoretically. In the present research, we 
investigated the role of group membership in witnesses’ confrontations of bias. 
Specifically, we investigated whether the ingroup or outgroup membership of the person 
expressing bias against another group influences the extent to which people confront bias.  
Group membership plays a fundamental role in how people respond to others.  In 
general, people evaluate others whom they perceive to be a member of their group more 
favorably and are more generous in allocating resources to them, compared to a member 
of another group (Dovidio & Gaertner, 2010). These effects occur not only in 
consequential, enduring groups but also in groups in which membership is initially 
established within a research context and has little consequence outside the laboratory – 
minimal groups (Tajfel, 1970).  Membership in minimal groups can be created, for 
example, by assigning individuals to groups randomly but ostensibly on the preference 
for an artist, Klee or Kandinsky (Brewer & Silver, 1978; Tajfel, 1970; Tajfel, Billig, 
Bundy & Flament, 1971). 
One aspect of intergroup relations, which may be particularly relevant to the degree 
to which people confront an expression of bias, is that individuals systematically make 
different attributions of negative behaviors performed by ingroup relative to outgroup 
members. Specifically, people are more likely to attribute the same negative action to the 
personalities of outgroup than ingroup members, while discounting the culpability of an 
ingroup member (Hewstone, 1990; Pettigrew, 1979). Because people are usually more 
willing to confront a negative remark when they perceive it to stem from negative 
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dispositional qualities, particularly the prejudice of the person who made that comment 
(Dickter, 2012; Lee et al., 2012), people who witness a biased comment may confront an 
outgroup member more than an ingroup member.  
Although ingroup-outgroup factors may generally affect confrontations of bias, 
there are also relevant individual differences related to general orientations toward 
prejudice that could also play a role, potentially in a way that transcends group 
membership. One such individual difference relates to motivation to respond without 
prejudice. Plant and Devine (1998, 2009; Plant, Devine & Peruche, 2010) distinguish 
between internal and external motivation to respond without prejudice. Internal 
motivation to respond without prejudice, as assessed by their internal motivation scale 
(IMS), captures the extent people have internalized egalitarian standards, which are used 
not only to evaluate their own behaviors but also the behaviors of others (Plant & Devine, 
1998, 2009; Schmader, Croft, Scarnier, Lickel & Mendes, 2012). External motivation to 
respond without prejudice, as measured on their external motivation scale (EMS), reflects 
the extent people are willing to regulate their own behavior to match social norms or to 
avoid the sanctions of others for being biased. Within the context of our studies regarding 
responses to other people’s bias, we anticipated that internal motivation to respond 
without prejudice would be primarily relevant. Schmader et al. (2012) found that White 
participants higher in internal motivation to respond without prejudice reported more 
negative emotion and showed greater distress-related physiological responses when they 
witnessed White individuals express racial bias. These responses were unrelated to 
external motivation to respond without prejudice. 
The present research, consisting of two experiments in which group membership 
was based on assignment to minimal groups, investigated the hypothesis that people 
would confront a person who expresses racial bias to a lesser degree when that person is 
an ingroup than an outgroup member and explored (a) the mediating role of attribution of 
bias-related characteristics (e.g., being close-minded) to the person who made the 
disparaging remark, and (b) the moderating role of individual differences in internal 
motivation to respond without prejudice (Plant & Devine, 1998, 2009). Confrontation 
was conceptualized as the degree of dissatisfaction expressed toward the person 
responsible for the biased behavior (see Dickter, 2012; Kaiser & Miller, 2004). 
We focused on minimal groups to test the psychological impact of group 
membership per se on this process, independently of variables (e.g., previous negative 
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attitudes, social status) that may affect confrontation of bias in more enduring groups. 
However, whereas the group identities of the participant and the person making the biased 
comment were experimentally defined by assignment to minimal groups, we focused on 
responses to a form of bias that has important “real-world” consequences – racial bias. 
Verbal expressions of racial bias perpetuate negative feelings and beliefs against the 
targeted groups, which have serious consequences for targets’ physical and mental health 
and wellbeing (for recent meta-analysis, see Paradies et al., 2015; Schmitt, Branscombe, 
Postmes & Garcia, 2014). In a recent study, undergraduates from different ethnic 
backgrounds reported hearing an average of nine comments targeting other ethnic groups 
in the course of one week (Dickter & Newton, 2013), revealing that such comments are 
still prevalent, even in traditionally liberal contexts such as universities. 
We hypothesized that group membership (specifically whether a person making a 
racially biased remark is an ingroup or an outgroup member) and internal motivation to 
respond without prejudice would jointly influence the degree to which participants would 
confront the person who made the comment.  In particular, we predicted that, because 
people tend to attribute negative actions more to the character of an outgroup than an 
ingroup member (Hewstone, 1990; Pettigrew, 1979) and attributions to a person’s 
prejudice are a key factor in confrontation of bias (Dickter, 2012; Lee et al., 2012), 
participants would (a) generally confront an outgroup more than an ingroup member for 
making a racially biased remark, and (b) this effect would be mediated by negative 
dispositional attributions to the commenter, particularly relating to prejudice. However, 
we anticipated that individual differences in motivation to respond without prejudice 
would moderate this effect. Specifically, because people who are more internally 
motivated to respond without prejudice (high IMS) adhere more strongly to anti-bias 
standards that transcend group membership, they were expected to confront bias to a 
higher degree, regardless of the group membership of the person expressing the bias.   
 
Study 1 
Study 1 investigated how individual differences in internal motivation to respond 
without prejudice (IMS) and the group membership of the person expressing bias jointly 
affect the degree to which people confront bias. Participants in Study 1 were led to believe 
they were interacting with a person who was either an ingroup member or an outgroup 
member based on the preferences they expressed for the paintings of one of two artists, 
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Klee or Kandinsky (Tajfel et al., 1971). In the context of a chat-room interaction, 
participants witnessed the other person making a biased online comment against a racial 
group to which neither the participant nor the other person belonged (Blacks, or Latinos 
if the participant identified as Black). We examined participants’ chat-room response to 
that comment and subsequently asked participants to describe their response on 
dimensions of confrontation and rate the other person’s characteristics. These 
characteristics included general positive and negative qualities, as well as an item, close-
minded, which is particularly strongly related to White bias (Sommers & Norton, 2006). 
Because individuals’ perceptions of their own behaviors often differ from those of third-
party observers (Pronin, 2009), we investigated our hypotheses with respect to both 
participants’ perceptions of their own responses to the biased comment (i.e., self-reported 
confrontation) and independent coders’ ratings of these responses (i.e., rated 
confrontation). 
We hypothesized that people who are relatively high in internal motivation to 
respond without prejudice (i.e., high IMS) would confront bias more strongly, because 
they have strongly internalized egalitarians standards (Plant & Devine, 1998, 2009) and 
have been shown to respond particularly negatively emotionally when they witness bias 
(Schmader et al., 2012).  
In addition, based on previous research showing that people are more likely to 
discount negative behaviors and their reflection on the character of ingroup than outgroup 
members (Hewstone, 1990; Maass Salvi, Arcuri & Semin, 1989; Pettigrew, 1979), we 
hypothesized that participants would confront an ingroup to a lesser degree than an 
outgroup member. However, we anticipated that this effect would occur primarily for 
participants low in IMS, for whom internalized egalitarian standards are relatively weak, 
and not for those high in IMS, who adhere strongly to egalitarian standards across 
situations (Plant & Devine, 1998, 2009). In addition, based on previous research 
supporting the link between perceptions of bias and confrontation (Dickter, 2012; Lee et 
al., 2012), we expected this pattern of confrontation of bias to be mediated by attribution 
of bias-related characteristics to the ingroup or outgroup member who made a racially 
biased remark.  
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Method 
Participants. Participants were 131 adults living in the United States (59 men, 72 
women; mean age = 38.94 years, SD = 12.40). The majority of participants (80%) 
identified as Caucasian/Non-Hispanic White; 6% identified as Black/African-American, 
6% as Hispanic/Latino 5% as Asian/Pacific Islander, and less than 1% as American 
Indian/Alaska Native. 2% of participants choose other identification13. Participants were 
recruited through Amazon’s Mechanical Turk. The protocol for the research (for both 
Study 1 and Study 2) was approved by the Institutional Review Board (IRB) of the 
university where one of the authors is affiliated. 
Procedure. After participants provided their basic demographic information (age, 
gender, race/ethnicity, education, employment status), we asked them to complete the 
Kandinsky/Klee preference task, in order to manipulate group membership. In the task, 
participants were presented with a sequence of pairs of paintings from Kandinsky and 
Klee. For each pair, they were asked to select the painting they preferred. Participants 
were then assigned either to the Kandinsky or the Klee group randomly, but ostensibly 
based on their systematic preference for one of the two painters (for a detailed description 
of the Kandinsky/Klee paradigm, see for example, Bornstein, et al, 1983; see also Tajfel 
et al., 1971). To reinforce the perceived similarity among group members, we further told 
participants, “Being a member of the Klees or of the Kandinskys has been shown to relate 
to personality variables, such as general outlook in life and sociability. In addition, 
previous research has shown that members of each group tend to find a lot of similarities 
among themselves and are often surprised to realize they have much more in common 
than they would have initially thought.” In addition, to enhance the impact of the 
manipulation, we asked participants why they believed they were a Klee or a Kandinsky 
(depending on their random assignment).  
Participants next read that the study was part of a research project in personality 
examining how people with similar or different characteristics interact together in an 
online setting (our cover story). They were also informed that they would interact with 
another person (supposedly also recruited through MTurk) online, who could be a 
                                                          
13 While it is possible that minority and majority group members react differently to expressions of bias 
made by a majority group member against a minority group, analyzing those potential differences was not 
the aim of the current paper, nor did we have enough statistical power to do so. If we include only 
participants who identified as Caucasian/Non-Hispanic White in the analysis, or only participants who did 
not identify as Black/African-American, the pattern of results of both Study 1 and 2 remains the same.  
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member of the same or of a different “artistic preference” group. The “other person” was 
actually fictitious; the responses made by this person were preprogrammed as part of the 
experiment. In order to make the interaction more realistic, participants were asked to 
wait for another person to join them online. After a brief period (approximately one 
minute), they were told that another person was found.  
Participants were then presented the other person’s profile. The other person was 
always portrayed as a 32 years-old Caucasian/Non-Hispanic White, employed for wages 
and a high-school graduate. We matched the other person’s gender to the participant’s 
gender. Embedded in profile was also information about whether the other person 
belonged to the same or to a different “artistic preference” group (the group membership 
manipulation). To maintain the salience of group identities, we subsequently referred to 
the other (fictitious) person as “the other Klee” or “the other Kandinsky” when the person 
was presented as having the same group membership as the actual participant. If the 
fictitious person was presented as having a group membership different than that of the 
actual participant, we used term “the Klee” or “the Kandinsky.” 
Participants were told that they and the other person would interact together by 
taking turns answering questions and giving feedback. This was achieved by simulating 
a chat paradigm in Qualtrics, using a sequence of screens and piped text. Participants 
were always assigned to answer a non-racially relevant question first, and received neutral 
pre-programmed feedback to their answer, supposedly from the other person. After 
receiving the bogus feedback, participants were asked to submit a final answer, in which 
they could choose to incorporate the other person’s feedback or not. Then, the roles were 
reversed, and participants were informed that it would be their turn to give feedback to 
an answer from the other person in the study. 
Next, all participants read that the other (fictitious) person had been assigned the 
question, “If you could change anything about the way you were raised, what would it 
be?” The other person’s preprogrammed answer represented a biased comment toward a 
racial or ethnic minority group to which the actual participant did not belong.  For Non-
Black participants, that group was Blacks.  When the participant identified as 
Black/African-American, the comment was directed toward Latinos.  This procedure 
allowed us to include members of all racial and ethnic groups in our analyses. 
The other person’s answer to the question about what they would the change about 
the way they were raised was designed to be disparaging, explicitly prejudiced and 
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stereotypical.  The other person answered, “I was raised in a neighborhood with lots of 
Blacks [or for Black participants, Hispanics], so I was always scared. I wish I had been 
raised in a friendlier neighborhood with people who were more like me. Even today I 
don't like being around Blacks [Hispanics], they are so aggressive all the time.”  
At this point, the actual participant was asked to give feedback to the other person 
about his or her answer. To emphasize that how the participant responded could have 
consequences in this context, the participant was reminded that the other person could 
change his or her answer after reading the feedback.  
After participants submitted their feedback, they were asked to respond to some 
measures about the interaction (they were assured that their answers would not be shown 
to the other person). Participants were asked to rate their feedback to the other person. 
Among filler items intend to distract them from the main focus of the research, 
participants were asked the extent their feedback was intended to “Be assertive,” “Be 
Critical,” “Show displeasure,” “Show disagreement,” “Be firm,” and to “Confront the 
[[other] Klee/[other]Kandinsky] because you disagreed with what he/she said,” from 1 = 
not at all to 7 = very much (α = .87). In order to maintain the cover story, we also asked 
participants about the other person’s intention when giving feedback.  
Participants then rated, from 1 = not at all to 7 = very much, the extent to which 
nine different adjectives characterized the other person. Among those adjectives, we 
included close-minded, the characteristics most associated with White racists (Sommers 
& Norton, 2006). A principal components factor analysis revealed that these adjectives 
formed two factors. The first factor, which explained 57.16% of the variance (eigenvalue 
= 5.72; factor loadings from .74 to .91) comprised six positive adjectives (friendly, funny, 
outgoing, creative, sensible, fair; α = .92). The second factor, which explained 15.22% of 
the variance (eigenvalue = 1.52; factor loadings .73 and .85) included two negative 
adjectives that are less related to racism (old-fashioned and strict; r(129) = .35, p < .001). 
Close-minded loaded on both factors (loadings of -.52 and .63, respectively for factor 1 
and 2); for this reason, we opted to analyze this item separately.  
Finally, participants were asked to complete Plant and Devine’s (1998) internal 
motivation to respond without prejudice (IMS) and external motivation to respond 
without prejudice (EMS) scales (we selected three items of each scale; α = .91 and α = 
.93, respectively).  
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After the study was completed, three independent judges (two female, one male) 
rated participants’ responses to the other person’s biased remark in the chat-room. Judges 
rated the extent, from 1 = not at all to 7 = very much, to which participants intended to 
confront the other participant, using two items (“To what extent did the participant intend 
to confront the other person,” “To what extent did the participant intend to disagree with 
the other person”). The judges’ ratings showed good interrater reliability, intraclass 
correlation coefficient = .86. 
We removed from the sample two participants who expressed suspicion about 
interacting with a real person in their feedback to the other participant. Thus, the final 
sample consisted of 129 participants14. 
 
Results 
We first analyzed the correlations among IMS, EMS, positive characteristics, 
negative characteristics, attributions to bias and confrontation of bias (self-reported and 
rated by judges). The correlation coefficients for these measures are presented in Table 
1. As expected, participants higher in IMS (but not participants higher in EMS) reported 
confronting the biased comment more, and their responses were also rated as being more 
confrontational.  Participants who perceived the other person less positively, more 
negatively and as more biased also confronted to a higher degree, in both self-reported 
and rated measures. Consistent with previous work (Devine, Plant, Amodio, Harmon-
Jones & Vance, 2002), EMS and IMS were not significantly correlated. 
 
Table 1. Correlations among the measures included in Study 1. 
 
Confront 
(self-
reported) 
Confront 
(rated) 
Close-
mindednes
s 
Positive 
character. 
Negative 
character. 
IMS 
Confront (rated) .68**      
Close-mindedness .55** .56**     
Positive 
characteristics 
-.36** -.45** -.56**    
Negative characteristics .35** .33** .48** -.20*   
IMS      .22* .36** .25**   -.30** .14  
EMS      .04      -.06      -.10        .14 .02 -.09 
Note: * p < .05; ** p < .01 
  
                                                          
14 Including these participants in the analysis does not change the results. 
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About a third of participants reported not confronting the other person (i.e., the 
mean rating for their answers was of two or less on a scale ranging from 1 = not at all to 
7 = very much). Similarly, judges rated 30% of the responses as not confrontational 
(corresponding to a score of two or less on a scale ranging from 1 = not at all to 7 = very 
much).  
Self-reported confrontation. In our minimal group paradigm, half of participants 
were told that they belonged to the Klees and half participants were told they belonged to 
the Kandinskys. To ensure that the group label assigned to participants did not influence 
the results, we first regressed self-reported confrontation, on participant’s group label 
(Klee vs. Kandinsky) and group membership (ingroup vs. outgroup), both dummy coded, 
IMS (centered; M = 5.58, SD = 1.55, measured on a 1-7 scale), and their interaction terms. 
We also included EMS (centered; M = 3.08, SD = 1.95, measured on a 1-7 scale) and the 
interaction term of IMS and EMS.  
The model explained a significant amount of variance in self-reported 
confrontation, adjusted R2 = .14, F(9, 119) = 2.15, p = .030. However, as expected, the 
group label each participant was assigned (Klee or Kandinsky) did not predict self-
reported confrontation (p = .230), nor did it significantly interact with the other variables 
(all p > .255). Therefore, we collapsed across participant’s group in all subsequent 
analysis.  
Our main prediction was that participants would confront an ingroup member less 
than an outgroup member. We also expected this effect to be moderated by IMS (but not 
by EMS). In order to test our predictions, we regressed self-reported confrontation on 
group membership (0 = ingroup, 1 = outgroup), IMS, and their interaction term. We also 
included EMS and the interaction between EMS and IMS in the model to control for any 
effects of EMS. 
This model explained a significant amount of variance in self-reported 
confrontation, adjusted R2 = .06, F(5, 123) = 2.58, p = .029. Both EMS and the interaction 
between EMS and IMS were not significant (p > .400). There was also no significant 
main effect of group membership, B = .26, SE = .30, p = .382, sr2 = .01. There was a 
significant effect of IMS, B = .44, SE = .14, p = .002, sr2 = .07. The higher participants 
scored on IMS, the more they reported confronting the other person. Importantly, there 
was a significant interaction between group membership and IMS, B = -.42, SE = .19, p 
= .033, η2p = .03.  
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As illustrated in Figure 1, among participants who scored high on IMS (i.e., one 
standard deviation above the mean), we found no significant effect of group membership, 
B = -.39, SE = .42, p = .357, sr2 = .01. Participants who scored high in IMS reported 
confronting an ingroup member (estimated mean = 3.89) as much as an outgroup member 
(estimated mean = 3.50). However, among participants who scored low on IMS (i.e., one 
standard deviation below the mean) there was a significant effect of Group Membership, 
B = .93, SE = .43, p = .034, sr2= .03. Participants low in IMS reported confronting an 
ingroup member less (estimated mean = 2.50) than an outgroup member (estimated mean 
= 3.43). 
 
Figure 1. Interaction between group membership (ingroup or outgroup member) and 
internal motivation to respond without prejudice (IMS) on predicted scores of self-
reported confrontation 
 
We expected that the extent participants recognized the other participant as biased 
would mediate the relationship between group membership and self-reported 
confrontation. Because close-minded is a characteristic more closely associated with 
White racists than old-fashioned or strict, or any positive characteristics, it more closely 
captures attributions to biased characteristics. Nevertheless, we also included the general 
positive and negative scales in the model to test for the effect of close-minded over other 
general characteristics. Furthermore, we expected the mediation to be significant only for 
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participants low in IMS, because participants high in IMS tend to be more sensitive to 
expressions of bias in ways that likely transcend group membership. 
We tested this proposed moderated mediation using the PROCESS macro for SPSS 
(Hayes, 2013). We used Model 8, which allows for multiple mediators and a moderator 
of the relation between (a) the independent variable and the dependent variable and (b) 
the independent variable and the mediators. In the model, we included close-mindedness, 
positive characteristics and general negative characteristics as mediators; we treated IMS 
as a moderator. We tested the proposed moderated mediation using a bias-corrected 95% 
Confidence Interval based on 10,000 bootstrap samples.  
There was a significant interaction effect between group membership and IMS for 
close-mindedness, B = -.46, CI = [-.92, -.01]. No similar interaction effects were found 
for positive characteristics or general negative characteristics. The regression coefficients 
for participants low and high in IMS are detailed in Figure 2a.  
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Figure 2. The effect of group membership on (a) self-reported confrontation and (b) 
rated confrontation is mediated by participants’ attribution of a bias-related 
characteristic (but not by the attribution of general positive and negative characteristics) 
and this mediation is moderated by IMS.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: The bolded values above the line are regression coefficients for participants low in IMS (-
1SD); the italicized values below the line are regression coefficient for participants higher in IMS 
(+1SD). *p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001. 
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As expected, attributions of closemindedness to the other person was a significant 
mediator of the relation between group membership and self-reported confrontation for 
participants low in IMS (1 SD below the mean), indirect effect = .43, CI = [.06, .95]. 
Participants low in IMS attributed more close-mindedness to an outgroup member than 
to an ingroup member, B = 1.32, p = .011. Attributions of closemindedness further 
predicted self-reported confrontation, B = .26, p = .036. In addition, there was no evidence 
that group membership influenced self-reported confrontation independent of its effect 
on close-mindedness, B = .59, p = .170 among those low in IMS. The same mediation 
effect was not found for participants high in IMS (1 SD above the mean), indirect effect 
= -.02, CI = [-.38, .33]. Participants high in IMS perceived an ingroup member as similarly 
close-minded as an outgroup member, B = -.15, p = .772.  
We hypothesized that the attribution of a bias-related characteristic (close-
mindedness) would primarily mediate the relationship between group membership and 
self-reported confrontation. Supporting that hypothesis, attributions of positive 
characteristics did not mediate the effect of group membership on Self-reported 
confrontation for participants higher in IMS, indirect effect = .01, CI = [-.09, .15] and 
lower in IMS, indirect effect = -.02, CI = [-.23, .04]. Likewise, attribution of general 
negative characteristics did not mediate the effect of group membership on self-reported 
confrontation, indirect effect = .01, CI = [-.08, .21] and indirect effect = .09, CI = [-.03, 
.37] for participants high and low in IMS, respectively.  
Judges’ ratings of participants’ confrontation. We expected the results for 
judges’ rating for confrontation to mirror the findings for self-reported confrontation. 
That is, we predicted that judges would perceive participants’ feedback as more 
confrontational when participants were interacting with an ingroup member than when 
participants were interacting with an outgroup member. We further hypothesized that this 
effect would be mediated by participants’ perceptions of the other person as close-
minded.  
We regressed the judges’ ratings on group membership, IMS the interaction term 
of Group Membership and IMS, EMS and the interaction term of IMS and EMS. The 
model explained a significant amount of variance, adjusted R2 = .12, F(5, 123) = 4.37, p 
= .001. The pattern of results was similar to the findings for participants’ self-ratings. 
There was no significant main effect of EMS nor an interaction effect of EMS and IMS 
(both p > .630). We also did not find a main effect of group membership, B = .14, SE = 
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.32, p = .664, sr2 < .01. There was a significant effect of IMS, B = .60, SE = .15, p < .001, 
sr2 = .11. The responses of participants who scored higher on IMS were rated by the 
independent judges as more confrontational. There was also a marginally significant 
interaction between group membership and IMS, B = -.36, SE = .20, p = .077, sr2 = .02. 
Judges’ ratings revealed that among participants who scored high in IMS there was no 
difference between the responses of participants to an ingroup member (estimated mean 
= 4.62) compared to an outgroup member (estimated mean = 4.19), B = -.43, SE = .45, p 
= .335, sr2 = .01. Among participants who scored low in IMS, judges perceived their 
confrontation of bias expressed by the other person as somewhat, but not significantly, 
weaker when the other person was an ingroup member (estimated mean = 2.72) rather 
than an outgroup member (estimated mean = 3.44), B = .72, SE = .46, p = .117, sr2 = .02.  
In the previous analysis, we found that close-mindedness (but not attribution of 
general positive or negative characteristics) mediated the relation between group 
membership and self-reported confrontation. We further tested whether close-minded 
would be a significant mediator of the relation between group membership and judges’ 
ratings of participants’ confrontation. In order to do so, we again used the PROCESS 
macro for SPSS (Hayes, 2013), Model 8, with the same potential mediators and 
moderator. We used 10000 bootstrap samples and a bias-corrected 95% Confidence 
Interval.  
Results for rated confrontation replicate the findings for self-reported confrontation 
(see Figure 2b). The attribution of close-mindedness mediated the relation between group 
membership and rated confrontation for participants low in IMS, indirect effect = .41, CI 
= [.06, .91], but not for participants high in IMS, indirect effect = -.02, CI = [-.40, .28]. 
Participants low in IMS perceived an outgroup member as more close-minded than an 
ingroup member, B = -1.32, p = .011; close-mindedness, in turn predicted rated 
confrontation, B = .40, p = .003. Among those low in IMS, there was no evidence that 
group membership influenced rated confrontation independent of its effect on close-
mindedness, B = .23, p = .602. 
Attributions of positive characteristics and of general negative characteristics did 
not mediate the effect of group membership on rated confrontation for participants high 
in IMS (indirect effect = .01, CI = [-.17, .21] and indirect effect = .01, CI = [-.08, .20], 
respectively) and low in IMS (indirect effect = -.04, CI = [-.29, .06] and indirect effect = 
.07, CI = [-.05, .36], respectively), suggesting that the attribution of behavior to bias-
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related characteristics to the person expressing bias (and not general positive or negative 
evaluations of the other person) explains why participants low in IMS confronted an 
ingroup member to a lesser degree than an outgroup member.  
 
Discussion 
In the present study, IMS (but not EMS, as expected) moderated the extent people 
were willing to confront an ingroup (vs. an outgroup) member. Participants who scored 
high in IMS did not respond differently to an ingroup and an outgroup member who acted 
biased. Because they have internalized egalitarian standards for behavior, people high in 
IMS tend to be more responsive to expressions of bias than people low in IMS (Schmader 
et al., 2012). To the extent they are more sensitive to expressions of bias, people higher 
in IMS are more likely to attribute those expressions to internal characteristics of the 
person and to confront more. This finding is also in line with previous research showing 
that people who are more motivated to promote equality tend to confront bias more (Swim 
& Hyers, 1999).  
By contrast, people low in IMS tended to show ingroup favoritism, confronting an 
ingroup member less strongly than an outgroup member. Furthermore, perceptions of the 
other person as close-minded (the characteristic most associated with White racists; 
Sommers & Norton, 2006) mediated the relation between group membership and both 
self-reported and rated confrontation for participants lower in IMS. Participants who have 
weaker internalized egalitarian values were less likely to perceive an ingroup member 
(vs. an outgroup member) as biased, which, in turn, predicted confrontation of bias. 
Attributions of positive and negative characteristics less associated with racism were not 
significant mediators of the relation between group membership and confrontation of 
bias. These findings further suggest that confrontation is predicted by the extent witnesses 
make attributions of the biased behavior to dispositional characteristics of the actor, and 
not by more general measures of liking or disliking.  
Even though previous studies have shown that old-fashioned is also a characteristic 
associated with racial bias (Sommers & Norton, 2006), our results suggest that the old-
fashioned and close-minded items measured different constructs. The reason for the 
difference between Sommers and Norton’s (2006) results and our own results may be due 
to sample differences (undergraduate students and people in public places vs. MTurk 
workers) or to changes in people’s perceptions that occurred in the time interval between 
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their data collection and ours. Nevertheless, this single-item measure of attribution of 
bias-related characteristics is a limitation of the current study, which we will address in 
Study 2.  
The degree to which participants confronted was analyzed in two ways: through 
participants self-reports of the degree to which they had confront and through judges’ 
ratings of participants’ actual responses. As mentioned, participants low in IMS reported 
confronting an outgroup member more than an ingroup member. Although self-reported 
confrontation and rated confrontation were strongly correlated (see Table 1), the results 
for rated confrontation showed a similar but non-significant trend (p = .117). The 
difference between self-reported and rated confrontation results may be due to 
participants’ relying primarily on their feelings and intentions when evaluating their own 
responses, but judges’ relying more on the actual responses gave by participants (Pronin, 
2009). Because participants have direct access to their own thoughts and goals, 
participants’ ratings may be more sensitive to contextual factors than judges’ ratings. 
Contextual factors such as the shared membership with the person expressing bias may 
primarily affect participants’ intentions to confront, which are then translated to actual 
behavior only to a certain extent. Importantly, the effect of group membership through 
close-mindedness was significant both for self-reported and rated confrontation. As 
Hayes (2013) highlighted, a direct effect of the independent variable on the dependent 
variable is not a necessary precondition for mediation analysis: An effect can be 
transmitted by an independent variable through a mediator on a depend variable without 
a direct association of the independent and dependent variables. 
We note that the attributions of characteristics to the other person were measured 
after self-reported confrontation. While we argue that attributions of characteristics 
associated with racism predict confrontation of bias, it is also possible that participants 
may have made those attributions based on their decision to confront (or not confront) the 
other person. That is, they may have perceived an ingroup member as less close-minded 
not because they were less willing to confront him or her. We tested this alternative 
explanation in Study 2, by asking participants to make attributions for to an ingroup or an 
outgroup member who expressed bias, without asking them to decide whether to confront 
or not confront him or her. We also improved the reliability of the measure of attribution 
of bias-related characteristics to the other person, by including additional adjectives 
associated with White racial bias (Sommers & Norton, 2006). 
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Study 2 
Study 2 aimed to test the hypothesis that people lower in IMS would attribute an 
expression of racial bias more to dispositional characteristics of an outgroup member, 
relative to an ingroup member, even if they did not have the chance to confront that 
person. Because participants higher in IMS tend to be more sensitive to expressions of 
bias from another person (Schmader et al., 2012), we expected that participants higher in 
IMS would generally perceive the commenter as more biased than participants lower in 
IMS, and that they would not differentiate between ingroup and outgroup members. 
In order to test these hypotheses, we again manipulated group membership using a 
minimal group paradigm. Participants were then presented with a profile, with answers 
supposedly from a previous participant of the study, who could either be an ingroup or an 
outgroup member. The actual participants were asked to form an opinion of that person, 
based on the profile. Among other neutral answers, we embedded in the profile the biased 
remark used in Study 1. We then measured participants’ attribution of bias-related 
characteristics to the other person, using adjectives generally associated with White 
racists (Sommers & Norton, 2006). 
 
Method 
Participants.  Participants were 123 adults living in the United States (57 men, 66 
women; mean age = 36.72 years, SD = 12.53). The majority of participants (80%) 
identified as Caucasian/Non-Hispanic White; 6% identified as Black/African-American, 
5% as Asian/Pacific Islander, 6% as Hispanic/Latino and 2% as American Indian/Alaska 
Native. 2% of participants choose other identification. Participants were recruited through 
Amazon’s Mechanical Turk. 
Procedure. After reading that the study was about how people form opinions about 
others who are similar or different from themselves (our cover story), participants 
completed the same Kandinsky/Klee preference task we used in Study 1 to establish group 
membership.  After selecting which painting they preferred from a sequence of pairs, we 
assigned participants (randomly, but ostensibly based on their preferences) to the Klees 
group or to the Kandinskys groups. Then, they were told that their task was to form an 
opinion of another person who had participated in a previous survey, based on his or her 
profile. Participants were presented with the same profile used in Study 1, which provided 
demographic information for the other person and information indicating whether the 
 Witnesses’ confrontation of racial bias  
 
 
68 
 
other person was an ingroup or an outgroup member (i.e., a member of the Klee or 
Kandinsky group). The profile included answers supposedly from the other person, on 
trivial questions. Among four filler questions and answers, we embedded the same 
question and biased answer we used in Study 1.  
 Participants were asked to rate the other person on positive and negative adjectives, 
using a scale ranging from 1 = not at all to 7 = very much. We used the same adjectives 
from Study 1 and added four negative adjectives that were shown to be associated with 
White racists (insecure, ignorant, naïve, and fearful of change; Sommers & Norton, 2006). 
A principal components factor analysis revealed a three factor structure. The first factor, 
which we called bias-related characteristics, explained 38.25% of the variance 
(eigenvalue = 4.97; factor loadings from .77 to .67) and included close-minded plus the 
four negative adjectives added in Study 2 (α = .83). The second factor, positive 
characteristics, explained 14.19% of the variance (eigenvalue = 1.85; factor loadings from 
.80 to .64) and included the positive adjectives (α = .82). The last factor, general negative 
characteristics explained 9.22% of the variance (eigenvalue = 1.20; factor loadings from 
.75 to .59) and included old-fashioned and strict (r(121) = .36, p < .001). Finally, 
participants completed the IMS (α = .81) and EMS (α = .93) items used in Study 1.  
 
Results 
We began by analyzing the correlations among our variables of interest. As in Study 
1, EMS and IMS were not significantly correlated, r(121) = -.10, p = .277. Participants 
who scored higher in IMS attributed bias-related characteristics to the other person more 
strongly, r(121) = .28, p = .002, but not positive characteristics, r(121) = -.12, p = .183, 
or general negative characteristics, r(121) = .06, p = .483. Conversely, participants who 
scored higher in EMS attributed more positive characteristics to the other person, r(121) 
= -.24, p = .007, but not bias-related characteristics, r(121) = -.13, p = .144, or general 
negative characteristics, r(121) = -.01, p = .889.  
We expected, based on the rationale and findings of Study 1, that (a) participants 
high in IMS would attribute bias-related characteristics to an ingroup member as strongly 
as to an outgroup member when the person expressed bias; (b) participants low in IMS 
would, when the other person expressed racial bias, attribute bias-related characteristics 
less strongly to an ingroup member than to an outgroup member. We hypothesized that 
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this effect would primarily occur for attributions of bias-related characteristics (compared 
to attributions of general positive and negative characteristics).  
To test the prediction that participants would attribute bias-related characteristics 
more strongly to the other person when he or she was an outgroup member (vs. an ingroup 
member), depending on participants’ IMS (but not EMS), we regressed negative 
characteristics on group membership (ingroup vs. outgroup, dummy-coded; 0 = ingroup, 
1 = outgroup), IMS (centered; M = 5.77, SD = 1.34, measured on a 1-7 scale), EMS 
(centered; M = 3.24, SD = 1.85, measured in a 1-7 scale), the interaction term of group 
membership and IMS, and the interaction term of IMS and EMS. The model explained a 
significant amount of variance in attribution of bias-related characteristics, adjusted R2 = 
.12, F(5, 117) = 4.38, p = .001. We found no main or interaction effects of EMS (all p = 
.330). There was a significant main effect of IMS, B = .64, SE = .17, p < .001, sr2 = .11. 
The higher participants scored on IMS, the more strongly they attributed characteristics 
bias-related characteristics to the other person. There was also a significant main effect 
of group membership, B = .57, SE = .25, p = .017, sr2 = .04. Participants attributed bias-
related characteristics more strongly to an outgroup (M = 4.76) than to an ingroup (M = 
4.19). These effects were qualified by a significant interaction between group 
membership and IMS, B = -.48, SE = .20, p = .018, sr2 = .04.  
As predicted, there was no effect of group membership for participants who scored 
higher in IMS, B = -.08, SE = .34, p = .827, sr2 < .01. Participants higher in IMS attributed 
bias-related characteristics to an ingroup member (estimated mean = 5.05) as to an 
outgroup member (estimated mean = 4.98) to the same extent. Among participants who 
scored lower in IMS, we found a significant effect of group membership, B = 1.22, SE = 
.39, p = .002, sr2 = .07. Participants low in IMS attributed bias-related characteristics more 
strongly to an outgroup member (estimated mean = 4.55) than to an ingroup member 
(estimated mean = 3.33), replicating Study 1 results.   
We conducted a similar regression on positive characteristics. Based on Study 1 
results, we did not expect, and did not find, a significant effect of group membership, B 
= -.18, SE = .21, p = .383, sr2 = .01, or interaction effect between IMS and Group 
Membership, B = .24, SE = .17, p = .148, sr2 = .02. We found a marginally significant 
effect of IMS, B = -.25, SE = .14, p = .070, sr2 = .03. Participants higher in IMS attributed 
less positive characteristics to the other person. We then regressed general negative 
characteristics (strict and old-fashioned) on the same variables. The model did not explain 
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a significant amount of variance, adjusted R2 = -.02, F(5, 117) = .54, p = .745 and we 
found no main effects or interaction effect of group membership and IMS (all p > .300).  
 
Discussion  
The goal of Study 2 was to test differences in the attribution of bias-related 
characteristics to ingroup and outgroup members and the potential moderating effects of 
IMS. To maintain the credibility of the study, in Study 1 we measured attributions after 
participants had the opportunity to respond to the other person in a chat-room paradigm.  
Study 2 assessed these attributions, the hypothesized mediator of confrontation in Study 
1, without permitting an opportunity to confront the racial bias of the other person.  
As predicted, IMS (but not EMS) moderated the attribution of bias-related 
characteristics to an ingroup (vs. outgroup) member, replicating Study 1 results. 
Participants higher in IMS attributed bias-related characteristics as strongly to an ingroup 
member as to an outgroup member who openly expressed racial bias. Participants higher 
in IMS have higher egalitarian standards, and thus they tend to react more strongly to 
expressions of bias (Plant & Devine, 1998, 2009; Schmader et al., 2012). Because their 
reaction after witnessing any person expressing bias is stronger, it likely limits ingroup 
favoritism, especially in a minimal situation such as the one employed in this study.   
Participants low in IMS, however, attributed bias-related characteristics more 
strongly to an outgroup member who expressed bias than to an ingroup member who 
expressed bias. These results give further support to the hypotheses that participants lower 
in IMS tend to confront an ingroup member less (as found in Study 1) because they 
attribute their expression of bias less to his or her dispositional characteristics.  
 
General Discussion 
Although societies frequently have egalitarian norms and formal sanctions for 
exhibiting some forms of intergroup bias (e.g., laws against discrimination toward 
members of particular groups), individuals are often reluctant to personally confront the 
bias of others.  In addition to feelings of anxiety and even fear, which can inhibit 
confrontations of bias (Woodzicka & LaFrance, 2001), there are other interpersonal 
concerns about confronting bias.  People who confront bias frequently experience social 
backlash, under the form of negative emotions and dislike (Czopp, Monteith & Mark, 
2006; Dodd et al., 2001; Shelton & Stewart, 2004; Wang, Silverman, Gwinn & Dovidio, 
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2014).  These negative reactions are particularly strong when the person confronting the 
bias is the target of the negative treatment (Gulker et al., 2013; Kaiser & Miller, 2001, 
2003; Rasinski & Czopp, 2010).   
Nevertheless, confronting bias is not solely the responsibility of members of 
targeted groups; members of non-targeted groups may also play an important role in 
upholding justice norms and principles shared in society and, often, in their group (Drury 
& Kaiser, 2014). Whereas previous work has focused on differences in reactions to 
confrontations of bias by people who are or are not members of the target group, the 
present research investigated whether a shared or different group membership with a 
person who expresses bias toward another group affects the degree to which witnesses 
confront bias.  We also examined the processes potentially underlying this effect. 
Across the two experiments in the present research, we showed that a shared group 
membership with the person expressing bias and individual differences in motivation to 
respond without prejudice jointly determined the degree to which witnesses confronted 
bias. People who are higher in internal motivation to respond without prejudice perceived 
another person who expressed bias as being more prejudiced, regardless of his or her 
group membership, and confronted bias to a greater degree. We note that external 
motivation to respond without prejudice did not have an effect on attributions of biased-
related characteristics or self-reported or rated confrontation.  This set of findings further 
supports the fundamentally different motivational processes accompanying internal and 
external motivation to respond without prejudice, reinforcing the distinctions made in the 
construction of these measures (Plant & Devine, 1998, 2009). In addition, the present 
work extends the research of Schmader et al. (2012), which found that people higher in 
internal (but not external) motivation to respond without prejudice were more emotionally 
and physiologically distressed when they witnessed racial bias. We demonstrated that 
differences in emotional and physiological responses between people high and low in 
internal motivation to respond without prejudice have corresponding attributional and 
behavioral differences, in terms of attribution of bias-related characteristics to the person 
expressing bias and stronger confrontations of that person. 
Whereas individuals relatively high in internal motivation to respond without 
prejudice were equally responsive to bias expressed by an ingroup or outgroup member, 
those relatively low in this motivation responded less negatively – attributing bias-related 
characteristics less strongly to ingroup than outgroup members who made the same 
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offensive remark and confronting them less strongly.  We note that, in order to control 
for other factors (e.g., degree of identification, status of the group), we experimentally 
manipulated group membership using an established minimal group paradigm (Brewer & 
Silver, 1978; Tajfel et al., 1971).  Yet, consistent with other research on attributions for 
negative or positive behavior (Hewstone, 1990), even such incidental group membership 
produced weaker dispositional attributions for negative behavior by an ingroup than an 
outgroup member.  Of course, the generalizability of our findings to enduring groups may 
be moderated by a range of additional factors.  For example, people who perceive their 
group higher in status (Hewstone & Ward, 1985) and those more strongly identified with 
their group (Johns, Schmader & Lickel, 2005) are more likely to discount the negative 
behavior of a member of their group in order to maintain their group’s positive 
distinctiveness (Tajfel, 1982).  Future research might productively consider how these 
factors, and others, relate to the way people respond to ingroup and outgroup members 
who express bias toward another group and explore the extent to which these factors 
might moderate the responses of even those relatively high in internal motivation to 
respond without prejudice. 
The finding that participants low in IMS may discount biased behaviors from 
ingroup members (vs. outgroup members), attributing those behaviors less to internal 
bias-related dispositions of the actor, may contribute to an understanding of why people 
report relatively low levels of distress after witnessing an ingroup member expressing 
blatant bias (Kawakami, Dunn, Karmali & Dovidio, 2009).  To the extent people attribute 
the biased behavior of ingroup members to external factors, they would be expected to 
feel less negative emotions such as shame, an emotion associated with negative events 
perpetrated by ingroup members (Johns et al., 2005). Future research may investigate 
whether shame also mediates the relationship between a shared or different group 
membership with the person expressing bias and witnesses’ willingness to confront bias.  
We note that the confrontation rate found on Study 1 was somewhat higher than 
found in previous studies focusing on witnesses’ confrontations of bias. While about two 
third of participants’ responses were self-rated or rated by judges as being confrontational 
at least to some extent, less than one third of witnesses of bias responses’ were rated as 
confrontational in studies using recall or diary methodologies (Dickter, 2012; Dickter & 
Newton, 2013). The higher confrontation rates found in Study 1 may be due to the 
interaction paradigm we used. Participants were directly invited to give feedback to the 
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other person after he or she expressed bias, which constituted a well-defined opportunity 
to confront seldom found in face-to-face interactions (see Rattan & Dweck, 2010, for the 
use of a similar paradigm in research on targets’ confrontations of bias). In addition, 
confronting in this situation posed minimal interpersonal costs: the survey was 
anonymous and participants could not reasonably expect to interact with the other person 
again. Lastly, the asynchronous nature of the communication allowed ample time for the 
participant to reflect and prepare his or her response to the biased comment, which may 
differ from less deliberative responses in more immediate interactive settings (Fazio, 
1990).  
However, confrontations of bias may occur in a multitude of contexts. Given that 
social networks such as Twitter or Facebook attract large numbers of users (e.g., Pew 
Research Center, 2015), people may often face the decision to confront or not confront 
bias in such computer-mediated settings, which also pose minimal confrontation risk and 
allow more deliberative responses. Thus, even though generalizations of the current 
results to confrontations of bias in face-to-face interactions should be done with care, a 
better understanding of the processes occurring when people witness expressions of bias 
in computer-mediated settings is relevant in its own right.  
In conclusion, the present research showed that a shared group membership with 
a person expressing bias and internal motivation to respond without prejudice jointly 
determine witnesses’ willingness to confront bias. To the extent people have less 
internalized egalitarian standards they are more lenient with ingroup (vs. outgroup) 
members who express bias, perceiving them as less biased and consequently confronting 
them less. Because people who express racial bias are often friends or acquaintances 
(Dickter & Newton, 2013) these results importantly contribute to the understanding of 
witnesses’ confrontation of bias, a process that may fundamentally contribute for 
reducing or maintaining public expressions of prejudice.  
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Chapter IV 
 
Making us look bad: Group image threat and the normativity of witnesses’ confrontations 
of racial bias 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This chapter is based on:  
Lavado, S., Pereira, C. R. & Vala, J. Making us look bad: Group image threat and the 
normativity of witnesses’ confrontations of racial bias. (Submitted).15 
 
  
                                                          
15 As the first author, I was the primary responsible for the design, implementation, data analysis and 
writing of the studies reported in this paper. My co-authors (my doctoral advisors) provided fundamental 
guidance and supervision throughout the entire process, ultimately leading to the publication of this 
manuscript. 
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Abstract 
The present research investigated whether the prescriptive normativity of 
witnesses’ confrontation of bias against immigrants depends on the 
relationship between the persons expressing bias and the potential confronter. 
More specifically, we used the self-presentation paradigm to investigate 
whether it is more normative to confront a close person than a stranger. Study 
1 and Study 2 results suggest that confronting is normative both when the 
person expressing bias is someone close and a stranger, but that confronting 
a close person is especially normative. Study 3 further shows that the 
difference in the normativity of confronting a close person and a stranger is 
explained by threat to the image of a highly-valued group (e.g. groups of 
friends or family), which legitimizes confrontations of bias. Because 
prejudice is often expressed by close others, our results contribute to the 
understanding of normative processes that may reduce expressions of 
prejudice. 
 
Key-words: confrontation, prejudice, prescriptive norms, self-presentation 
paradigm, witnesses 
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Introduction 
Despite social norms that condemn expressions of racial bias in many societies 
(Crandall, Eshleman, & O'Brien, 2002; Dovidio & Gaertner, 2000; Katz & Hass, 1988; 
Vala & Pereira, 2012), those expressions are still prevalent (Dickter & Newton, 2013; 
Swim, Hyers, Cohen, Fitzgerald, & Bylsma, 2003), with serious negative consequences 
for the targets of prejudice (recent meta-analysis, see Paradies et al., 2015; Schmitt, 
Branscombe, Postmes & Garcia, 2014). One of the ways to reduce future expressions of 
bias and to motivate amendments from the person responsible for the negative comment 
is to confront that comment (Czopp, Monteith & Mark, 2006; Mallett & Wagner, 2011), 
that is, to publicly express dissatisfaction directly to the person being biased (Kaiser & 
Miller, 2004; Shelton, Richeson, Salvatore, & Hill, 2006). Importantly, confronting bias 
is not the sole responsibility of people who are, directly or indirectly, targets of bias. It is 
also the responsibility of majority-group members who witness biased behaviors. 
Because non-targets of bias report witnessing several prejudiced comments per 
week, even in traditionally liberal contexts such as universities (Dickter, 2012; Dickter & 
Newton, 2013), it is especially important to understand the conditions that facilitate or 
discourage witnesses’ confrontations of bias. Indeed, confrontations of bias can be 
especially persuasive when they are enacted by witnesses, rather than targets of bias, 
because it is more surprising and elicits less backlash (Rasinski & Czopp, 2010; Gulker, 
Mark & Monteith, 2013). One of the factors that may influence witnesses’ responses to 
expressions of bias is the extent the confrontation of such expressions is socially valued 
and approved, that is, the extent confronting bias is prescriptively normative.  
 
Prescriptive norms and witnesses’ confrontations of bias 
Prescriptive norms (also called injunctive or subjective norms) reflect the extent 
behaviors are valued, approved and perceived as desirable by society (Cialdini, Reno, & 
Kallgren, 1990; Dubois, 2003). These norms have been shown to influence several 
behaviors, including intergroup behaviors (Blanz, Mummendey, & Otten, 1997; Franco 
& Maas, 1999; Gaertner & Insko, 2001; Paluck, 2009; Pereira, Vala, & Leyens, 2009). 
In terms of confrontational behavior, people are expected to be more likely to confront 
if they perceive such interventions as normative. Accordingly, expectations about how 
others (including the confronted person) will evaluate the behavior may influence the 
decision to confront (Good, Moss-Racusin, & Sanchez, 2012; Swim & Hyers, 1999).  
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 Witnesses’ confrontations of bias are often positively evaluated, because they 
address socially unfair behaviors (Dickter, Kittel & Gyurovski, 2012; Lavado, Pereira, 
Dovidio & Vala, 2016). However, confrontations of bias may arouse anger and 
defensiveness, which strain social relationships (Czopp, et al., 2006). In addition, 
confronters are often perceived as impolite, oversensitive or troublemakers (Condor, 
2006; Swim & Hyers, 1999; see also Eliezer & Major, 2012; Kaiser & Miller, 2001) and 
people frequently argue others should “mind their own business” (e.g., Schwartz, 1973). 
Indeed, while it may generally be socially desirable to confront, several factors may 
increase or reduce such normativity.  
One of the factors that may influence the normativity of confrontational behaviors 
is the relationship between the person expressing bias and the potential confronter. 
Indeed, prescriptive norms vary depending on the specific context and the nature of the 
relationship between the individuals involved. For example, people feel that it is more 
appropriate to discuss emotionally charged topics with a friend than with a stranger (Clark 
& Taraban, 1991). Similarly, we predicted that it would be more normative to confront a 
close person (e.g., a friend, a relative) than a stranger. We further hypothesized that the 
extent it would be more normative to confront a close person (vs. a stranger) would be 
explained by two factors: threat to the image of an ingroup and the costs of confronting 
bias.  
Expressions of bias and group image threat. Because expressing bias against 
outgroups can be considered a failure to meet moral norms regarding fairness of treatment 
and justice (Dickter, et al, 2012; Effron, Miller, & Monin, 2012; Rutland, Killen & 
Abrams, 2010) and the moral behavior of group members is central to the formation of 
group impressions (Leach, Ellemers, & Barreto, 2007; Brambilla, Rusconi, Sacchi, & 
Cherubini, 2011; Brambilla, Sacchi, Rusconi, Cherubini, & Yzerbyt, 2012), witnessing 
an ingroup member expressing bias should threaten the image of the group. One of the 
possible strategy to deal with threats to the image of an ingroup is to reinforce the ingroup 
norms (Marques & Paez, 1994; Moreland & Levine, 1982), for example by confronting 
the person expressing bias. 
We hypothesize that threats to the image of an ingroup member would socially 
legitimize witnesses’ decision to confront prejudice. Actions that aim to protect a person’s 
group are generally perceived as socially appropriate and justified (Pereira, et al, 2009; 
Ramos, Pereira & Vala, 2016), especially when those actions benefit a group that is highly 
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valued (Kaiser, Hagiwara, Malahy, & Wilkins, 2009).  Thus, we predicted that to the 
extent that expressions of bias threatens the image of a valued group, people would 
perceive that they have social legitimacy (see Effron & Miller, 2012) to confront.  
People tend to value their membership in groups of friends or relatives more than 
they valued their membership in groups defined by criteria such as nationality (Lickel, et 
al, 2000). Accordingly, it is possible that only threats to the image of a highly valued 
group legitimizes, confrontations of bias, increasing the prescriptive normativity of the 
confrontational behavior. In other words, we expected that only threats to the image of a 
family or friends’ group, and not threats to the image of a social category, such as the 
Portuguese, would grant social approval to witnesses’ confrontation of bias.  
The costs of confronting bias. Confronting bias often entail high costs, such as 
being the target of negative emotions being labeled a “complainer” or even losing a much 
desired job opportunity (Czopp et al., 2006; Shelton & Stewart, 2004; Swim & Hyers, 
1999). The perceived costs of confronting are one of the most important predictors of the 
people’s willingness to confront bias (e.g., Ashburn-Nardo, Blanchar, Petersson, Morris, 
& Goodwin, 2014; Good, et al., 2012) and, importantly, the costs of confronting bias also 
predict observers’ evaluations of witnesses’ responses to bias (Lavado et al, 2016). Even 
though the costs of confronting appear to be more important predictors of observers’ 
attitudes toward non-confrontations of bias than observers’ attitudes toward 
confrontations of bias, because they make non-confrontations of bias more excusable 
(Lavado et al., 2016), we explored the influence of this variable on the prescriptive 
normativity of witnesses’ confrontational behavior. We hypothesize that the costs of 
confronting would reduce the normativity of confronting bias. People tend to anticipate 
less costs when confronting someone close than a stranger, because reactions of close 
people tend to be more predictable and less threatening (Ayres, Friedman, Leaper, 2009; 
Swim, Gervais, Pearson & Stangor, 2009). Thus, the perceived costs of confronting may 
mediate the influence of the person expressing bias (a close person vs. a stranger) on the 
normativity of confronting or not confronting bias. 
 
Overview 
The present research, consisting of three studies, tested the hypothesis that it 
would be more prescriptively normative for witnesses’ to confront bias when the person 
making a biased remark is a close person than when the person making that remark is a 
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stranger. We further predicted that this effect would be explained by differences in the 
extent people (a) feel that the expression of bias threatens the image of an ingroup, 
especially the image of a highly-valued ingroup (such as a group of friends or family)and 
(b) perceive confrontation as costly. 
We tested this predictions using the self-presentation paradigm. This paradigm 
was first proposed by Jellison and Green (1981) and subsequently used on several studies 
about prescriptive norms. It is based on the finding that people can use their knowledge 
of social norms to modulate their behavior in order to create positive or negative 
impressions on others (Jellison & Green, 1981). In this paradigm, research participants 
are explicitly asked to fill a survey either aiming to gain social approval and/or social 
disapproval. By doing so, participants should reveal what they think is more normative. 
A behavior that is more normative should be significantly more endorsed when 
participants are trying to gain social approval than when participants are trying to gain 
social disapproval. Several variations of the paradigm have been used, that varied in the 
design (between or within) and on the potential evaluator of the behavior (a general 
“other” or a specific person, like a parent or a teacher; for a review of the self-presentation 
paradigm, see Gilibert & Cambon, 2003; see also Alves & Correia, 2008). In the current 
paper, we used a between participant design in the first two studies and a within 
participant design in the third study, maintaining the evaluator unspecified. 
In the present studies, we asked participants to imagine hearing a comment that 
was biased against “immigrants” (Study 1) and “Black immigrants” (Study 2 and 3). We 
chose these groups because recent reports show that the prevalence of prejudiced behavior 
(under the form of, for example, verbal harassment in public places) against immigrants 
in general, but especially against immigrants from African countries, is still relatively 
high in Portugal, the country where the studies were conducted (Mendes & Candeias, 
2013; Santos, Oliveira, Kumar, Rosário, & Brigadeiro, 2006). At the same time, however, 
there are strong anti-prejudice norms in the country protecting the group (Pereira et al. 
2009; Vala, Lopes & Lima, 2008), which may contribute to the normativity of 
confrontation.  
Study1 
 Study 1 aimed to test the hypothesis that confronting bias is more normative when 
the person expressing bias is a close person (i.e., a friend, a relative) than when the person 
expressing bias is a stranger. Participants were invited to take part in a study investigating 
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“people’s opinion about different behaviors in several social contexts.” In order to 
examine beliefs about the normativity of confrontations of bias, participants were asked 
to imagine several scenarios, where a close person (a friend or a relative) or a stranger (of 
the same nationality) expressed bias. Participants were randomly assigned to one of three 
condition. They were either asked to rate how they would act in each scenario in order to 
present a positive image of themselves (social approval condition); in order to present a 
negative image of themselves (social disapproval condition); or according to their own 
opinion (standard condition). We hypothesized that the difference between the social 
approval and the social disapproval conditions would be larger when the person 
expressing bias was a close person rather than a stranger, suggesting that it is more 
normative to confront someone close than a stranger. 
 
Method 
Participants and design. 106 undergraduate students completed the survey (53 
women, 53 men, Mage = 20.72 years, SD = 4.39, 93% indicated they had Portuguese 
nationality, 1% indicated they had more than one nationality and 6% indicated they did 
not have Portuguese nationality16). Participants were recruited through the university, and 
completed the survey in class with no direct compensation. Participants were randomly 
assigned to a 3 (instructions: social approval; social disapproval; standard) X 2 
(relationship: close person vs. stranger) mixed factorial design where the former is a 
between factor and the latter is a within factor. 
Procedure. Following the self-presentation paradigm, we varied the instruction 
given to participants in each condition. In the social approval condition, participants were 
instructed “to answer the survey giving a positive image of yourself, that is, answering in 
a way that people who read your answers would approve and like you;” in the social 
disapproval condition, participants were instructed “to fill the survey giving a negative 
image of yourself, that is, answering in a way that people who read your answers would 
disapprove and dislike you;” finally, on the standard condition, participants read a 
standard instruction asking them “to fill the survey according to their own opinion. There 
are no right or wrong answers, as they all represent your honest opinion.”  
                                                          
16 Excluding participants that indicated a different nationality did not change the results in any of the 
studies reported in this paper. 
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Participants were asked to read six small scenarios (presented in appendix C), in 
which a person made a prejudiced comment against immigrants. Across scenarios, we 
varied the relationship between the person who expressed bias and the participant. 
Specifically, in half of the scenarios the prejudiced comment was made by someone close 
(a relative, a friend or a colleague) and in the other half the prejudiced comment was made 
by a stranger. 
In each scenario, participants were asked to indicate how they would respond to 
the comment in a 7-point scale ranging from 1= ignore the comment to 7 = say the 
comment was prejudiced. We submitted the six scenarios to principal axis factoring factor 
analysis using a promax rotation. The final solution contained two factors accounting for 
89.21% of the variance. The first factor included the scenarios where the author of the 
prejudiced comment was a stranger (loadings ranged from .93 to .96, other items loading 
< .08). The second factor included the scenarios where the author of the prejudiced 
comment was a close person (loadings ranged from .87 to .98, other items loadings < .03). 
At the end of the survey, participants were asked to provide demographic 
information (gender, age, nationality) and recall the instructions they received in the 
beginning of the survey. We removed from the sample 17 participants who failed to 
correctly recall the instructions17. Thus, the final sample included 89 participants.  
 
Results 
To test the hypothesis that the normativity of prejudice would depend on the 
relationship between the person expressing bias and the potential confronter, we ran a 
3(Instructions: social approval, social disapproval, standard) x 2(Relationship: close 
person vs. stranger) analysis of variance (ANOVA) with repeated measures on the last 
variable. The analysis revealed a significant main effect of instructions, F(2, 86) = 16.01, 
p < .001; η2p = .27. Participants in the social disapproval condition said they would 
confront less (M = 3.04, SD = 1.95) than participants in the social approval (M = 5.19, SD 
= 1.25; p < .001) and in the standard (M = 4.19, SD = 1.06; p = .004) conditions. These 
latter two conditions also differed significantly (p = .009). We found a main effect of 
relationship, F(1, 80) = 219.89, p < .001; η2p = .72. Participants said they would confront 
                                                          
17 Participants who failed to correctly answer the manipulation check were evenly distributed across 
instructions conditions, Χ2(2, N = 106) = 1.75, p = .417. 
 Witnesses’ confrontation of racial bias  
 
 
85 
 
more when the person expressing bias was a close person (M = 5.42, SD = 2.03) than 
when the person expressing bias was a stranger (M = 2.93, SD = 1.79).  
There was a significant interaction effect between instructions and relationship, F(2, 
86) = 14.74, p < .001; η2p = .26 (see figure 1). When the person expressing bias was a 
close person, there was a significant effect of instructions, F(2, 86) = 20.86, p < .001; η2p 
= .33. Participants in the social disapproval condition said they would confront less (M = 
3.74, SD = 2.39) than participants in the social approval (M = 6.39, SD = 1.27; p < .001) 
and in the standard (M = 6.00, SD = 1.19; p < .001) conditions, suggesting that confronting 
a close person is normative. No differences were found between social approval and 
standard conditions (p = .372).  
 
Figure 1. Means of confrontation for each instruction condition in Study 1. 
 
 
When the person expressing bias was a stranger there was also a significant effect 
of instruction, F(2, 86) = 10.23, p < .001; η2p = .19. Participants in the social approval 
condition said they would confront more (M = 4.00, SD = 1.69) than participants in the 
social disapproval condition (M = 2.35, SD = 1.93; p < .001) and in the standard (M = 
2.38, SD = 1.19; p < .001) conditions, suggesting that confronting a stranger is normative. 
There were no significant differences between social disapproval and standard conditions 
(p = .940). Thus, the interaction seems to be due to differences in the standard condition. 
When the person expressing bias was someone close, we found no difference between 
standard and social approval conditions, while the difference between standard and social 
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disapproval conditions was significant. A different pattern emerged when the person 
expressing bias was a stranger: there were no differences between standard and social 
disapproval conditions, but there were significant differences between standard and social 
approval conditions. 
Importantly, it should be noted that when the person expressing bias was a close 
person, both social approval and standard conditions means were well above the mid-
point of the scale, t(30) = 10.43, p < .001 and t(29) = 9.23, p < .001, respectively, while 
there was no difference between the mean and the scale mid-point in the social 
disapproval condition, t(27) = -.58, p = .567. When the person expressing bias was a 
stranger, there was no difference between social approval condition mean and the scale 
mid-point, t(30) < 0.01, p = 1.00, while both the standard and the social disapproval 
condition means were below the scale mid-point, t(29) = -7.47, p < .001 and t(27) = -4.53, 
p < .001, respectively.  These results suggest people are more certain they would and 
should confront a close person than a stranger. 
 
Discussion 
Study 1results offer direct evidence that confronting is generally perceived to be a 
normative response of witnesses of biased behaviors. Participants instructed to answer in 
order to obtain social approval said they would confront a prejudiced comment more than 
participants instructed to try to be socially disapproved, both when the person expressing 
bias was a stranger and a close person. These results converge with previous studies 
showing that people evaluate confrontational behaviors more positively than non-
confrontational behaviors (Dickter et al., 2012; Lavado et al., 2016). Results further 
suggest that confronting a close person is more normative than confronting a stranger. 
When the biased remark was made by a close person, the scores for both the social 
approval and the standard conditions were well above the scale midpoint, while the scores 
for social disapproval were at the mid-point. When the person expressing bias was a 
stranger, the means for all three conditions were below or at the mean point of the scale. 
These results suggest that people are more certain they should and would confront a friend 
than they are certain they should or would confront a stranger. 
In addition, it is common in the self-presentation paradigm to find no significant 
differences between the social approval and the standard conditions, because people in 
the standard condition often try to convey a positive impression of themselves when 
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answering (Gilibert & Cambon, 2003). Consistent with these assumption, when the biased 
comment was made by a close person we found no differences in the extent participants 
giving their own opinion and participants trying to convey a positive image of themselves 
would confront a biased comment. However, when the person expressing bias was a 
stranger, there were not only significant differences between the standard and the social 
approval conditions but also no difference between the standard and the social 
disapproval condition. Again, these results may suggest that it is more normative to 
confront a close person than a stranger. 
In this first study, we opted for using the general expression “a prejudiced 
comment” instead of giving examples of actual comments that could be considered 
biased. We used this strategy because what is considered to be an expression of prejudice 
may vary from person to person (Sommers & Norton, 2006). By using the expression “a 
prejudiced comment”, we guaranteed all participants imagined they had witnessed an 
expression of bias directed to immigrants, independently of the specific content of the 
comment. However, this approach has limitations, such that people may have imagined 
different comments when the person expressing bias was a close person or a stranger. In 
addition, in Study 1 we asked people to choose between confronting and ignoring the 
comment using a single item which may raise concerns about the construct validity of the 
confrontation measure. Study 2 overcomes these limitations. 
 
Study 2 
Study 2 aimed to replicate Study 1 results, again using the self-presentation 
paradigm (Jellison & Green, 1981).  However, Study 2 implemented three important 
improvements. First, we used a full between factorial design, where both the person who 
expresses bias (a friend or a stranger) and the self-presentation instructions were 
manipulated between-participants. Second, we presented participants with only one 
scenario, where we specified the biased comment made by either a friend or a stranger. 
Finally, we modified the normativity of confrontation measure in order to in order to 
allow participants to independently indicate the probability they would verbally confront 
and abstain from confronting when trying to obtain social approval, obtain social 
disapproval or convey their own opinion. 
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Method 
Participants and design. The study had a 3 (instructions: social approval; social 
disapproval; standard) X 2 (relationship: friend vs. stranger) between-factors design. 172 
Portuguese undergraduate students completed the study (142 women, 29 men, 1 did not 
specify gender, Mage = 20.30 years, SD = 4.07, 94% indicated they were Portuguese, 3% 
reported having more than one nationality and 3% indicated they had a different 
nationality). Participants completed the survey in class with no direct compensation.  
Procedure. Participants were randomly assigned to read a scenario where a person, 
either a friend or a stranger, made a biased comment. The scenario presented to 
participants was the following (stranger condition in brackets).  
“You are sitting outside a coffee shop with your friends. You are all having a 
conversation when a black immigrant walks by you. One of your friends [a 
stranger in the table next to you], who is Portuguese, says “I don’t understand 
how they keep letting immigrants to come and just ruin what is ours.” 
Participants were asked to indicate how they would react to the situation described 
in the scenario. Using the same instructions of Study 1, we randomly assigned a third of 
participants to give their honest opinion about how they would react (standard condition); 
a third of participants to convey a positive image of themselves (social approval 
condition); and a third of participants to convey a negative image of themselves (social 
disapproval condition). Under these instructions, participants were asked to rate the 
probability they would engage in different behaviors after hearing the biased comment, 
on a 6-point scale (1- not very likely, 6- very likely): “say the comment was prejudiced”, 
“show that the comment was incorrect”, “ignore the comment”, and “change the topic of 
conversation”. The responses were submitted to an exploratory factor analysis (using the 
principal axis factoring method of extraction), which revealed two factors. The first factor 
included the items measuring the probability of a verbal confrontation (the first two 
reported items) and explained 49.70% of the variance (eigenvalue = 1.99; factor loadings 
.89 and .92). Because they were highly correlated, the responses to these two items were 
averaged to form a behavior appropriateness scale, r(170) = .82, p < .001. The second 
factor included the items measuring the probability of not directly responding to the 
biased comment and explained 32.75% of the variance (eigenvalue = 1.31; factor loadings 
.65 and .63). However, this measure will not be further considered, due to the relatively 
weak correlation between the two items, r(170) = .39, p < .001. At the end of the survey, 
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participants were asked some demographic information and to recall the instructions they 
received in the beginning of the survey. We removed from the sample 22 participants who 
failed to correctly recall the instructions18. Thus, the final sample included 150 
participants. 
 
Results  
To test our main hypothesis that the normativity of confronting bias would depend 
on the relationship between the potential confronter and the person expressing bias, we 
ran a 3(Instructions: social approval, social disapproval, standard) x 2(Relationship: close 
person vs. stranger) ANOVA. The results, which generally replicated Study 1, are 
presented in Figure 2. There was a main effect of instructions, F(1, 144) = 42.64, p < .001; 
η2p = .37. Post-hoc analysis revealed that participants in the social disapproval condition 
rated the probability of confronting as lower (M = 1.89, SD = 1.48) than participants in 
the social approval (M = 4.37, SD = 1.47; p < .001) and standard conditions (M = 3.62, 
SD = 1.68; p < .001). The latter two conditions also differed significantly (p = .017). In 
addition, there was a main effect of the relationship, F(1, 144) = 26.99, p < .001; η2p = 
.16. Participants indicated they would more likely confront a friend (M = 3.89, SD = 1.84) 
than a stranger (M = 2.77, SD = 1.70).  
 
  
                                                          
18 Participants who failed to correctly answer the manipulation check were evenly distributed across 
relationship condition, Χ2(1, N = 172) = .16, p = .690 and instructions conditions, Χ2(2, N = 172) = 1.27, 
p = .529. 
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Figure 2. Means of confrontation for each instruction condition in Study 2. 
 
 
The analysis also revealed a significant interaction between instructions and 
relationship, F(2, 144) = 8.71, p < .001; η2p = .11. When the person expressing bias was 
a friend, there was a significant effect of instructions, F(2, 144) = 36.68, p < .001; η2p = 
.34. Participants instructed to obtain social disapproval said they were less likely to 
confront a friend (M = 1.98, SD = 1.55) than participants trying to obtain social approval 
(M = 4.83, SD = 1.13; p < .001) and answering according to their own opinion (M = 4.85, 
SD = 1.05; p < .001), and these latter two conditions did not differ significantly (p = .974), 
suggesting that it is normative to confront a friend. 
When the person expressing bias was a stranger, there was also a significant effect 
of instructions, F(2, 144) = 16.00, p < .001; η2p = .18. When the person expressing bias 
was a stranger, participants in the social disapproval condition said they were less likely 
to confront (M = 1.80, SD = 1.42) than participants in the social approval condition (M = 
3.94, SD = 1.64; p < .001). However, participants giving their own opinion said they were 
as likely to confront (M = 2.44, SD = 1.30) as participants in the social disapproval 
condition (p = .100) and less so than participants in the social approval condition (p < 
.001). 
The obtained results revealed it is normative to confront both a friend and a stranger. 
However, similarly to the results obtained in Study 1, Study 2 findings suggest that 
confronting a friend is more normative than confronting a stranger When the person 
expressing bias was a friend, both the standard and the social approval condition means 
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on the probability of confronting bias are above the scale mid-point, respectively t(25) = 
6.56, p < .001 and t(23) = 5.78, p < .001, while the mean of the social disapproval 
condition is well-below the scale mid-point, t(24) = -4.90, p < .001. When the person 
expressing bias was a stranger, however, there was no difference between the social 
approval condition and the mid-point of the scale, t(25) = 1.38, p = .181; while both the 
standard and the social disapproval conditions means are below the scale mid-point, 
respectively t(26) = -4.23, p < .001 and t(21) = -5.63, p < .001, suggesting that participants 
are more certain they should or would confront a friend compared with a stranger. 
 
Discussion 
Study 2 replicated Study 1 results. Participants aiming to obtain social approval said 
they would confront more than participants trying to obtain social disapproval. This was 
true both when the person expressing bias was a friend and a stranger, reinforcing the 
experimental evidence showing it is generally normative to confront expressions of 
prejudice. However, results also suggest that it is more normative to confront a friend than 
a stranger. When the person expressing bias was a stranger, the mean for the social 
approval was at the mid-point of the scale and the mean for the standard conditions was 
below it, suggesting that participants did not believe very strongly that they would or 
should confront a stranger. On the contrary, when the person expressing bias was a friend, 
the mean for both the social approval and the standard condition are well above the mid-
point of the scale, suggesting that participants were more certain that they should and 
would confront a friend who expresses bias.  
The results of the first two studies converge to show that confronting expressions 
of bias from both a close person and a stranger is normative, that is, that confronting is 
socially valued reaction to behaviors that are not in accordance with egalitarian norms. 
Results further suggest that it is more normative to confront a close person (vs. a stranger). 
In Study 3, we explore psychological mechanisms that may account for this result. 
 
Study 3 
At least two factors may explain why the prescriptive normativity of witnesses’ 
confrontations of bias depends on who the agent expressing bias is: the perceived costs 
of confronting and threat to the image of an ingroup – more specifically, a highly-valued 
ingroup such as a group of friends (Lickel et al., 2000). The costs of confronting were 
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previously shown to reduce the perceived appropriateness of responses to bias, even 
though they seem to be more important predictors of attitudes toward non-confrontational 
behaviors than attitudes toward confrontational behaviors (Lavado et al. 2016). Group 
image threat is an important predictor of intergroup behavior (Brambilla, Sacchi, Pagliaro 
and Ellemers, 2013), and because people tend to value actions aiming to protect an 
ingroup (Pereira et al, 2009), it may legitimize confrontations of bias, especially in highly-
valued groups, such as a group of friends (Lickel et al., 2000). 
In order to test the hypothesized mediators, we again applied the self-presentation 
paradigm. However, in the current study, we used a within-participants manipulation 
(Gilibert & Cambon, 2003), such that all participants answered once trying to gain social 
approval and once trying to gain social disapproval (the order was counterbalanced). This 
design allowed us to compute a normativity score for each participant, by subtracting the 
answers given in the social disapproval condition from the answers given in the social 
approval condition. The higher the score, the more normative the behavior was perceived 
to be. We then tested whether, as hypothesized, threats to the image of the group of friends 
and the costs of confronting mediate the relation between the person expressing bias and 
the normativity of confrontation of bias. 
 
Method 
Participants and design. 82 students completed the study (25 men, 57 women; 
Mage = 22.49 years, SD = 4.06; 96% participants indicated they were Portuguese, 2% 
indicated they had more than one nationality and 1% indicated a different nationality). 
Participants were recruited in a university library. All students present at the library at the 
recruitment time were approached by a female experimenter and asked to complete the 
survey, which was described as a survey on student’s opinions about social situations. 
They were offered a candy bar in exchange for their participation. About 90% of the 
approached students accepted participating. The experimenter was unaware of the 
condition presented in the survey she handled to each participant. The study had a 
2(instructions: social approval vs. social disapproval) x 2(order of instructions: negative 
first vs. positive first) x 2(relationship: friend vs. stranger) mixed factorial design, where 
the former was a within factor and the latter were between factors.  
Procedure. Participants were randomly assigned to read the same scenario used in 
Study 2 where either a friend or a stranger expressed bias. They were then asked to answer 
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(from 1 = disagree a lot to 6 = agree a lot) to four items measuring the extent hearing that 
person expressing bias would threaten the Portuguese image (two items: Your friend[the 
stranger]: “threaten the image of the Portuguese people”; “threaten the reputation of the 
Portuguese people”; r(80) = .95, p < .001) and the image of their group of friends (two 
items: Your friend[the stranger]: “threaten the image of your group of friends”; “threaten 
the reputation of your group of friends”; r(80) = .88, p < .001), adapted from Brambilla 
et al.(2013). Participants were also asked to rate the costs of confronting in that situation 
(3 items: saying that the comment was prejudiced would… 1 = be very easy. 6 = be very 
hard; 1 = be very safe, 6 = be very risky; 1 = have many positive consequences, 6 = have 
many negative consequences; α = .76). 
After, we applied the self-presentation paradigm. Participants were asked to 
indicate the probability they would confront prejudice if they wanted to convey a positive 
image of themselves (social approval condition) and if they wanted to convey a negative 
image of themselves (social disapproval condition). Thus, unlike the previous two studies, 
participants answered the same scale twice. Half participants read the social approval 
instructions first and then the social disapproval instructions; and the other half received 
the instructions in reversed order. Because the self-presentation paradigm posits that 
normativity is expressed by the difference between the answers given when trying to 
convey a positive and a negative image of the self, we computed a normativity score, 
subtracting the answers given in the social disapproval condition from the answers given 
in the social approval condition. The higher the score, the more normative confronting 
bias was perceived to be. We excluded four participants whose answers suggested they 
hadn’t understood the instructions (they gave the same, extreme answers both when 
instructed to answer in order to gain social approval and when instructed to answer in 
order to gain social disapproval).19 
 
Results  
We began by analyzing the correlations between the proposed mediators (costs of 
confronting, threat to the image of the Portuguese and threat to the image of the group of 
friends) and the normativity of confronting. The correlation coefficients are presented on 
Table 1. As expected, the lower the perceived costs of confronting and the higher threat 
                                                          
19 All four participants had been assigned to the friend condition. 
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to the image of the group of friends, the more normative confronting was perceived to be. 
There was no relationship between threat to the image of the Portuguese and the 
normativity of confrontation. 
 
Table 1. Correlation between the proposed mediators and the normativity of 
confrontation. 
 IT: Portuguese IT: Friends’ group Costs  
IT: Friends’ group .38**   
Costs .04 -.22  
Normativity -.03 .30** -.25* 
Note: IT = image threat; * = p < .05; ** = p < .01. 
 
In order to test for effects of the order in which the social approval and social 
disapproval instructions were presented, we regressed the normativity score on order 
(dummy-coded, first negative = 0, first positive = 1), relationship (dummy-coded, 
stranger = 0, friend = 1), and their interaction term. There were no main effect of order 
and no interaction effect of order with any of the other variables (all p > .365). Therefore, 
we collapsed across groups on this variable for the remaining analysis.  
Replicating Study 1 and Study 2, the normativity of confronting was predicted by 
the person expressing bias, B = .73, SE = .33, p = .030, η2p = .06. The normativity scores 
were larger when the person expressing bias was a friend (M = 4.26, SD = 1.12) than a 
stranger (M = 3.52, SD = 1.72), suggesting that it is more normative to confront a friend 
than a stranger. 
The relation between the person expressing bias and the proposed mediators was 
significant. Participants perceived more threat to the image of the of the friends’ group 
when the person expressing bias was a friend (M = 4.15, SD = .24) than a stranger (M = 
2.37, SD = .23), B = 1.78, SE = .33, p < .001, η2p = .27. Similarly, participants perceived 
more threat to the image of the Portuguese when the person expressing bias was a friend 
(M = 4.31, SD = .25) than a stranger (M = 3.54, SD = .24), B = .77, SE = .35, p = .029, 
η2p = .06. Finally, participants perceived less confrontation costs when the person 
expressing bias was a friend (M = 2.30, SD = .16) than a stranger (M = 3.74, SD = .16), B 
= -1.44, SE = .23, p < .001, η2p = .35.  
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As detailed in Figure 3, when the normativity score was regressed on relationship, 
costs, threat to the image of the Portuguese and threat to the image of the group of friends, 
only threat to the image of the group of friend was a significant mediator of the effect of 
the relationship between the person expressing bias and the potential confronter on the 
normativity of confrontation. The mediation effect of threat to the image of the group of 
friends was reliable with 5,000 bias corrected resamples bootstrapping procedures 
(indirect effect = .48, 95%CI = .07 to 1.15). Both the mediation effect of threat to the 
image of the Portuguese (indirect effect = .11, 95%CI = -.44 to .05) and of costs of 
confronting (indirect effect = .30, 95%CI = -.23 to .97) were not reliable. The overall 
model explained a significant amount of variance in the normativity of confrontation, 
adjusted R2 = .10, F(4, 73) = 3.07, p = .021. 
 
Figure 3. The effect of relationship with the person expressing bias on normativity of 
confronting bias is mediated by group image threat and the costs of confronting. 
 
Note: path values represent unstandardized regression coefficients. The value in the brackets 
represents the effect of the relationship with the person expressing bias prior to the inclusion of 
the hypothesized mediators. Solid lines represent significant paths *p < .050, **p <.010, ***p < 
.001. 
 
Discussion 
We hypothesized that the perceived threat to the image of highly-valued ingroup 
and the costs of confronting would mediate the relationship between the actor expressing 
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bias against an outgroup and the perceived normativity of confronting that actor. Our 
results partially supported our hypothesis.  
As predicted, we found that a friend who expressed bias threatened the image of the 
group of friends more than a stranger who expressed bias; and that the higher the threat 
to the image of that friends’ group, the more normative it was to confront. In other words, 
threat to the image of the friends’ group mediated the relationship between the person 
expressing bias and the normativity of confrontation. These results suggest that a threat 
to the image of a highly-valued group gives people social legitimacy to act against bias.  
The costs of confronting were not significant mediators of the influence of the 
relationship with the person expressing bias on the normativity of confronting bias. Even 
though the costs of confronting were perceived to be higher when the person expressing 
bias is a stranger (vs. a close person) and were negatively related to the normativity of 
confrontation, they did not significantly explain the relation between who the person 
expressing bias was and the normativity of confrontation. While previous research has 
shown that the costs of confronting influence observers’ evaluations of different responses 
to bias, they seem to be more important predictors of observers’ attitudes toward non-
confrontations of bias than observers’ attitudes toward confrontations of bias (Lavado et 
al., 2016). The current results give further support to those findings. 
We also did not find a significant relation between threat to the image of the 
Portuguese and the normativity of confronting bias. As suggested by previous research, 
threats to the image of less valued groups such as groups of people of the same nationality 
(Lickel et al., 2000) may be more commonly addressed by distancing the self from the 
group (Leach et al., 2007; Lickel, Schmader, Curtis, Scarnier, & Ames, 2005, 2005; Johns, 
Schmader, & Lickel, 2005) and avoidance of deviant ingroup members (Brambilla, et al, 
2013). Therefore, threat to the image of a less relevant group may be a weaker justification 
for confrontations of bias. 
Because in our scenarios both the friend and the stranger were described as 
Portuguese, we did not expect differences in the extent the two actors would threaten the 
image of the Portuguese. However, results showed that an expression of bias by a friend 
threatened more the image of the Portuguese than an expression of bias by a stranger. 
These results may be explained by the ingroup projection model effect, which suggest 
that when a superordinate category is made salient (in this case, the Portuguese), people 
tend to perceive their closer ingroup, as more prototypical of a superordinate category to 
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which both groups belong (Mummendey & Wenzel, 1999; Waldzus & Mummendey, 
2004). It is plausible to think that the more a group member is perceived to be a 
representative of a group, the more his/hers immoral behavior threatens the group image.  
 
General Discussion 
In Study 1 and Study 2, results suggested that although confrontation is generally 
perceived as prescriptively normative, people perceive a confrontation of a close person 
as more normative than a confrontation of a stranger. In Study 3 we replicated these 
results and addressed the mechanism underlying them, showing that confronting a close 
person is more normative because an expression of bias from a close person (a friend) 
threatens more the image of a highly-valued group (a friends’ group) than an expression 
of bias from a stranger. Threat to the image of a highly-valued group, in turn, predicted 
the extent witnesses’ confrontation of bias was perceived as a socially approved behavior, 
over and above other factors such as the costs of confronting and threat to the image of a 
less valued group. Threats to an ingroup have been shown to legitimize discrimination, 
by providing seemingly unprejudiced justifications to act on prejudiced attitudes (Pereira, 
Vala & Costa-Lopes, 2010; Pereira, et al., 2009). On the flip side of the coin, the current 
studies show that threats to the image of a highly-valued ingroup can also help people 
justify actions that are consistent with egalitarian norms. 
We also explored if the costs of confronting would mediate the effect of the 
relationship with the person expressing bias on the perceived normativity of confronting. 
However, the results did not support this hypothesis. Even though participants perceived 
more costs of confronting when the person expressing bias was a stranger (vs. a close 
person) and costs were positively correlated with the normativity of confrontation, the 
effect of costs was non-significant when threat to the image of a highly-valued group was 
included in the model. However, future research may productively investigate whether 
the costs of confronting are better predictors of the normativity of non-confrontational 
behaviors, in line with previous research (Lavado et al., 2016). The present studies 
contribute to the literature on the normativity of witnesses’ responses to bias, by showing 
that the relationship between the potential confronter and the person expressing bias 
matters for evaluations of the normativity of confrontational behaviors. Moreover, the 
finding that threat to the image of an ingroup constitutes an important legitimizing factors 
of the decision to confront also contributes to our understanding of people’s reactions to 
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being associated with prejudiced behaviors. Previous research has shown that people react 
strongly when they do not meet their non-prejudiced self-standards (Devine, Monteith, 
Zuwerink & Elliot, 1991; Monteith, 1993) and when they are accused of racism by others 
(Czopp, et al., 2006; Shelton, Richeson & Vorauer, 2006). To the extent that people 
include important others in the self (Aron, Aron, Tudor, Nelson, 1991) and derive part of 
their self-image from their group memberships (Tajfel & Turner, 1979), protecting the 
image of those groups (and especially of highly-valued groups) may be a powerful drive 
of the decision to confront bias. While witnessing a member of an important group may 
arise feelings of vicarious shame and guilt (Johns, et al., 2005; Lickel et al., 2005), 
confronting bias may be instrumental in repairing the image of the group and protecting 
people own image. Although the present research specifically focused on the normativity 
of confrontations of bias, future studies may productively investigate the influence of 
perceived image threat on witnesses’ actual decision to confront. 
Across the three studies, we relied on the self-presentation paradigm (Jellison & 
Green, 1981) to assess the normativity of confronting. While this paradigm efficiently 
measures the normativity of different behaviors (Gilibert & Cambon, 2003), it has some 
limitations. In the case of the present studies, it required participants to image a scenario. 
In the same way there is sometimes a mismatch between how people believe they would 
act and their behavior in the actual situation (Kawakami, Dunn, Karmali & Dovidio, 
2009; Woodzicka & LaFrance, 2001), there may also be differences between how people 
imagine others would judge their behavior when reading a scenario and when they are in 
the actual situation, a question future research might investigate.  
In the present paper, we did not investigate whether the degree a comment is 
perceived to be prejudiced influences the prescriptive normativity of confronting that 
comment. However, evidence suggest that the more offensiveness a biased comment is, 
the more positively a confrontation by a witness is evaluated (Dickter et al., 2012). Future 
research may investigate whether the relation between the person expressing bias and the 
normativity of confronting is moderated by the extent the comment is subtle or 
ambiguous. For instance, an ambiguous comment may be perceived as more intentional 
and less innocuous when it is made by a stranger than when it is made by a close person, 
increasing the normativity of confronting a stranger. In addition, confrontational 
behaviors may take several forms, including non-verbal behaviors (Shelton, et al., 2006; 
Swim & Hyers, 1999). Different confrontational behaviors may be more or less 
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prescriptively normative (Becker & Barreto, 2014; Dickter et al., 2012). Future research 
may productively investigate whether the normativity of different confrontational 
behaviors also depends on the relationship between the confronter and the agent 
expressing bias. 
 
Conclusion 
Confrontational behaviors by witnesses’ of bias are prescriptively normative, 
especially when the person expressing bias is someone close, rather than a stranger. A 
biased expression from a close person threatens the image of a highly-valued group more 
than a biased expression from a stranger, and the higher the threat to the image of a highly-
valued group, the more confronting bias is normative. Because prescriptive norms are 
fundamental guides of people’s actions toward their own and other groups, influencing 
behaviors independently from personal attitudes (e.g., Blanz, Mummendey, & Otten, 
1997; Franco & Maas, 1999; Gaertner & Insko, 2001; Paluck, 2009; Pereira, et al., 2009), 
it is important to study the norms regarding witnesses’ confrontation of bias, an 
interpersonal process that may fundamentally contribute to reduce prejudice. Perceptions 
of threat to the image of a highly-valued group may constitute an important justification 
for witnesses’ decision to confront, granting people social legitimacy to publicly 
challenge expressions of bias. 
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Overview of the findings 
Expressions of racism are still prevalent in societies that have egalitarian norms 
(e.g., Crandall et al., 2002; Dickter & Newton, 2013; Santos et al., 2005; Vala & Pereira, 
2012). Witnesses of those expressions of prejudice are faced with an important decision: 
to confront the person expressing prejudice, potentially incurring in interpersonal costs 
(Czopp et al., 2006; Ashburn-Nardo et al, 2014); or to not challenge the behavior, 
allowing unfair and prejudiced behaviors to persist. Only recently researchers have started 
to investigate factors that influence people’s responses to expressions of bias against 
members of groups to which the person does not belong (see Dickter, 2012; Dickter & 
Newton, 2013; Drury & Kaiser, 2014). This is surprising, as witnesses’ confrontations of 
prejudice are more effective in reducing prejudice, because they tend to elicit less 
backlash and to be more persuasive (Czopp & Monteith, 2003; Gulker et al., 2013; 
Rasinski & Czopp, 2010). Indeed, witnesses’ confrontations of bias may be a fundamental 
tool to reduce expressions of prejudice against immigrants and, more generally, against 
racialized groups. Considering that immigration issues are one of the challenges that 
Europe is currently facing, and will continue to face in the future, it is crucial to 
investigate strategies that help promoting a more inclusive and egalitarian society (for 
additional recommendations for promoting social cohesion and positive attitudes toward 
immigrants, at different geographic levels, see Fonseca & McGarrigle, 2012). 
In seven studies, organized into three empirical chapters, we examined the influence 
of factors related to the relationship between the person expressing racial bias and the 
witness of those expressions of bias in a) observers’ attitudes toward confrontation of 
bias; b) witnesses’ willingness to confront and c) social norms regarding witnesses’ 
confrontations of bias. We further showed that the influence of these social factors in 
attitudes toward confrontation and on confrontational behaviors is moderated by 
witnesses’ and observers’ egalitarian values and standards.   
The first empirical chapter (Chapter II) presented two studies that examined 
observers’ attitudes toward the behavior of a witness who, at the end of a job interview, 
confronts or does not confront a prejudiced remark made by his interviewer. We further 
manipulated whether the interviewer had low power over the witness (because the 
interview was for a job the witness did not want or need; low cost condition) or high 
power over the witness (because the interview was for a much-needed job; high cost 
condition). Results showed that participants generally evaluated a confrontational 
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behavior more positively than a non-confrontational behavior, replicating previous 
findings suggesting that witnesses’ who confront are more positively evaluated than 
witnesses who fail to confront blatantly prejudiced remarks (Dickter et al., 2012). 
Evaluations of confrontational behaviors were especially positive when the costs of 
confronting were low, that is, when the interviewer expressing prejudice had low power 
over the witness. When the costs of confronting were high, a confrontational behavior 
was only more positively evaluated than a non-confrontational behavior by people who 
strongly endorsed egalitarian values. People who were less committed to social justice 
principles did not evaluate a confrontational behavior as more positive than a non-
confrontational behavior. We suggested that in the high-cost condition, the 
appropriateness of responses to a prejudiced comment is more ambiguous, because there 
is a conflict between the cost to society for not intervening and the cost to an individual 
for confronting bias. In this ambiguous situation, individual differences in the 
endorsement of egalitarian values become especially important determinants of attitudes 
toward different responses to bias. Therefore, in Chapter II, we showed that the 
endorsement of egalitarian values moderate the extent the power asymmetry of the 
relation between the potential confronter and the person expressing bias influences 
observers’ attitudes toward responses to racial bias. Only individuals who strongly 
endorse egalitarian values and are, therefore, more committed to fight bias, believe it is 
more appropriate to confront even when the costs of doing so are high.  
Chapter III described two studies investigating whether witnesses’ actual responses 
to a biased remark revealed ingroup favoritism. More specifically, we hypothesized that 
witnesses would confront an ingroup member who expressed bias to a lesser degree than 
an outgroup member who expressed bias. The results supported this hypothesis and 
further showed that witnesses are less willing to confront an ingroup member than an 
outgroup member because they attribute less bias-related characteristics to an ingroup 
member than to an outgroup member who makes the same biased remark. However, only 
witnesses who were relatively less internally motivated to respond without prejudiced 
showed this type of ingroup favoritism. People who have internalized stronger egalitarian 
standards show more distress after witnessing another person expressing biased than 
people with weaker egalitarian standards (Schmader et al., 2012), in a way that likely 
transcends group membership. Accordingly, witnesses with stronger motivation to 
respond without prejudice perceived a biased comment as stemming from internal 
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dispositions of the person expressing bias as much when that person was an ingroup as 
an outgroup member.  
Finally, the results of the three studies presented in Chapter IV showed that 
witnesses’ confrontation of bias is generally a prescriptively normative behavior, that is, 
a behavior that is socially valued and approved. However, degree to which confronting is 
prescriptively normative depends on the relation between the person expressing bias and 
the potential confronter. Confronting was especially normative when the person 
expressing bias was someone close rather than a stranger. When a close person (i.e., a 
friend) expressed bias, it threatened the image of a highly-valued ingroup (i.e., the group 
of friends) more than when a stranger expressed bias. Threat to the image of a highly-
valued group, in turn, predicted the extent witnesses’ confrontation of bias is socially 
approved. Because egalitarian norms suggesting one should confront are often in conflict 
with social norms suggesting one should “mind their own business,” we argued that threat 
to the image of a highly-valued ingroup provides social legitimacy for witnesses to 
confront bias. 
The findings of Chapter III and Chapter IV may, at first glance, look contradictory. 
In Chapter III we showed that people tend to confront an ingroup member less than an 
outgroup member, but in Chapter IV we showed that it is more normative to confront 
someone close than a stranger. Several factors may account for these findings. We note 
that in the studies reported in Chapter III, both the ingroup and the outgroup member who 
expressed bias may be considered strangers: participants’ interaction with them before 
they expressed prejudice was minimal, and participants may not have reasonably 
expected to interact with them after the experiment was over. Indeed, strangers may often 
be considered ingroup members at a certain level of inclusiveness (for example, students 
attending the same university or with the same nationality). Likewise, even though it may 
be more normative to confront someone close than a stranger when that person is 
perceived to be biased, it is nonetheless possible that people in the actual situation would 
discount the behavior of a close person more, attributing biased-related characteristics 
less strongly to him or her (compared with a stranger). In other words, although it may be 
more normative to confront someone close when that person is perceived to be biased, 
people may still be less willing to attribute bias-related characteristics to a close person, 
requiring a more blatantly racist comment to trigger a strong confrontation. This 
 Witnesses’ confrontation of racial bias  
 
 
106 
 
possibility may help explain the low rates of confrontation of bias found in previous 
research (Dickter & Newton, 2013), and may be addressed by future research. 
While the results of Study 1 of Chapter II suggest that the costs of confronting 
(emerging from the power of the person expressing bias over the witness of the biased 
comment) predict observers’ evaluations of witnesses’ responses to expressions of bias, 
in Study 3 of Chapter IV the costs of confronting were not significant predictors of the 
normativity of confronting a close person (vs. a stranger), when threat to the image of a 
highly-valued ingroup was included in the model. However, we note that in Chapter II 
the costs of confronting increased the perceived appropriateness of not confronting bias, 
but did not significantly decrease the perceived appropriateness of a confrontational 
behavior. That is, the costs of confronting were a more significant predictor of observers’ 
attitudes toward non-confrontations of bias than of observers’ attitudes toward 
confrontations of bias. This finding may help explain why the costs of confronting were 
not significant predictors of the extent a confrontation of bias was perceived to be socially 
valued and approved, as the results of Study 3 of Chapter IV suggest. 
Confrontations of prejudice help reduce expressions of prejudice against immigrant 
groups. Public expressions of prejudice against immigrants perpetuate negative attitudes 
and feelings toward the group (Blanchard et al., 1991; 1994), which, in turn, increase 
majority-group members’ support of restrictive laws and policies regarding immigration 
(Lima-Nunes, Pereira & Correia, 2013; Pereira et al., 2010). Challenges to those public 
expressions may lead to more favorable attitudes toward immigrants (Rasinski & Czopp, 
2010), promoting a more welcoming and integrative society. This thesis, developed in the 
context of a PhD program in Migrations, aimed to contribute to our knowledge of 
confrontations of bias, by focusing in confrontations of expressions of prejudice directed 
to immigrants and also including expressions of prejudice against black people who may 
or may not have citizenship status. In Portugal, people often assume that anyone who 
lives here but is not White is “a foreigner”, regardless of the person’s place of origin or 
citizenship status (that is, there is a racialization process where group boundaries are 
defined by phenotypical characteristics; Cabecinhas, 2002). It is also likely that public 
expressions of prejudice would target people more due to their skin color than due to their 
citizenship status (see the report of the European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights, 
2009). In the US, the concept of race is ingrained in everyday practices and discourse 
(e.g., Dovidio & Gaertner, 2010; Essed, 1991). The citizenship status of the person 
 Witnesses’ confrontation of racial bias  
 
 
107 
 
targeted by prejudice may nuance the expressions of bias and the confrontational (or non-
confrontational) responses; however, it would not have been as productive to attempt to 
capture those nuances in this early phase of the research. 
In the present thesis, we aimed to investigate the social and individual factors that 
facilitate or hinder witnesses’ confrontations of bias. The results of our empirical studies 
converge to suggest that the relationship between the person expressing bias and the 
person witnessing that expression influence witnesses’ confrontation of bias at the 
attitudinal, behavioral and normative levels. However, majority-group witnesses’ and 
observers’ egalitarian values moderate the influence of those social factors. Non-targets 
of prejudice with strong egalitarian motivations are more supportive of witnesses’ 
confrontation of bias and are more willing to confront, regardless of who the person 
expressing bias is. 
 
Theoretical and practical contributions 
The majority of studies investigating confrontations of bias has focused on the 
responses of people who are either directly or indirectly (due to their group membership) 
targeted by the biased expression (e.g., Becker & Barreto, 2014; Dodd et al., 2001; Good 
et al., 2012; Swim & Hyers, 1999), with few studies directly investigating witnesses’ 
confrontations of biased remarks. However, the responsibility of showing dissatisfaction 
with public expressions of prejudice, promoting egalitarian norms should be shared by 
both targets and witnesses of those expressions. In the current thesis, we helped to fill that 
gap in the literature, investigating the joint effect of social and individual factors that 
influence witnesses’ responses to bias, and attitudes and prescriptive norms regarding 
those responses.  
The results obtained in the empirical studies that comprise the current thesis suggest 
that the relationship between the person expressing bias and the potential confronter is a 
fundamental factor in witnesses’ confrontation of bias. We showed that different facets 
of the relationship between the person expressing bias and the witness of that expression 
– namely, the power of the person expressing bias over the confronter, a shared group 
membership and the degree of proximity between the confronter and the person 
expressing bias – not only influences witnesses’ actual responses to bias, but also 
observers attitudes and social norms regarding those responses. While previous research 
had already showed that power and proximity are important factors in confrontations of 
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bias (Ashburn-Nardo et al., 2014; Ayres et al., 2009; Shelton & Stewart, 2004), we further 
showed that those factors influence, respectively, attitudes and norms regarding 
witnesses’ confrontation of bias. In addition, to our knowledge, no previous research had 
investigated the influence of a shared group membership with the person expressing bias 
on people’s willingness to confront. The group membership of the person expressing bias 
is a particularly important factor in witnesses’ confrontation of bias, considering that 
often20 both the person expressing bias and the witness of that prejudice remark are 
members of high-status groups (Dickter & Newton, 2013; Inman & Baron, 1996; Swim, 
Hyers, Cohen, & Ferguson, 2001).  
Practically, our finding that the attribution of biased-related characteristics to the 
person expressing bias predicts witnesses’ willingness to confront the biased remark (see 
Chapter III) corroborates the argument that, in order to increase witnesses’ confrontation 
of bias, it is important to encourage them to recognize prejudiced remarks (Drury & 
Kaiser, 2014). People who do not belong to the targeted group tend to acknowledge 
prejudice less than targets of that prejudice, especially if the expression of bias is subtle 
or ambiguous (Drury & Kaiser, 2004; Salvatore & Shelton, 2007). Previous research has 
already highlighted that promoting awareness of people’s own bias may be an important 
tool to reduce prejudice (Perry, Murphy & Dovidio, 2015); our results complement these 
findings by suggesting that being aware of other people’s bias may also be important to 
reduce expressions of prejudice. However, confrontations of bias may be especially 
effective if they, rather than generating high defensiveness on the part of the confronted 
person, promote reparation efforts (Mallet & Wagner, 2011). Therefore, it may be 
important not only to help people to recognize their own biases (Perry et al., 2015) but 
also to confront more constructively (see Crosby, 1993), perhaps aiming more to change 
prejudiced beliefs and less to accuse someone of being racially biased (which is highly 
threatening; Van Dijk, 1992; Winslow, 2004).  
In Chapter II and Chapter III of the current thesis, results showed that the extent 
people endorse or have internalized egalitarian values moderates the effects of social 
factors on observers’ attitudes toward responses to bias and witnesses’ actual responses 
to bias. Participants who strongly endorse universalism-concern (a value related to social 
                                                          
20 We of course acknowledge that the person making a prejudice remark may also belong to another low-
status group, or even to the group targeted by prejudice (e.g., women who stereotype other women as 
being less competent than men or who assume that a person in a high power position is male); and that 
the witness of the biased comment may also belong to a (non-targeted) low-status group. 
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justice and equality) supported a witness who confronts bias even when the costs of 
confronting were high; and participants who were strongly internally motivated to 
respond without prejudice confronted an ingroup member as much as an outgroup 
member. While previous research have investigated the role of attitudes toward the 
targeted group on confrontational behavior (Ashburn-Nardo et al., 2014; Dickter, 2012; 
Dickter & Newton, 2013), we are not aware of any research that directly investigated the 
role of egalitarian values confrontations of bias, even though values are conceptualized 
as being less situation-specific that attitudes (Schwartz, 1992) and, therefore likely 
comprise the specific attitudes studied in previous research.  
Besides demonstrating that people with stronger egalitarian values are more 
resilient to social factors that influence responses to bias and attitudes toward those 
responses, we also directly contributed to the literature on Schwartz's theory of basic 
human values (Schwartz, 1992; Schwartz et al., 2012) and on motivations to respond 
without prejudice (Plant & Devine, 1998; 2009). Schwartz et al (2012) have recently 
proposed a refined version of the theory of basic human values, in which they distinguish 
between three lower order universalism values: universalism-concern, universalism-
tolerance and universalism-nature. We further contribute for the validation of the theory 
by showing that only universalism-concern, and not universalism-tolerance or 
universalism-nature, predicts observers’ attitudes toward witnesses’ responses to bias (see 
Chapter II). Similarly, our results showing that internal motivation to respond without 
prejudice is predicts the attribution of bias-related characteristics to the person expressing 
bias and, consequently, to witnesses’ willingness to confront bias (see Chapter III) 
contribute to a recent line of research showing that people who are internally motivated 
to be egalitarian are, besides being more motivated to control their own prejudice (Devine 
et al., 2002; Plant & Devine, 2009), more responsive toward other people’s expressions 
of prejudice (Schmader et al., 2012). Practically, these results suggest that, in order to 
increase the prevalence of witnesses’ confrontations of bias, it is important to promote 
the endorsement and internalization of egalitarian beliefs and standards. 
Fear of negative backlash, from the confronted person but also from observers, may 
be one of the reasons why witnesses’ refrain from confronting. While this fear might be 
sometimes justified (Dodd et al., 2001; Swim & Hyers, 1999), our results suggest that the 
prescriptive norms and the attitudes toward witnesses’ confrontations of bias are 
generally positive (see Chapter II and Chapter IV of the current thesis; see also Dickter 
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et al., 2012). That is, confronting bias may be interpersonally less costly than it is 
anticipated (Swim & Hyers, 1999), at least to the extent observers are concerned (if not 
to the extent the confronted person is concerned; Mallet & Wagner, 2011). As mentioned 
previously, promoting a higher awareness of self-biases (Perry et al., 2015) might also 
reduce the extent the person expressing bias reacts negatively to being confronted about 
a specific remark, therefore reducing the perceived costs of confronting bias and, 
consequently, increasing confrontations of bias (Ashburn-Nardo et al., 2014; Good et al., 
2012; Shelton & Stewart, 2004).  
In societies where, even after decades of egalitarian norms, biases against people 
with different origins and ethnicities still persist, it is increasingly important that people 
not only internalize unprejudiced self-standards but also take an active role against 
prejudice, collectively or individually. Witnesses of bias can play a fundamental role in 
reducing biased expressions, by effectively challenging them. Indeed, open discussion 
and acknowledgement of bias might pave the way for the construction of a more 
egalitarian society (Monteith, 1993; Perry et al., 2015). Thus, our results inform theories 
and practices regarding witnesses’ confrontations of bias, a process that may 
fundamentally reduce expressions of prejudice against racialized groups such as 
immigrant people, promoting a more fair and inclusive society. 
However, we also wish to corroborate Drury and Kaiser’s (2014) recommendation 
that witnesses of bias should work against prejudice alongside with targets of bias, instead 
of on their behalf. While witnesses’ may be important allies in addressing expressions of 
prejudice, the kind of paternalistic helping that reduces targets’ ability to deal with the 
prejudiced remark in their own terms, no matter how well-intentioned, may do more harm 
than good. That is, witnesses’ of prejudice should use their voice aiming to reduce 
prejudice and supporting others who do so, without speaking over the voice of members 
of the target group.   
 
Limitations and future directions 
One of the novelties of the current thesis, the focus on witnesses’ responses to bias 
and on observers’ attitudes toward those responses, may be considered one of its 
limitations. We do not know if the variables we investigated would similarly influence 
the attitudes and behaviors of members of target groups. Minority-group members tend 
to be more responsive to expressions of bias than majority group members (Drury & 
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Kaiser, 2014; Inman & Baron, 1996) and people who belong to the target group tend to 
be more supportive of a fellow ingroup member who confronts than people who do not 
belong to the target group (Becker & Barreto, 2014; Dodd et al., 2001). These differences 
suggest that observers’ who belong to the target group might likewise be more supportive 
of witnesses’ confrontations of bias, being less influenced by contextual variables. 
However, future research is necessary to investigate whether this is the case. Similarly, 
future research may investigate whether members of the target group also display ingroup 
favoritism when a shared group membership with the person expressing bias is salient, or 
if, on the contrary, they tend to confront more an ingroup member than an outgroup 
member, perhaps because they anticipate less backlash.  
Other variables, such as ingroup identification, that have been shown to be 
associated with targets’ confrontation of bias may have a different influence on witnesses’ 
confrontation of bias. Targets of bias tend to confront more when they more strongly 
identify with the group (Ayres et al., 2009; Good et al., 2012), and targets more identified 
with the group also tend to evaluate an ingroup member who confronts more positively 
(Becker & Barreto, 2014; Kaiser et al, 2009). However, the effect of group identification 
for majority-group members who witness another majority-group member expressing 
bias may depend on the perceived severity of the biased comment. Johns et al (2005) 
showed that highly identified majority-group members (relatively to less identified 
majority-group members) responded more negatively to an ingroup member who acted 
biasedly only when the event was very negative. However, when the event was less 
negative, participants more identified with the group showed less negative reactions than 
participants less identified with the group (Johns et al., 2005; these results are also 
consistent with research on the subjective group dynamics theory and the black sheep 
effect, Branscombe, Wann, Noel, & Coleman, 1993; Marques & Paez, 1994; Pinto, 
Marques & Paez, 2015). For confrontations of bias, this may mean that more identified 
witnesses are less willing to confront an ingroup member who expresses more subtle or 
ambiguous bias, but are more willing to confront an ingroup member who expresses 
blatant bias.  
Relatedly, in the studies that comprise this thesis, we always either asked 
participants to imagine they had heard “a prejudice remark against immigrants” (Study 1 
of Chapter IV) or presented participants’ comments that were designed to be blatantly 
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prejudiced and stereotypical of ethnic minorities or immigrants21. Ambiguity of the biased 
comment has been shown to influence both attitudes toward responses to that comment 
(Dickter et al., 2012; Dodd et al., 2001) and actual confrontations of the biased remark 
(Dickter, 2012; Dickter & Newton, 2013; Lee et al., 2012). People might attribute bias-
related characteristics less strongly to a person who expresses ambiguous rather than 
blatant prejudice and, consequently, be less willing to confront him or her (see Chapter 
III; Lee et al., 2012). Accordingly, because individual differences are stronger 
determinants of behavior in more ambiguous situations (Mischel, 1973; Snyder & Ickes, 
1985) it is expectable that the endorsement and internalization of egalitarian values would 
be more relevant in witnesses’ confrontation of subtle biases. Future research may 
investigate whether the ambiguity of the biased remark moderates the effect of the 
individual and social factors that were the investigated in the current thesis. 
Across the studies presented in this thesis, we mainly focused on witnesses’ 
confrontations of bias against Black people. The choice of Blacks as the group targeted 
by prejudice has important theoretical and practical implications, considering that Black 
people are simultaneously one of the groups more protected by anti-discrimination laws 
and social norms (Crandall et al, 2002; Vala & Pereira, 2012) and one of the main targets 
of prejudice both in Portugal and in the US (Santos et al., 2005; Dickter & Newton, 2013). 
Even though we would expect our findings to generalize to other low-status groups who 
are equally protected by social norms, different variables and processes may account for 
attitudes, norms and behaviors in responses to expressions of prejudice targeting groups 
against which is more socially accepted to discriminate (see Crandall et al., 2002).  
In the studies presented in Chapter II and Chapter IV we relied in scenarios to 
investigate individual attitudes and social norms regarding witnesses’ confrontations of 
prejudice. This methodology has been used in several studies examining attitudes toward 
people who confront (or not confront) bias (Ashburn-Nardo et al., 2014; Becker & 
Barreto, 2014; Kahn, Barreto, Kaiser & Rego, 2015), because it provides experimental 
                                                          
21 In Study 1 and Study 2 of Chapter II the biased remark was “I really liked you and I think you and the 
company would be a good fit. We had a lot of Black applicants, so it’s good to have someone White for a 
change. I’ll contact you when we have a decision.” In study 1 and Study 2 of Chapter III, it was “I was 
raised in a neighborhood with lots of Blacks [or for Black participants, Hispanics], so I was always 
scared. I wish I had been raised in a friendlier neighborhood with people who were more like me. Even 
today I don't like being around Blacks [Hispanics], they are so aggressive all the time;” and finally, in 
Study 2 and Study 3 of Chapter IV, it was “I don’t understand how they keep letting immigrants to come 
and just ruin what is ours.”  
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control to manipulate the specific aspects of the situation that are the main focus of the 
study. However, how people imagine they would behave in a situation described in a 
scenario often differs from their reaction in the actual situation, particularly in the context 
of responses to bias (Kawakami et al., 2009; Shelton & Stewart, 2004; Woodzicka & 
LaFrance, 2001). Similarly, the extent to which people imagine they would be have 
favorable attitudes toward another person’s response to bias may be different from their 
attitudes in a more compelling situation. The weight given to factors such as the power 
of the person expressing bias or the degree of proximity between the person expressing 
bias and the confronter may be different for people more detached from the situation, 
compared with observers in the more immediate situation. In addition, majority-group 
members report that they will be more emotionally upset by witnessing an act of bias than 
they experience in the actual situation (Kawakami et al., 2009). If people closer to the 
immediate situation experience less upset in response to a racially biased comment, they 
would also likely evaluate a confrontation by a witness less positively. Thus, future 
research on how people judge the appropriateness of witnesses’ decision to confront or 
not confront bias might consider how the proximity to the actual incident and the 
associated salience of different factors may moderate attitudes and norms regarding 
witnesses’ responses to bias. 
We likewise note a methodologic limitation of Study 1 of Chapter III, in which we 
investigated witnesses’ actual responses to prejudice using a chat-room paradigm. 
Interactions in chat-rooms such as the one used in that study have important 
characteristics that distinguish them from face-to-face interactions. First, in our study, the 
interaction was anonymous; participants were not ask to convey any information about 
themselves other than basic demographic information. Second, participants could not 
reasonably expect to interact with the (fictitious) person expressing bias after the 
experiment was over. Third, the asynchronous nature of the interaction in such computer-
mediated settings allowed participants to take time to reflect and prepare their answers to 
the biased comment. Lastly, participants’ were directly invited to respond to the other 
person after he or she expressed bias. These characteristics are rarely (if ever) present in 
face-to-face interactions. Studying responses to bias in computer mediated settings is 
important – increasingly large number of people use social networks such as Facebook 
or Twitter (Pew Research Center, 2015) and it is likely than people often face the decision 
to confront or not confront a biased comment in such settings. However, the processes 
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involved in responses to bias are likely moderated by contextual variables. While we 
would hypothesize that witnesses’ willingness to confront in a face-to-face interaction is 
also influenced by a shared group membership with the person expressing bias (as we 
showed in Chapter III), especially when that membership is highly salient, future research 
should test this assumption.  
There are reasons to believe that prescriptive norms regarding witnesses’ responses 
to prejudice influence witnesses’ willingness to confront when faced with expressions of 
bias. Prescriptive norms have been shown to influence a variety of behaviors, such as 
environmental behaviors (Cialdini, et al., 1990; Kallgren, Reno & Cialdini, 2000), 
prosocial behaviors (e.g., Gruder, Romer & Korth, 1978; Rutkowski, Gruder & Romer, 
1983) and, importantly, intergroup behaviors (e.g., Blanz, et al, 1997; Franco & Maass, 
1999; Gaertner & Insko, 2001; Paluck, 2009; Pereira, et al., 2009). However, we did not 
directly investigate the relation between prescriptive norms regarding confrontation of 
bias and actual responses to bias. Indeed, there is an apparent gap between how positively 
witnesses’ confrontation of bias are evaluated (see Chapter IV; see also Dickter et al., 
2012) and the frequency to which witnesses’ report confronting bias (Dickter, 2012; 
Dickter & Newton, 2013). Even though confrontations of biased expressions are socially 
valued and approved, in Dickter (2012) and Dickter and Newton (2013) studies only 
about one third of respondents reported confronting those expressions. This discrepancy 
between prescriptive norms and witnesses’ actual responses to bias may be due to several 
factors. As suggested in Chapter IV, the extent to which confrontations of bias are 
normative may depend on contextual factors, such as the relationship of the confronter 
with the person expressing bias – that is, confronting may not always be normative. 
Accordingly, it is important to consider how other social factors may influence the 
normativity of confrontation (even though one should bear in mind that norms may only 
be useful in predicting behavior if they are relatively consistent across social situations). 
In addition, norms influence behavioral intentions more directly than they influence 
behaviors (Ajzen, 1987; 1991). Factors that interfere with the translation of intentions to 
behaviors may also weaken the relationship between prescriptive norms and 
confrontations of bias. Future research may not only directly investigate  the relation of 
norms and behavior and behavioral intentions in witnesses’ confrontation of bias, but also 
strategies that may facilitate the transition from intentions to confront to actual 
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confrontations of bias (such as, for example, implementations of intentions; Gollwitzer, 
1993; 1999). 
In Chapter IV, we showed that threat to the image of a highly-relevant group 
predicted the prescriptive normativity of witnesses’ confrontation of bias. We argued this 
effect happened because threats to the image of a highly-valued ingroup grants social 
legitimacy for witnesses to confront bias. However, we did not directly test this 
hypothesis, a possible future direction for this line of research. In addition, future research 
may investigate whether threat to the image of a highly-valued ingroup directly predicts 
witnesses’ confrontations of bias. Previous research has shown that a common strategy 
to deal with threats to the image of the ingroup is to distance oneself from the deviant 
ingroup member (Brambilla et al., 2013). However, we expect people to be less willing 
to distance themselves from members of highly-valued ingroups. Alternatively, they may 
attempt to deal with such image threats by pressuring the deviant ingroup members to 
conform to the group norms (Marques & Paez, 1994; Sampson & Brandon, 1964). 
Assuming that the group has egalitarian norms, one way to pressure an ingroup member 
who express bias to conform to the ingroup norms may be to confront that ingroup 
member. Future research may test this possibility. 
 
Conclusion 
Several factors may influence the extent confrontations of bias are enacted by 
witnesses, supported by observers and valued by societies. In the current thesis, we 
showed that who the person expressing bias is in relation to the witness of bias matter for 
each of these dimensions of witnesses’ confrontation of prejudice. Observers have more 
favorable attitudes when a witness confronts a person who has low power over him or 
her; witnesses confront an ingroup member less than an outgroup member; and 
confronting a close person is more normative than confronting a stranger.  
Still, the impact of these social factors is not the same for all people. The 
endorsement and internalization of egalitarian values buffers witnesses against the 
influence of a shared membership with the person expressing bias; and observers’ against 
the influence of the power asymmetry in the relationship between the person expressing 
bias and the confronter. That is, people who have strong egalitarian beliefs and standards 
support and confront even in more unfavorable social conditions, probably because they 
are strongly motivated to fight for equality and social justice.  
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Despite considerable progresses in the last decades, we still have a long way to go 
before we can consider even societies with strong egalitarian norms free of biases. With 
the current work, we have contributed to the current understanding of factors that may 
encourage or prevent witnesses’ confrontation of bias, a process that may fundamentally 
challenge public expressions of prejudice.  
 
 
 
“A man dies when he refuses to stand up for that which is right. A man dies when he 
refuses to stand up for justice.” 
Dr. Martin Luther King Jr., 1965 
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Appendix A 
Materials used in Study 1 and Study 2 of Chapter II 
 
1. Scenario used in Study 1 and Study 2. The low cost/low power condition is in 
brackets. 
 
Vamos pedir-lhe que leia uma situação que ocorreu recentemente numa entrevista de 
emprego em Portugal. Por favor, tente imaginar esta situação o mais realisticamente que 
conseguir. 
Leia por favor a descrição da situação com atenção, uma vez que as perguntas que lhe 
vamos fazer se referem aos eventos e personagem da história. 
 
O Paulo está numa sala à espera de ser chamado para uma entrevista de emprego. Esta 
entrevista [não] é muito importante para o Paulo, uma vez que esta é a sua terceira 
entrevista de emprego deste mês e [ainda não teve nenhuma oferta de trabalho] já recebeu 
algumas ofertas de trabalho interessantes. O Paulo [não] tem de dar o seu melhor nesta 
entrevista, porque [não] precisa mesmo deste emprego. Além disso, o cargo [não] parece 
muito interessante e ele [não quer assim tanto] quer mesmo a oportunidade de trabalhar 
nesta empresa.  
O Paulo é chamado para a entrevista. É cumprimentado pelo entrevistador, um homem 
alto e loiro que usa fato. Ambos se sentam e o entrevistador começa a fazer perguntas ao 
Paulo. O Paulo tem a impressão que a entrevista está a correr bem. No final, o 
entrevistador dá um aperto de mão ao Paulo e diz “Gostei muito de si e acho que o seu 
perfil se adequa à nossa empresa. Tivemos bastantes candidatos negros, por isso é bom 
ter alguém branco, para variar. Entrarei em contacto consigo quando tivermos uma 
decisão.”  
Confrontation condition: O Paulo decide responder ao entrevistador. Ele diz “Acho que 
a cor da pele não devia ter nada a ver com isto.” 
Non-confrontation condition: O Paulo decide responder ao entrevistador. Ele diz 
“Fico então a aguardar o seu contacto”. 
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2. Attitudes toward Paulo’s behavior (Study 1 and Study 2) 
Em que medida acha que a reação do Paulo foi… 
 
Nada   
Um 
pouco 
  Muito 
 Apropriada 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 Irracional 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 Sensata 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 Despropositada 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
3. Manipulation checks (Study 2) 
Quão importante era para o Paulo conseguir o emprego? 
 
Nada  
  
Um pouco 
  
Muito 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
 
Qual a probabilidade de o Paulo conseguir o emprego? 
Muito 
improvável 
  Nem 
improvável 
nem provável 
  
Muito 
provável 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
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4. PVQ-5X (Schwartz et al., 2012) – Female version (Study 2) 
Vamos apresentar-lhe descrições breves de algumas pessoas. Por favor leia cada uma das 
descrições e pense em que medida cada uma dessas pessoas é ou não parecida consigo. Assinale 
com um círculo o número que melhor indicar em que medida a pessoa descrita é parecida 
consigo. Tente, por favor, responder a todas as questões. 
 … Quão parecida consigo é esta pessoa? 
 
Exacta-
mente 
como eu 
Muito 
parecido 
comigo 
Parecido 
comigo 
Um 
bocadinho 
parecido 
comigo 
Nada 
parecido 
comigo 
Não tem 
nada a ver 
comigo 
Uma mulher para quem é importante proteger os 
elementos mais frágeis e vulneráveis da sociedade. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
Uma mulher que quer que as pessoas façam o que ela diz. 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Uma mulher que acredita seriamente que deve cuidar da 
natureza. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
Uma mulher para quem é importante ser leal para com as 
pessoas que lhe são próximas. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
Uma mulher para quem é importante a sensação de poder 
que o dinheiro pode dar. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
Uma mulher que pensa que é importante ser ambiciosa. 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Uma mulher para quem é importante agir contra as 
ameaças ao mundo natural. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
Uma mulher para quem é importante ser rica. 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Uma mulher para quem é muito importante ajudar as 
pessoas que lhe são queridas. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
Uma mulher que acha que todas as pessoas no mundo 
devem ter as mesmas oportunidades na vida. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
Uma mulher para quem é importante cuidar do bem-estar 
das pessoas que lhe são próximas. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
Uma mulher para quem é importante ser ela a dizer aos 
outros o que devem fazer. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
Uma mulher para quem é importante ouvir pessoas 
diferentes de si. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
Uma mulher para quem é importante ter muito sucesso. 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Uma mulher que se esforça por ser uma amiga de 
confiança e com quem se pode contar sempre. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
Uma mulher para quem é importante proteger o ambiente 
da destruição ou poluição. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
Uma mulher que quer que todas as pessoas sejam tratadas 
de forma justa, mesmo aquelas que ela não conhece. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
Uma mulher que quer ser admirada pelo que consegue 
realizar. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
Uma mulher que quer que as pessoas com quem costuma 
estar possam contar com ela plenamente. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
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Uma mulher para quem é importante compreender as 
outras pessoas, mesmo quando não concorda com elas. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
 
5. PVQ-5X (Schwartz et al., 2012) – Male version (Study 2) 
Vamos apresentar-lhe descrições breves de algumas pessoas. Por favor leia cada uma das 
descrições e pense em que medida cada uma dessas pessoas é ou não parecida consigo. Assinale 
com um círculo o número que melhor indicar em que medida a pessoa descrita é parecida 
consigo. Tente, por favor, responder a todas as questões. 
 … Quão parecida consigo é esta pessoa? 
 
Exacta-
mente 
como eu 
Muito 
parecido 
comigo 
Parecido 
comigo 
Um 
bocadinho 
parecido 
comigo 
Nada 
parecido 
comigo 
Não tem 
nada a ver 
comigo 
Um homem para quem é importante proteger os 
elementos mais frágeis e vulneráveis da sociedade. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
Um homem que quer que as pessoas façam o que ele diz. 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Um homem que acredita seriamente que deve cuidar da 
natureza. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
Um homem para quem é importante ser leal para com as 
pessoas que lhe são próximas. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
Um homem para quem é importante a sensação de poder 
que o dinheiro pode dar. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
Um homem que pensa que é importante ser ambicioso. 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Um homem para quem é importante agir contra as 
ameaças ao mundo natural. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
Um homem para quem é importante ser rico. 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Um homem para quem é muito importante ajudar as 
pessoas que lhe são queridas. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
Um homem que acha que todas as pessoas no mundo 
devem ter as mesmas oportunidades na vida. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
Um homem para quem é importante cuidar do bem-estar 
das pessoas que lhe são próximas. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
Um homem para quem é importante ser ele a dizer aos 
outros o que devem fazer. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
Um homem para quem é importante ouvir pessoas 
diferentes de si. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
Um homem para quem é importante ter muito sucesso. 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Um homem que se esforça por ser um amigo de 
confiança e com quem se pode contar sempre. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
Um homem para quem é importante proteger o ambiente 
da destruição ou poluição. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
Um homem que quer que todas as pessoas sejam tratadas 
de forma justa, mesmo aquelas que ele não conhece. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
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Um homem que quer ser admirado pelo que consegue 
realizar. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
Um homem que quer que as pessoas com quem costuma 
estar possam contar com ele plenamente. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
Um homem para quem é importante compreender as 
outras pessoas, mesmo quando não concorda com elas. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
 
 
6. Manipulation check (Study 2) 
Qual foi a reação do Paulo ao comentário do entrevistador? 
a) Não disse nada. 
b) Disse “Acho que a cor da pele não devia ter nada a ver com isto.” 
c) Concordou com o comentário do entrevistador. 
d) Disse “Fico então a aguardar o seu contacto”.  
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Appendix B 
Materials used in Study 1 and Study 2 of Chapter III 
 
1. Minimal group paradigm (Study 1 and Study 2) 
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2. Minimal group paradigm: Results (Klee22) (Study 1 and Study 2)
 
 
 
3. Pairing instructions (Klee) (Study 1) 
 
                                                          
22 For convenience, we will present only the materials for the Klee condition. For the Kandinsky 
condition, all materials were the same, with the exception that the word “Klee” was replaced by the word 
“Kandinsky”. 
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4. Other (fictitious) person’s profile23 (Study 1) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
23 For convenience, we will present only the materials of the condition where a participant in the Klee 
condition interacted with a fictitious partner who was also a Klee. When the participant was in the Klee 
condition interacting with a (fictitious) Kandinsky partner, we replaced the expressions “the other Klee” 
for “the Kandinsky.” When the participant was in the Kandinsky condition interacting with a Kandinsky 
partner, we used the expression “the other Kandinsky.” When the participant was in the Kandinsky 
condition interacting with a Klee, we used the expression “the other Klee.” All the remaining wording 
was the same. 
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5. Instructions (Study 1) 
 
 
6. Biased answer and participant’s feedback (Study 1) 
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7. Ratings of participants’ own feedback (Study 1) 
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8. Attribution of positive, negative, and bias-related characteristics to the other 
(fictitious) person (Study 1) 
 
 
9. Internal and External motivation to respond without prejudice (Plant & Devine, 
1998) (Study 1 and Study 2) 
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10. Instructions (Study 2) 
 
 
11. Other (fictitious) person’s profile, including the biased answer (Study 2) 
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12. Attribution of positive, negative, and bias-related characteristics to the other 
(fictitious) person (Study 2) 
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Appendix C 
Materials used in Study 1, Study 2 and Study 3 of Chapter IV 
 
1. Instructions of the self-presentation paradigm (Study 1, Study 2 and Study 3). 
Social approval condition: 
Vamos apresentar-lhe algumas situações sociais. A sua tarefa é responder a cada situação de 
modo a dar uma imagem POSITIVA de si, isto é, de forma a que quem ler as suas respostas 
as aprove e fique a gostar de si. 
 
Social disapproval condition: 
Vamos apresentar-lhe algumas situações sociais. A sua tarefa é responder a cada situação de 
modo a dar uma imagem NEGATIVA de si, isto é, de forma a que quem ler as suas respostas 
as desaprove e fique a não gostar de si. 
 
Standard condition: 
Vamos apresentar-lhe algumas situações sociais. A sua tarefa é responder a cada situação de 
acordo com A SUA OPINIÃO. Não existem respostas certas nem erradas pois todas 
representam a sua opinião honesta sobre cada uma das situações.  
 
2. Scenarios used in the self-presentation paradigm (Study 1) 
 
Está no metro e ouve um português fazer um comentário preconceituoso contra imigrantes.  
 
Ignorava o comentário ou dizia à pessoa portuguesa que o comentário foi preconceituoso?  
 
Ignorava o 
comentário 
     
Dizia que foi 
preconceituoso 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
 
 
Está num jardim público e ouve um português a fazer um comentário preconceituoso contra 
imigrantes.  
 
Ignorava o comentário ou dizia à pessoa portuguesa que o comentário foi preconceituoso?  
 
Ignorava o 
comentário 
     
Dizia que foi 
preconceituoso 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
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Está numa fila de supermercado e ouve um português fazer um comentário preconceituoso 
contra imigrantes.  
 
Ignorava o comentário ou dizia à pessoa portuguesa que o comentário foi preconceituoso?  
 
Ignorava o 
comentário 
     
Dizia que foi 
preconceituoso 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
 
 
Está num café com amigos e um deles, que é português, faz um comentário preconceituoso 
contra imigrantes.  
 
Ignorava o comentário ou dizia ao seu amigo que o comentário foi preconceituoso?  
 
Ignorava o 
comentário 
     
Dizia que foi 
preconceituoso 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
 
 
Está num almoço de família e um dos seus familiares faz um comentário preconceituoso.  
 
Ignorava o comentário ou dizia ao seu familiar que o comentário foi preconceituoso?  
 
Ignorava o 
comentário 
     
Dizia que foi 
preconceituoso 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
 
 
Está a fazer um trabalho de grupo e um dos seus colegas, que é português, faz um        
comentário preconceituoso contra imigrantes. 
 
Ignorava o comentário ou dizia ao seu colega que o comentário foi preconceituoso?  
 
Ignorava o 
comentário 
     
Dizia que foi 
preconceituoso 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
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3. Attention check (Study 1 and Study 2) 
Queremos saber se se lembra das instruções que lhe demos na primeira parte deste questionário. 
Por favor responda à questão seguinte sem voltar a ver as páginas anteriores, mesmo que não se 
lembre exatamente das instruções.  
Na primeira parte do questionário, pedimos-lhe que: 
a) Respondesse de acordo com a sua opinião. 
b) Respondesse de forma a dar uma imagem positiva de si. 
c) Respondesse de forma a dar uma imagem negativa de si. 
 
4. Scenarios used in the self-presentation paradigm (Study 2 and Study 3). 
Stranger condition is in brackets.  
Está numa esplanada de um café com os seus amigos. Estão todos a conversar quando passa um 
imigrante negro na rua. Um dos seus amigos [Um desconhecido na mesa do lado], que é 
português, diz: “Não percebo como é que continuam a deixar vir para cá imigrantes que só vêm 
estragar o que é nosso.”  
Quão provável seria que fizesse cada uma das seguintes ações … 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Nada 
provável 
    
Muito 
provável 
Dizer ao seu amigo [ao desconhecido] 
que o comentário foi preconceituoso. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
Ignorar o comentário do seu amigo 
[do desconhecido]. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
Mostrar ao seu amigo [ao 
desconhecido] que o comentário foi 
incorreto. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
Mudar de assunto. 1 2 3 4 5 6 
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5. Threat to the image of a the friends’ group and threat to the image of the 
Portuguese (Study 3) 
Nesta situação, em que medida acha que o seu amigo [o desconhecido]… 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
6. Costs of confronting (Study 3) 
Acha que seria fácil ou difícil dizer ao seu amigo [ao desconhecido] que o comentário foi 
preconceituoso? 
 
Muito 
fácil 
    
Muito 
difícil 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
 
 
 
Acha que seria seguro ou arriscado dizer ao seu amigo [ao desconhecido] que o comentário foi 
preconceituoso? 
 
Muito 
seguro 
    
Muito 
arriscado 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
 
 
Acha que teria consequências positivas ou negativas dizer ao seu amigo [ao desconhecido] que 
o comentário foi preconceituoso? 
 
Muitas 
consequências 
positivas 
    
Muitas 
consequências 
negativas 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Discorda 
muito 
    
Concorda 
muito 
Ameaçou a imagem do seu 
grupo de amigos. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
Ameaçou a reputação do seu 
grupo de amigos. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
Ameaçou a reputação dos 
portugueses. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
Ameaçou a imagem dos 
portugueses. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
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